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ABSTRACT
CONSERVING THE URBAN HOUSING STOCK
A Set of Case Studies on the Impact of Government Policy
Rolf Goetze
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
In spite of a general increase in housing welfare in the United States and
substantial autonomous upgrading of the existing substandard stock during the
1950's, many low income families still have inadequate housing services or pay
an undue proportion of income on housing. Direct federal subsidy assistance in
market production began to deliver housing in the early 19 60's, but has remained
a slow, arduous or costly process.
This study attempts to explore the impact of specific federal subsidies to
rehabilitation sponsors on the general flow of low income housing services. It
focusses on a set of interrelated issues raised by their mode of application: their
efficiency in producing more low income housing, their interactions with previous
factors governing the delivery of housing services, and their drawbacks. The actual
federal tools are remarkably recent, small scale, and slow in implementation;
decades will elapse before their full effects become manifest. This thesis uses case
studies to get an advance reading of the possible range of their impact.
Deducing the incentives and constraints confronting the various actors with
roles in the process serves to generate insights throughout the study. This analytical
approach is first applied to the general housing system to develop a functional
analysis of the causal factors affecting the flow of housing services, and then
applied to each case.
The Boston cases reveal that even in the absence of subsidies, arbitrary
and ill-defined regulation of upgrading efforts has come to constrain and raise costs
of rehabilitation. These rehabilitation subsidies backed by limited appropriations
1) mask the excessive regulation, 2) legitimize adherence to obsolete codes,
practices, and land uses, 3) impose additional regulation upon their recipients,
4) discourage evolution of alternatives for comparison, 5) foster grantsmanship and
rivalry instead of joint action towards improved housing services, and 6) fail to
provide for subsequent maintenance of the upgraded units. The normal entrepreneurial
role in allocating resources towards housing services is shifted to the subsidizers,
creating an ongoing dependency for more assistance. A special large scale attempt
under exceptioal regulations produced more rehabilitated dwellings, but it added
relocation hardships without achieving economies of scale in production.
In Rochester, New York, a smaller city with fewer bureaucratic
constraints, the same subsidy system manifests analogous drawbacks. An
unusual case has evolved in Rochester which suggests that a more productive
alternative application of housing subsidies lies in assisting low income families
directly and more broadly. The dweller's role in allocating his housing
resources among choices has important spillover effects: 1) it induces him to
play a more positive role in subsequent maintenance, 2) it disciplines behavior
on his part, 3) it identifies shunned areas and obsolete units in the existing stock,
and 4) it encourages evolution of alternative market responses. These effects
jointly simplify many aspects of the "low-income housing problem."
The analysis by incentives and constraints reveals the special nature of
resident ownership and the non-profit sponsor. Resident ownership focusses
incentives and rationalizes expenditure of resources through self-interest, and
thereby aids in conserving marginal portions of the existing stock. Non-profit
sponsors, on the other hand, are likely to be inefficient. When the profit
incentive is removed., their entrepreneurial initiative is weakened and they
become particularly susceptible to the distorting impact of the federal subsidies..
In summary this study furnishes arguments supporting a system of general
housing allowances, coupled with regulation by a separate agency, in place of
the present system of narrower multiple subsidies and compound regulation of
housing producers. It outlines such a housing allowance system. In addition
this study suggests that resident ownership merits special support. It offers a
modification of the present system of homeownership subsidies to reach the low-
income sector. Finally it stresses the need for more responsive dweller education,
and outlines how this need might be met.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning
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PART ONE- CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
Public 'policy has shown several decades of concern about the production
of adequate and decent housing to meet low income needs.. Maintaining and
managing existing housing-in the low income market is rapidly emerging as a
separate critical problem scarcely recognized in public policy today. The inter-
relationship between production and maintenance must be analyzed because they
reinforce each other. Certain modes of production discourage maintenance;
maintenance deferred hastens decline of the existing stock, in turn exerting
additional pressure on production. Our purpose is to begin to explore the
interrelationship between producing housing and conserving it, to maximize net
benefits to the low income sector.
This study assumes that housing services in the general-housing system are
delivered in response to housing demand initiated by the dwellers. In addition to
the provision of adequate space and shelter, housing services are presumed to
include heat, light, sanitation, hot water, and a range of other services. Where
incentives are inadequate or constraints too great, housing servi ces become
qualitatively restricted. This study further assumes that the low income sector
has insufficient resources to cover the cost of adequate housing services. Under
rental tenure this situation is compounded by distrust between tenant and landlord,
between one landlord and another, leading to underinvestment on the part of each and
sometimes to the premature destruction of basically sound housing. 1
Limited federal subsidies have been made available to counter this
resource deficiency. This study focusses on a set of issues connected with the
mode of application of specific federal subsidies to produce standard housing
through rehabilitation.
1. Are these subsidies efficientin producing more standard
housing? In other words, are they producing more housing
per dollar than conceivable alternatives?
II. How do the subsidies interact with the forces that governed
the delivery of housing services in their absence? Do the
subsidies complement pre-existing incentives or reduce
pre-existing constraints to stimulate an increased flow of
housing services?
Ill. Subsidies are generally used to distort market operations
towards desired ends. Do these subsidies have drawbacks that
have been overlooked, and if so, how might they be overcome?
Direct evidence on the pre-existing incentives and constraints affecting
general maintenance is hard to obtain. It involves a multiplicity of operations,
each engaging many actors. Each actor, in turn, leaves only a fragmentary record
of his transactions. Outsiders can only assume that housing decline is evidence of
insufficient incentives, and further, that reclaiming marginal areas would be
easier than more severely blighted areas. 1-2
9A number of sponsored rehabilitation efforts, however, are opcn to
pub!ic view. Four are presented here for examination in detail. These efforts,
conducted in declining areas 'here net incentives spurring delivery of housing
services are deficient in varying degrees, afford some insights into the underlying
reasons why these were not maintained. These insights in turn suggest remedial
measures to halt decline in marginal areas presently threatened. This is related
to the efficiency of subsidies in producing standard housing.
These rehabilitation cases also enable evaluation of how various federal
programs and subsidies integrate with the pre-existing incentives and constraints
yielding evidence on interactions. These subsidies are assumed to be pump-
priming in nature, to restore the flow of housing services. In the examination of
these rehabilitation attempts, the effects of the production subsidies upon the
behavior of suppliers and others are stressed to gain a preliminary assessment of
the subsequent outlook for conserving the resulting dwellings. In other words,
we are interested in the multiplier effects and the spillover effects of the subsidies
upon other developers, sponsors, owners, and tenants. Absence of multiplier
effects or negative spillovers are considered drawbacks.
The four cases are serially examined in light of the questions raised above.
In each, the analytical method consists of interpreting the perceived incentives
and constraints upon the actors engaged and affected by the process.
In conclusion, this study outlines three policy recommendations for federal
incentives which would significantly improve the efficient delivery of housing
servi.ces in the long run. We assume, and encounter supporting evidence in the 1-3
study, that presently marginal areas are more appropriate for this than the more
severely blighted context in which some of the cases are found.
*Chapter 11 presents the necessary background information, identifies
assumptions, and develops the conceptual framework for interpreting the cases.
Incentives-constraints is the analytical fool used to generate insights. Applying
'it to the general housing system serves to develop a functional analysis of the
housing process. In subsequent chapters these assumptions about the process in
the sound stock are applied to the cases in declining areas to draw inferences
about the impact of the government programs under examination.
Part Two focusses on the development of the rehabilitation process in
Bos ton.
Chapter.Ill. The case of King-Bison presents evidence of recent
difficulties encountered by small scale entrepreneurs in rehabilitating dwellings
in declining areas without subsidies. It serves to construct a "before" picture and
suggests market interventions required of public policy torestore the upgrading
process. The incentives are limited and the constraints overwhelming. Excessive
regulation emerges as a significant factor more discouraging to the unwary than
on-site reconstruction costs.
Chapter IV focusses on the impact of federal subsidies to redevelopers.
The case of South End Community Development, Inc. (SECD) is selected to
represent the ncn-profit housing sponsors in Boston who are attempting rehabilitation I-4
with various subsidies. SECD illustrates.' carefully reasoned effort, utilizing.
all available subsidies. This sophisticated venture reveals the extent of the
"web of constraints" upon rehab, and that the time and effort costs of gaining
the subsidies just about offset their value.
The Boston Rehabilitation Program (BURP) was designed by policy-
makers to overcome some of the drawbacks of small scale rehabilitation.
Redevelopers were carefully selected for competence. The case seives to
demonstrate the impact of much larger scale intervention in the production process
through specially granted incentives and waiver of normal processing constraints.
The incentives exceeded constraints for the selected redevelopers, producing a
burst of rehabilitation but no real cost breakthrough. The disincentives upon
others than the selected redevelopers and failure to consider subsequent maintenance
problems discourages a local repetition of the BURP approach without major
modi fi cations.
Chapter V serves to summarize the trends brought to light in the examination
of the Boston rehab cases. In parts of the general housing market, the incentives to
maintain and upgrade are lacking or too diffuse and insufficient to produce private
rehabilitation on a chain reaction basis. Too many constraints already discourage
upgrading the housing unit. The application of carefully regulated subsidies to
selected, isolated suppliers merely compounds them. The role of the entrepreneur
in housing conservation is overlooked, and the need to provide ongoing maintenance
emerges as critical.
Boston offered no cases dealing with these critical deficiencies. Part
Three, Chapter VI presents an alternative model of housing rehabilitation, involving 1-5
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the dweller, to result in self-sustaining maintenance. The existence of a
promising case in Rochester, New York, coping with some of these long range
problems is worthy of inclusion in spite of its location in a separate context.
The case of Better Rochester Living is contrasted with other low income
housing efforts in Rochester, New York. This case can serve as a benchmark
for efficient subsidization in rehabilitating run-down houses, and it establishes
that under appropriately structured incentives and guidance, low income dwellers
can play the entrepreneurial role in conserving their own dwellings. Home
ownership acts as incentive to families in the program. Even here the present
subsidies have drawbacks. The incentives to the non-profit sponsor are less
evident, limiting broader application of the Better Rochester Living approach.
Part Four, Chapter VII summarizes the case evidence in relation to the.
issues posed above and then considers some potential policy changes in the
application of subsidies to overcome the drawbacks in the present system. The
advantages of resource allocation in self-interest are evaluated. The differences
between narrow and broad subsidies to the supply or demand side are qualitatively
examined. The need for dweller education and ways integrating it within the
rehabilitation process are explored. The technique of analyzing incentives and
constraints confronting the actors in the cases led to the conclusions. It also
serves to generate some illustrative policy recommendations for assisting low
income families to obtain improved housing services from the existing stock. The
analytical method is applicable to any program or decision-making process. 1-6
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CHAPTER 1I - FRAME AND TERMS OF REFERENCE
This chapter attempts to provide the background necessary before
examining the individual cases. It consists of four sections, each of which
contains contextual information and makes certain assumptions explicit.
Ideally these sections would be read concurrently with each other. The case
interpretations will bring the separate strands together.
The sections are: A) National and Boston Housing Trends, B) The
Role of Public Policy, C) Analysis by Perceived Incentives and Constraints,
and D) The Entrepreneurial Role in the General Housing System. Appendix
A, Case Studies and Their Methodology, should be regarded as attached to
this chapter.
NATIONAL AND BOSTON HOUSING TRENDS
A brief analysis of housing trends is necessary to grasp the recentness of
both publicly assisted rehabilitation and extensive public regulation of the
existing stock as strategies to improve housing services for low income families.
National Trends
Trends in the condition of the national urban housing stock are
difficult to evaluate because of the infrequent, ambiguous, and uncertain nature
of the census data. IIA-1
Based on careful analysis of trends brought to light by the 1960 housing
census, Grigsby has ventured to predict that by 1980 substandard housing in the
United States will be eliminated. Such conclusions must be evaluated in light
of expectations and available resources on the part of the dwellers. Frieden
assessing the national housing outlook on the basis of various sources, draws his
conclusions with more qualifications:
The experience of the 1950's shows considerable progress
in improving housing welfare in the United States, but the
performance of the housing market was less than satisfactory
in some important respects. In urban areas, the improvement
that did take place was not sufficient to cope with the growing
numbers of Negro families, and in the country at large an
increasing number of families at all economic levels were forced
to spend more than a reasonable share of their income for rent in
order to better their housing conditions. (2)
Who remains in substandard housing? Predominantly renters. In
metropolitan areas in 1960, 92.4% of the owner-occupied units were in sound
condition and 1.4% were classed as dilapidated, whereas only 79.1% of the
renter occupied dwelling units were sound and fully 5.0% were dilapidated.
Rented units made up 41% of the stock inside metropolitan areas. Looked at on the
basis of condition 64% of the deteriorating and 71% of the dilapidated units were
renter-occupied -- chances were two to one that any substandard unit would be
in rental tenure. Even within the same income categories, at each income level
there was at least twice as much dilapidated and substantially more deteriorating
(4)
housing among rented than among owner-'occuped units. These statistics offer
simple correlations but no causal explanations why owners tend to be in better IIA-2
units. The census data also reveals substantial upgrading of existing units during
the 1950's,(5) which is difficult to correlate directly with form of tenure.
Clouding this generally optimistic outlook of housing welfare generated
by the 1960 housing census is the lack of causal explanations. Perhaps the
easier upgrading has been completed, leaving the less tractable units.
In any case a substantial amount of rehabilitation to meet the housing
needs of the low income sector is still seen as necessary. The President's Report
on National Housing Goals indicates 28.2 million housing units will be needed
during the 1967-77 decade. Rehabilitation of nondilapidated substandard dwellings
is to account for 3.7 million units. (6) The rehabilitation of 2.0 million, or more
than half of these, is to be achieved with public assistance. We assume this is to
occur in the metropolitan areas.
Boston Trends
The General Plan for the City of Boston, 1965/1975, calls for
private and publicly assisted rehabilitation of some 32,000 units alongside
construction of 37,000 new housing units to replace some 29,000 dilapidated
or deteriorating units. (7) It seems doubtful that these targets are going to be
met. More recent figures are only available in urban renewal areas. Here, since
the beginning of renewal in Boston, 5,616 units had either been rehabilitated,were
being rehabilitated or had been financially committed as of 1969.
These figures acquire more meaning in context from the 1950's. The data
from the 1950's revealed that even within the city of Boston a substantial amount
IIA-3
of autonomous upgrading occurred. Brigham estimated that in the City of Boston
between 1950 and 1960 up to 19,800 units were upgraded from substandard to
standard (in a 1960 housing stock of approximately 238,000 units). He also
found that 73,200 permits for improvements to existing structures were issued, which
can be taken as evidence of further upgrading. Brigham concludes that most of
these repairs incurred modest cost for the owners, and generally did not result in
sharp rent increases.
Whether this trend continued will be unclear until the 1970 housing census
becomes available. The record since 1960 remains more speculative. The general
impression is that unassisted upgrading diminished severely and that assisted
rehabilitation was an arduous process. Recently spiraling rents, units going
into abandonment, and the push for rent control suggests that housing progress
is considerably more difficult in this decade.
By 1969 a housing task force stated "The failure in this city to build an
adequate supply of housing is clear even to the casual observer. " Investigating
the failure, the Citizens Housing and Planning Association (CHPA) task force
found a correlation between little action, high public costs, and "the complicated
network of city agencies working at various levels of efficiency and enthusiasm,
which affect private and public housing and management.,(10) Their report,
To Rebuild a Ciy, makes particular mention of the high rehabilitation costs under
the Boston Rehabilitation Program and the South End Community Development, Inc.
demonstration in the South End. To place progress of publicly assisted rehabilitation
in context, the report stresses that while Boston needs the equivalent of a BURP a IIA-4
year to approach the norms of The General Plan, the exceptional circumstances
surrounding BURP render its quick repetition unlikely.
Autonomous upgrading may be quietly proceeding, to be revealed by
the 1970 housing census, but this seems doubtful. (11) If there is little action
it is possible the easier units for upgrading were completed during the 1950's.
But the correlation noted by CHPA between little action and too many regulators
may also be a causal one, affecting autonomous upgrading. If the private up-
grading of up to 19,800 units to standard condition during the fifties was in some
way discouraged by publicly assisted upgrading of less than 10,000 units at much
greater expense, then it is a serious matter.
As background to the cases, the recent proliferation of agencies in Boston
whose functions touch housing is important. The seventeen found by CHPA in
1969 are: (12)
* The Assessing Department, which
fixes the value of property to be
taxed by the city.
* The Back Bay Architectural Com-
mission and the Beacon Hill
Architectural Commission, which
regulate exterior changes in the
city's two historic districts.
* The Board of Appeal, which can
grant variances from the city's
building code and zoning ordi-
nance.
* The Boston Housing Authority,
which has charge of constructing
and maintaining public housing
in Boston and administers the
federal leased housing program.
* The Licensing Board, which grants
permits for lodging houses.
* The Office of Public Services, a staff
agency which carries out a line function
in administering the little city halls.
The little city halls are fast becoming
an efficient collector of complaints about
housing and other city services. Moreover,
OPS is carrying out management studies
of department services, including those
departments which affect housing.
* The Public Facilities Department, an
agency with broad powers including
the responsibility for construction of
public facilities other than schools,
and the preparation of a long-term
capital improvements program and an IIA-5
annual capital budget for the city.
* The Boston Redevelopment
Authority, which is the city's
general planning arm and renewal
agent.
* The Building Department, which
regulates construction, rehabili-
tation and demolition of buildings
through the granting of permits.
The Building Code is administer-
ed here.
* The Fire Department's Fire Pre-
vention Division, which adminis-
ters the Fire Code through its
inspection procedures.
* The Health and Hospitals De-
partment's Environmental Sani -
tation Section, which carries
out inspections in administering
health regulations.
* The Housing Inspection Depart-
ment, which administers the
State Sanitary Code through
the inspection of housing.
* The Public Improvement Commission,
which has jurisdiction over the laying
out, alteration and relocation of
streets, the installation of sewers,
water mains and sidewalks, and the
betterment assessments levied
against homeowners for improvements.
* The Public Works Department, which
has general jurisdiction over the
maintenance of streets, sewer and
water lines and street lighting, as
well as the removal of trash and
garbage, snow removal and street
cleaning.
* The Real Property Department's
Property Division, which is responsible
for foreclosed properties.
* The Zoning Commission, which has
jurisdiction over the city's zoning
ordinance.
This many regulatory agencies constitute one way to try to safeguard
the housing stock. The next section presents a broader view of the potential
of public policy.
IIA-6
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY
Understanding that the intenfion of public intervention is to improve the
operation of the market helps to clarify the purpose and potential role subsidies
could play.
Schaaf, in his ground-breaking analysis of urban. renewal, states:
The role of public policy is to bring about renewal in
situations where it would not otherwise occur. Belief in
the motivating power of the profit incentive leads us to
presume as a general rule that privately initiated renewal
will be forthcoming whenever profitable circumstances
exist and that such circumstances are not present if public
implementation is necessary. If renewal is to be accomplished
in situations where it would not otherwise occur, changes in
the variables affecting the private investment decision are
required. Such changes are the function of the various publ c3policies that have been devised in the urban renewal field. 13)
The problem confronting public policy makers consists of determining which
variables are amenable to change, and how productive responses resulting from their
alternation are likely to be. Broadly speaking, the factors promoting better housing
can be grouped as either positive or negative, as incentives for doing "right" versus
constraints or sanctions against doing "wrong." On the positive side, are the "do's"
of tax incentives, depreciation write-off, the enabling of credit, of insurance, and
of interest subsidies. As Haar points out, these supports all tend to emanate
from the federal level. On the other hand, the sanctions, the "don'ts," exercised
ihrough permits, codes, and inspections, by code enforcement, zoning and legal
occupancy law -- are found on the local level. Working together, these are
aimed at safeguarding the quality of the housing stock. IIB-1
The large number of local regulatory agencies in Boston has already been
mentioned above. The background of federal incentives is important as well.
Since the 1930's there had been public housing, but the idea of correcting
market deficiencies in the housing system as Schaaf advocates, began with the
Housing Act of 1949, which enables direct intervention and subsidies in areas
designated by local renewal authorities with the advice and consent of the federal
government. This took the form of clearance by eminent domain and land value
write-down. Under the Housing Act of 1954 the approach was broadened to
include subsidized area improvements and liberalized financing. The federal
government would absorb two-thirds the cost of public environmental improvements
in the designated renewal area -- landscaping, recreational and educational
facilities, maintenance and protective services, limited replanning and spot
clearance, etc. - and would extend mortgage insurance under section 220. The
"carrot" of area improvements and liberal financing, coupled with the "stick" of
code enforcement were to stimulate renewal. In the sixties the tools diversified.
Of particular interest are below market interest rate mortgages to non-profit and
limited dividend sponsors, and outright grants for certain actions by dwellers of
limited income.
Before the Housing Acts, decisions between rehabilitation, new construction,
and inaction were left to the consumer-supplier market. With the Housing Acts,
determination of what was desired in urban renewal areas shifted to public
agencies, who found (and sought) little economic guidance on questions of
rehabilitation vs. new construction. They were wide open to the enthusiasm for IIB-2
building new. By the end of the fifties, local opposition generated by vacant
cleared sites with little redevelopment forced a reconsideration, which led to a
similarly unfounded endorsement of rehabilitation. Now experience is tempering
that as well, revealing that the problems are considerably more serious. Signifi-
cantly, the policy makers have few guideposts, aside from political popularity
of their strategies, on which to base their decisions. Few economists have been
able to help them.
Rothenberg offers an interesting analysis to guide choice between
redevelopment (building new) and rehabilitation. (15) His analysis points out that
in making this choice there is insufficient feedback from the "insiders" to the
"outsiders" -- from the dwellers to the planners and-public policy makers. Such
feedback is vital in shaping policy variables to stimulate the missing private invest-
ment.
There are broader possible changes within the realm of public policy which
are just beginning to come under consideration. Housing subsidies to date have
been relatively restricted to the supply side. These restrictions have been thought
necessary to assure that benefits would flow to specific income groups and to avoid
inflationary impact. ising them would provide advantages and incur drawbacks
that require further analysis. Direct income assistance to low-income households
is receiving increasing attention, but its benefits and drawbacks also require study.
However, let us note some income assistance possibilities, ranging from broad to
relatively restricted: IIB-3
1. Income maintenance and resource redistribution schemes in which
households can allocate the benefits as they please.
2. Housing allowance programs whose benefits are confined to purchasing
housing services, but which households can allocate within the general housing
market.
3. Restricted housing allowances, in which household allocation is
regulated, for example, to assure that selection is made only from standard units.
4. Leased housing in which a household selects housing in the private
(16)
market, but the public agency arranges payment on its behalf.
Present regulatory efforts in Boston may be ill-conceived, but measures
regulating the delivery of housing services are-necessary. The present situation
of insufficient resources hampers application of even reasonable regulations.
Income assistance measures would offset this but would need to be accompanied
by revised and perhaps graduated standards. Such code revisions are necessary
and overdue, but beyond the scope of this study.
ANALYSIS BY PERCEIVED INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
This study assumes that transactions resulting in the delivery of housing
services are governed by perceived incentives and constraints. This methodology
furnishes insights to increase predisposition toviards action. In the cases, the
introduction of subsidies and their impact on efficiency will be evaluated in this
light. 1IC-1
Incentives and Constraints
Incentives constitute an exchange of resources which an actor
perceives as advantageous to himself. The resources exchanged, one for another,
include labor, money, time, know-how, influence, and psychological well-being.
Constraints are perceived by each actor in terms of the diminution of the resources
resulting from the transactionl. These resources are loosely interrelated to one
another, although each individual uses different vates of substitution. All are
resources that can be acquired, pyramided, invested, capitalized, spent, squandered
and lost, much like money. They are exbhanged in informal markets, in which
actors trade to increase their share. We assume an actor acts when incentives
exceed constraints, or loosely speaking, when benefits exceed costs to him.
Our analytic method further assumes that action occurs until perceived
incentives just balance constraints. Actions are undertaken because the anticipated
advantages derived from doing so just offset the contingent costs; the economic
concept "marginal revenue equals marginal cost" is an illustrative example.
Employing the concept of marginality, increased action would follow
from increasing the perceived incentives or reducing the perceived constraints.
It is up to policy makers to determine which is easier to achieve.
Of course, altering the perceived incentives may have repercussions
when the incentive is perceived by others as modified. This is in the nature
of "markets." Note we can alter the incentive or the way it is perceived
by the actor, however. IIC-2
In the imperfect market, where actions are disjointed,(17) there are
further complicating effects, analogous to the difference between starting
friction and sliding friction. A process under way often takes fewer incentives
to sustain it than were required to start it. This suggests that to sustain
processes still operating in marginal areas requires fewer resources than to
restore processes that have ceased in declined areas.
Operations, Actors and Their interdependence
The many activities carried out in delivering housing seriices
comprise a discrete set of operations. Such operations must be executed to
maintain, rehabilitate, or restore housing units. While the specifically required
operations differ from case to-case, all operations have common aspects.
Any given operation requires effort and time in its execution and engages
actors interlinked in specific roles, who "do" the operation and "get something
out of it,." External to each operation are a set of incentives and constraints
upon its execution. The incentives spur the actors on, while the constraints
govern and channel the way their efforts are expended. The way in which each
actor does his job is governed in part by external constraints -- space, cost and
time limitations, availability of materials, relevant codes and practices, etc.
But other constraints involve ihe perceptions of each actor and result from the
interdependence -of their various roles. Cultural forces, work practices, and the
interaction of personalities all affect the outcome of the operation. IIC-3
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Each operation can be analyzed by hypothesizing "What's in it" for
each actor. Each expects to be paid for his efforts in some currency, including
but not limited to money, influence, prestige, or psychological well-being. In
a given operation, each actor faces choices including the choice to do nothing
or withdraw. He bargains with others to reach the choice that gives him the
best return for invested effort. As each actor does this for his own position, a
sort of collective bargaining results, whose outcome resembles Simon's
"satisficing. "(18) Any actor pushed to the limit where he sees "nothing in it for
him" ceases to play a role in the operation. This study explicitly assumes this
is where processes maintaining housing frequently break down.
This analytical approach proves nothing; it simply suggests ways to bring
the actors in the operation into agreement. In situations of inaction, this is
achieved by altering the perceived pay-offs of the withholding actors. The
method lies in discerning how each actor interpreis exdernal incentives and
constraints into benefits and costs to himself. Techniques of persuasion are
merely forms of altering any actor's pay-off matrix so that alternatives acceptable
to him overlap with alternatives acceptable to the others.
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To express this graphically Fig. ll.C.1. Venn Diagram of
Outcomes Preferred by Actors
through Venn diagrams, consider this
to represent the set of outcomes of a joint
undertaking acceptable to Actor A:
Among several actors, the
following diagram suggests that there is
shared interest in some outcomes by
actors A and B, but no overlap with the
e
interests of actor C, resulting in inaction:
To execute the operation, an A
overlap in interests must be found, and
the commonly acceptable outcome will be found
in the common ground:
From this we can deduce 1) that common interests among different actors
are likely to help shape commonly acceptable outcomes; 2)as. the number of actors
increases (other things being equal) the likelihood of commonly acceptable outcomes
existing at the outset diminishes; and 3) that the effort required to develop a common
ground will increase with the number of actors.
In the market processes a perceived net advantage by one actor is spread
through bargaining -- the sharing of the advantage through buying and selling in
interpersonal transactions. When different forms of resources are present, the manner
of achieving coordination becomes critical. When harmonious goals govern,
coordination is easy and outcomes can be found with relative efficiency; but when IIC-5
goals conflict, the difficulties of coordination increase. Politics frequently
requires the blurring of goals to build an enabling coalition. Paradoxically,
if the blurred goals mask conflict, producing action becomes an extremely
delicate process of manipulating perceptions. Inaction, which appears to
harm the least, becomes an increasingly likely choice.
This study explicitly assumes that in the absence of a shared goal,
processes calling for more actors increase the likelihood of conflicting interests,
and thereby the time and effort required to produce. Thus the efficiency is
reduced and inaction is a frequent outcome.
Goal conflict is not the only cause of inaction. Unrealistic perception
of possible alternatives can also produce this result. Davis.develops a market
(19)
illustration of this in a hypothetical case of two adjacent property owners,
A, and A2 . Each monitors the percent return on his invested capital. Each
separately decides whether to invest in maintenance, knowing that the adjacent
owner would get a windfall benefit from his investment through "neighborhood
effects."
The matrix, Figure ll.C.2, displays the percent return to each owner
for the four possible perceived outcomes, as well as the average return for this
society of two:
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Fig. ll.C.2: Percent Return to Actor by Outcome
0 0 0 0412 3 4
both Al A2  neither
invest invests invests invests
Owner A  .07 .03 .10 .04
Owner A2  .07 .10 .03 .04
Society
average .07 .065 .065 .04
In this situation, A, gets his best return from Outcome 3 when only A2
invests. A2 , similarly, chooses Outcome 2. In fact, the selected outcomes are
incompatible, so Outcome 4 results. Both, or "society" would have been better
off through coordination, selecting Outcome 1.
Davis' market illustration is relatively simple because the incentive of
higher monetary yield is automatically shared. Where resources in multiple forms
are involved, as in politics, achieving coordination and making realistic appraisal
of possible outcomes are rendered even more difficult.
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ROLE IN THE GENERAL HOUSING SYSTEM
To detect distortions and drawbacks produced by the introduction of
subsidies, we must be explicit about pre-existing incentives and constraints
governing delivery of housing services. IID-1
This section firstly links clarity of incentives to mode of tenure in the.
general housing system, then offers some operational definitions, and finally
makes some specific assumptions about maintenance in the general housing
system, when resources and understanding are adequate. These enable a better
understanding of what results when resources and entrepreneurial activities are
restricted.
Mode of Tenure
This study assumes that dwellers normally initiate a demand for
housing services in a market. Various entrepreneurs respond with offers to
supply housing services in ways most advantageous to themselves. From these
each household selects that bundle of housing services that best fits its needs
and means.
Each selection has many components, broadly including neighborhood
(20)
services and labor intensive services, in addition to services that come
directly from the physical housing stock. These services from the stock are not
spontaneous but only flow as operating expenditures are paid to cover their
release. The housing stock is simply a physical facility able to render services.
It is usually in the best interests of the entrepreneur providing the services
from the housing stock to maintain his facility in good working order, but it
naturally ages, declining in appeal. In addition the entrepreneur willingly
alters the facility when he sees a way of improving the return on it to himself. IID-2
As housing demand alters, entrepreneurs attempt to modify the portions of the
stock that offer the best return to meet the new demand. Haltingly the stock
shifts through new additions, conversions, mergers, and elimination of obsolete
units. This process of responding is governed by perceived incentives and con-
straints, wherein countless actors attempt to maximize the return on the effort
and resources they invest. (21)
The process is most evident in new additions to the stock. Through
occupancy rates, expenditure patterns and preference surveys, suppliers can
identify gaps in the existing housing market. From prior experience, supply
costs and bureaucratic constraints are reasonably well-known. Incentives
and constraints can easily be translated into monetary terms and the net
differential maximized.
These relatively explicit actions play only a minor role in the shifting
housing market. At any given time, 97/6 of the stock is existing. While the
incentives to modify it are similar, assessing the constraints is more difficult.
The fixed location and layout of the existing stock inhibit change. The construc-
tion process contains more uncertainties (but not necessarily higher costs) and the
surrounding bureaucracy is more encumbered with ambiguously updated codes,
erratic enforcement, inconsistent zoning due to variances, etc.
The incentives in the existing owner-occupied and renter-occupied stock
are distinctly different, requiring separate treatment.
The owner-occupier supplies housing services to himself, and he is only
secondarily interested in investment return on his property.. High transaction 1D-3
costs of changing ownership further encourage him to remain. His mortgage
interest and property tax payments are tax deductible. These factors combine
to spur him to Maintain his property and to oppose vigorously influences that
might blight its value. These include dwelling and neighborhood deterioration.
If they are too threatening, he moves while he can; if not, he maintains and
upgrades his home periodically. He provides many of his own services, including
labor-intensive ones that tenants expect from suppliers. For the heavier tasks,
he directly summons contractors. As he ages, his long range interest in the
property wanes and he may defer maintenance. The incentive to maintain his
home is never of uppermost priority. When neighbors improve theirs, he benefits
without effort on his part in appreciation of his property value; when he improves
his in the absence of parallel efforts on their part, his property may appreciate
by less than the cost of the improvements. He is only encouraged to maintain
and upgrade his property when his neighbors are doing likewise; otherwise, if his
earnings improve, he simply moves out, to a higher status neighborhood.
The absentee owner of renter-occupied stock, on the other hand, is
principally motivated by investment return and rent yield, and is consequently
much more sensitive to market forces. While his mortgage interest is not tax
deductible, his expenses are. Tenants, being relatively free to move, have a
short range interest in the dwelling. They count upon the supplier to deliver
housing services. Since the owner's satisfaction is not directly related to the
state of the building, his actions are governed to a much greater extent by the 111 D-4
market. He expects outlays on improvements to pay back through increased rent-yield
within a reasonable period of time. Improvements requested by tenants that fail to
meet this test, are foregone. Absentee owners are more likely to sell to realize
the appreciation of their property. Owners who can take advantage of accelerated
depreciation find themselves encouraged to sell the property after only six to ten
years, to repeat the process on another building. This discourages long term
improvements, and allows downgrading to begin.
The owner of rental housing is much more sensitive to neighborhood effects
than to his own maintenance practices, so that without an active code enforcement
program, or interspersed resident owners, whole neighborhoods can go into decline.
In spite of these factors, there was substantial autonomous upgrading of the stock in
central cities of the United States in the fifties. (22)
Blight, this study assumes, is the joint product of insufficient dweller
resources with which to demand improved housing services, and the multiple
constraints discouraging maintenance in declining areas. Which would be easier
to counter is a decision best left to policy makers and the entrepreneurs. The
market has indicated that net incentives for adequate housing services are missing,
leading to their curtailment. Physical deterioration is simply a visible by-product,
but also a contagious one.
Definitions
At this point, some operational definitions identifying tasks to
offset deterioration are required. Explicit mention of restricted resources and 11D-5
discouraging neighborhood effects will no longer be made. The subsequent
analysis of maintenance, restoring, upgrading and rehab operations assumes
that adequate resources are made available. This study stresses that there is
a clear distinction between the state of a given housing unit and its market value.
Dwelling state we here take to refer to the unit's condition in comparison
with the other units in the housing stock. A- crude index is furnished by the census
definitions of standard, substandard lacking plumbing facilities, and dilapidated.
It ignores such factors as location, size, neighborhood, age, even though these
may have profound influence on the future state of the dwelling.
Market value, on the other hand, is affected by many factors left out in
assessing dwelling state. Taken as the price at which the unit would be traded
"from a willing buyer to a willing seller," market value is not only influenced
by neighborhood factors, economic policy, and general housing demand, but also
by the way each of these in turn is perceived by buyer and seller.
The cost of maintaining and upgrading a dwelling is a function of its
prior state; but the-incentive to maintain derives from the change in market
value as a result of expending the time and effort costs of maintenance. For the
time being let us put considerations of incentives for maintaining aside, and focus
on the effects of time on dwelling state.
Dwelling state (defined above) can shift with time, but this cannot be
simply correlated with change in market value.
Deterioration: without specifying the underlying causes, deterioration is
simply the physical decline or decay of a given unit to a lower state. It arises [ID-6
from a complex range of factors, some of which are steady and incremental, and
others which are highly disjointed.
Obso.lescence refers to the shift of a given dwelling over time to a
relatively lower state due to rising expectations, often codified in standards
that have been revised upwards. Obsolescence can be a function of physical
layout, or changes in taste, fashion and opportunity as new things become
possible. Due to interdependence, it can affect entire areas.
Maintenance is the set of operations which must be executed to offset
deterioration, to keep the dwelling unit in a given state.
Upgrading is the set of operations executed to offset obsolescence or improve
the dwelling to a higher state. It is useful to try to distinguish between absolute
and relative decline, between deterioration and obsolescence. Maintenance offsets
the former, upgrading the latter, but operations in the field are frequently hard to
class.
Restoration: when maintenance has been neglected for a time, the deficit
is called "deferred maintenance. " Restoration refers to the set of operations that
must be executed 'to offset this deficit, to bring the dwelling back into an "as was"
state.
Rehabilitation is the set of operations executed to both restore and upgrade
a dwelling to a higher state. It takes general rising standards into account.
Conservation is the set of operations required to k' the housing stock in
a sound, acceptable state. The meaning of "acceptable" is hard to agree upon in.
'the absence of an entirely free market, and consequently the term conservation has IID-7
some ambiguity, viewed in terms of changing standards. It is used here loosely
in the maintaining and upgrading -of the housing stock wherever suitable for
future users, thereby touching on all the above sets of operations.
The conceptual interrelationship among these terms can best be shown
graphically. The curves are hypothetical. The axes serve to rank dwelling
state, s, against time, t.
Fig. II. D. 1. Interrelationship among Conserving Terms (23)
Ir
- Line A-A" represents a dwelling maintained in a given state over time
- Curve A-B represents deterioration of that dwelling over time
- Curve A-D reflects rising standards, due to taste and technology
- The gap A'-B is deferred maintenance or deterioration
- The distance B-A' reflects the efforts required to restore to original level A
- The gap D-A' reveals obsolescence
- The distance A'-D reflects the efforts required to upgrade the unit
- The-distance B-D reflects the efforts required to rehabilitate the unit to
upgraded level D
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Maintenance and Upgrading
Whether offsetting Maintenance and upgrading are undertaken is
normally an entrepreneurial decision, taking neighborhood and economic factors
into account in calculating anticipated return. But the magnitude of the task is a
function of the state of the unit. Here we develop the assumption that given ade-
quate resources, it is easier to arrest decline early than rebuild later.
Maintenance was defined above as the set of operations which must be
executed to keep the dwelling unit in a given state. This requires a feedback
system like a thermostat, to indicate when the unit-is deteriorating below the state.
To develop the thermostat analogy, someone must desire to keep the dwelling at a
given temperature. As heat is lost, he must 1) recognize the signs when more heat
is called for, 2) be able to select the most expedient ways of restoring the tempera-
ture to the previous level, and 3) arrange for heat to be supplied by the appropriate
component. Similarly, someone must have the incentive to prevent deterio6ration.
As deterioration occurs, he must 1) be able to recognize the signs, 2) be able to
select the necessary conserving operations and 3) arrange for these operations to be
executed. To keep the system functioning requires incentives and the informed
ability to react appropriately.
This study assumes the dweller normally furnishes the incentives, and the
entrepreneur the action. The entrepreneurial role requires and obtains information
through the feedback system. Homeownership is a special case that conveniently.
and efficiently places the two roles in one person. IID-9
Deterioration of a dwelling is a much more complex phenomenon than heat
loss. Nevertheless, deterioration of a dwelling takes place over time, and can be
(24)
said to occur. at a rate. This rate of deterioration is a function of many factors
which the entrepreneur monitors. Some are minor and easy to counter; others are
serious and difficult to counter. They range from elemental forces physically
eroding the unit to attitudes of :the occupants.
The constraints on early maintenance are minor. The eroding forces can
be of animate as well as inanimate origin. Factors including insects and rodents,
as well as moisture, sunlight, and storms can run down an uninhabited house
relatively swiftly in the absence of maintenance. Means to counter their effects,
however -- such as chemical treatment, or know-how of moisture and dampness
control--are readily available to anyone who has the incentive and informed
determination to employ them.
Practicality of dwelling design, by easing maintenance tasks, interacts
with the likelihood of their being executed. Recent inventions to ease maintenance
- new paints, sidings, and finishes -- can and generally are easily installed. The
great majority of existing dwellings can be renovated to serve for a good time
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longer by replacing the wearing surfaces and fixtures in time.
Availability of maintenance services affects the cost and likelihood of their
execution. As skilled manpower has become more scarce and costly, neglect and
deferral are more likely. Bureaucratic controls, barring use of new technologies,
excess regulation by inspectors, and reassessment for higher taxes all loom as
perceived constraints, discouraging the timely application of maintenance. IID-10
As maintenance is deferred, the constraints increase: what was originally
a matter of painting the siding now necessitates its replacement. More -skills are
called for; permits are required. Reassessment becomes more likely.
In the case of absentee-owners, poor feedback from the dwellers impairs
appropriate understanding to act in the situation. When tenants lack incentives
or understanding to do their part -- such as disposing of garbage so it does not
attract rodents -- or even have abusive living patterns, this in turn actively
contributes to deterioration and decline of the neighborhood. (26) Throughout
the entire system, action can be interpreted as indicating that the individually
perceived opportunities exceed the obstacles, and inaction as the reverse.
So far, the reasoning suggests that if resources were available,
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maintenance would cost least if carried on continuously. Strictly speaking,
this is not true. There are distinct micro-economies of scale in the way main-
tenance services are available on the market today. (One arranges to paint
the whole exterior of a house at once, not just the side that has suffered in the
sun.) We have shown that undue delay results in more serious maintenance. Jointly
these processes interact to produce sporadic bursts of maintenance.
Fig. II.D.2. Typical Maintenance Patterns
A
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This study assumes the most economical maintenance pattern is reflected
by the saw-tooth pattern, whereby successive increments of C-A' are applied
to keep the dwelling in a given state. Of course in reality there are daily,
monthly, weekly, seasonal., and even more long range maintenance cycles, or
"saw-teeth," superimposed on one another. Allowing the dwelling to deteriorate
to B by deferring maintenance means that enough effort (B-A') must be invested
to restore the dwelling to its former state, A', and that this gap widens with time.
(in our example this might entail re-siding the entire building after replacing
rotted sills and sheathing where necessary.) The decision whether it is more
rational to restore B-A' in one shot or maintain in successive increments of C-A'
is quite complex and perhaps best made on the. spot.(
Upgrading in response to new possibilities, raised expectations and to
counter obsolescence introduces further complexity. -Upgrading typically involves
new finish materials, new kitchen and/or bathroom fixtures, and even new room
uses.
Fig. II.D.3. Typical Upgrading cum Maintenance Patterns
A
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Although A-D reflects continuous upgrading of the dwelling unit, such
efforts again tend to be nude as a disjointed lump due to market patterns governing
their installation. The do-it-yourselfer more closely approximates curve A-D
than the homeowner who engages a contractor.. Only the owner-occupier
experiences the incentives to upgrade fairly directly, as indicated above. The
perceived time horizon becomes a critical factor governing upgrading. We here
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assume, with Schaaf that improvements will not be undertaken unless the doer
can see their contingent benefits accruing to himself and these discounted benefits
exceed their present cost of installation. As mentioned above, declining years,
absentee ownership, negative neighborhood factors and lack of money all diminish
the perceived incentives to maintain and upgrade. Nevertheless, autonomous
upgrading has been an important aspect of our general housing system.
This analysis leads to the hypothesis that if adequate resources and under-
standing were always present, housing conservation would follow an ascending
curve.
Fig. ll.D.4. Housing Conservation
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To rehabilitate a unit allowed to decline to B by market forces, will.
entail much more costly operations than if the decline had been arrested earlier.
If this analysis is correct., a public policy objective in housing would be
to furnish the necessary carrots and sticks to maintain sufficient units above the
rising line of minimum standards, and allow entrepreneurial decisions to identify
those that are obsolete or too difficult to conserve. Such a policy would minimize
the negative effects and contagion of decline. We have only reasoned this point.
The cases furnish supporting evidence, but strict proof remains beyond the scope
of this study.
Reviewing the Analytical Approach
The process of getting a dwelling unit from the AB curve to the AD
curve, upgrading or rehabilitating it from substandard to standard, involves quite a
set of operations, whose complexity is related to the width of the gap. We hold
that the operations are executed when individually perceived incentives are
greater than the constraints upon the actors. This may seem like an inordinately
difficult approach towards analyzing housing conservation , but recall that we are
basically examining market operations. Market forces handle the complex flow
of information for each entrepreneur to interpret.
Attempts to simplify examination of the rehabilitation process into overall
benefits and costs are misleading. Benefits are often not shared with the cost bearers.
Attempts to reduce strategies to dollars per square foot, or dollars per rehabilitated
lID-I'
x-bedroom apartment are too-simplistic for evaluation of the wide variety of
housing conservation strategies. As mentioned above, incentives derive from
resource exchanges which the actor perceives as opportunities to him. These
resources include money, time, influence, power, prestige, and know-how.
A trade that one actor views as beneficial, another in his place might view
as harmful to his interests. Benefit cost indices attempt to reduce these multiple
dimensions to a tractable few so that evaluations can be made. In the realm of
public goods(30) where there are no market signals, benefit cost analysis provides
some guidance, but in sectors where the market is functioning, albeit lamely, the
policy maker's task is to improve its operation by reshaping its inputs, and not to
simplify it to the point where nuances vital to the participants are lost. Low
income feedback on the impact of public programs is weak. Planners and policy
makers must counter this by attempting to discern their desires and reactions from
other aspects of their behavior. This approach increases the likelihood of developing
responsive programs that assist low income families.
We must not forget that the incentive to house himself decently originates
with the dweller. The strength of this incentive can be amplified, complemented,
overwhelmed, or even squelched by constraints (and incentives) in the hands of
policy-makers. In our present urban civilization, owner, dweller, financier,
builder, all play highly specialized roles in a system to deliver housing services.
Incentives are diffused among these roles to produce action; and constraints -- in
part cultural, and in part legally codified -- are to channel this action into IID-15
acceptable forms. Somehow this process has broken down. In many areas of
our American cities, the quality of housing services is deficient or too costly.
The available incentives appear insufficient to produce an adequate flow.
Or are the constraints excessive?
IID-16
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PART TWO - EVOLUTION OF THE REHABILITATION PROCESS IN BOSTON
In Part One it was reasoned that perceived incentives and constraints shape
housing markets both locationally and economically. Part Two attempts to examine
some cases in inner-city Boston in this light, to see what this approach reveals about
the interplay of various forces affecting this particular declining submarket, to reach
a better understanding of their interaction. From these cases we may deduce how
government policy could act to remove constraints or improve incentives in the mar-
ginal portions of the housing stock. This analysis assumes that in the general
housing turnover process there is a watershed where the downgrading forces are far
greater than those associated with filtration in the rest of the market, presently
creating a pool where unmaintained houses and people are trapped. Our analytical
approach may give us some new insights into the causes.
Chapter III discusses unsubsidized rehabilitation, taking King-Bis6n as a
representative case.
Chapter IV explores the impact of federal subsidies upon the pre-existing
system.
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CHAPTER III - THE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE CONTROLS ON AUTONOMOUS
UPGRADING
THE UNWARY REHABILITATORS
If individual dwellers and local groups are going'to continue to play a role
in the process of conserving housing, it is fruitfuI to scrutinize the present
interactions in settings which come as close as possible to revealing the atomistic
aspects of the market. Ideally, one should survey every dwelling and examine
the contingent maintenance interactions, or lack thereof, but this is impractical.
However, the actions of neophytes -- the church-sponsored non-profits, the
altruistic housing efforts are also revealing, and the actors in these cases are
readily accessible and willing to describe their goals and their problems. The
behavior of these small-scale rehabilitators is similarly shaped in response to the
maze of constraints they face. The interactions between resident owners, absentee
landlords, tenants, and the various authorities offer clues to the nature of the
housing system, that are obliterated in the cases of the larger interventions.
In 1969 there were close to ten organizations attempting small-scale
rehabilitation of housing in Boston's South End and Roxbury neighborhoods.
One of these, the King-Bison Company, was incorporated as a profit-making
enterprise, but this was to captyre potential tax benefits rather than for actual
profit. The remainder are non-pfit groups. (See Figure IlA.I. , below.) lilA-1
FIGURE lil.A.1
Small-Scale Housing Rehabilitation Organizations Working in Boston in 1969
Discussed here: Other non-profit groups:
Profit group
King-Bison Company
Mr. David Bird
Mr. George Sommaripa
145 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Non-profit groups
South End Development Corporation
Mr. Robert Whittlesey
677 Tremont Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Housing Innovations Inc.
Mr. Denis A. Blackett
366a Blue Hill Avenue
Roxbury, Massachusetts
source: Rev. Ev Blackman
The Commission on
Housing
United Church of Christ
14 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Low-cost Housing
Mr. Rudy Waker
162 West Concord Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Joseph Tuckerman Foundation
Rev. Virgil. Murdock
110 Arlington Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Cooperative Metropolitan Ministers
Rev. Charles Harper
34 Concord Square
Boston, Massachusetts
Association for Better Housing, inc.
Rev. Harold Ross Jr.
14 Crawford Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Massachusetts Housing Inc.
538 Massachusetts Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts
Afro-American Associates
R. Charles Turner
12 Morley Street
Roxbury, Massachusetts
Trinity Church Foundation
Rev. Samuel Tyler
Trinity Episcopal Church
Copley Square
Boston, Massachusetts
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I was employed by King-Bison during the summer of 1968 and subsequently
served them as consultant. I interviewed the. principals in the other organizations
-- some in considerable depth -- from which the pattern described in this chapter
emerged. Because I worked extensively with King-Bison, I can chronicle the
surrounding political process more fully in this instance, but the experiences are
simply a typical variant of those encountered by these organizations.
South End Community Development, Inc., headed by Robert Whittlesey.,
chose a more sophisticated approach embracing various public and private
subsidies.. The aspects of the system illuminated by the resulting interactions are
discussed in Chapter IV, in the case of the Methodical Rehabilitators.
General Model of Small-Scale Housing Rehabilitation in Boston
The incentive causing the production of housing normally comes from the
dweller. Upgrading is stimulated in the general housing market by the antici-
pation of increased rent-yield. This incentive is channeled into acceptable
forms through the regulatory agencies, whose function is to prevent unhealthy
conditions and exploitative actions on the part of property owners.
In contrast to this, many of the small-scale rehabilitators were not
motivated for profit. They resulted from the general concern for the City.
Many formed around the search for a relevant task. Some started on their own,
others were sought out by the BRA as vehicles for the execution of particular
housing projects, and were talked into undertaking a project. Because of their
dedication or conmitmen, all were generally more willing to attempt the dubious, lIlA-"
to put up with hardship, and to invest time and effort for little return than
normal entrepreneurs and owners; on the other hand, they were generally
less experienced.
Focussing on the simple goal of merely producing rehabilitated dwellings
brings some order to an examination of the multiplicity of small scale
rehabilitation efforts. Most of the small efforts of course were directed towards
broader goals than mere dwelling rehabilitation, among them: preservation of
neighborhood character, historical restoration, resident participation in the
process, indigenous skills training, low income home-ownership, or the imple-
mentation of construction innovations and new forms of neighborhood community
plans. These extras make the efforts less comparable, so we must attempt to
hold them in abeyance while we examine the backbone of the rehabilitation process.
No provision for relocation is necessary in the small-scale model because the
market accepts the atomistic displacement of dwellers during upgrading. In fact,
many sponsors rehabbed vacant units.
Despite the diverging nature of the broader goals, the procedures followed
by the small-scale rehabbers are quite similar due to the maze of constraints they
must pass through to reach their objectives. The steps in the process of rehabilitating
packages of several dwelling units are outlined in a simplified flow chart (Figure
lIlA. 2.). (2 )
(3)The rehabilitation sponsor trying to restore and upgrade dwelling units
finds that the hurdles he inust clear to attain his goal present themselves in this
sequence, which is difficult for him to alter. Ideally he would like a definite IIIA-4
._______ . _ . ....
Fig. Ill A.2. Small Scale Rehabilitation Process
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rather than a speculative incentive -- he would like to have his financing
committed and his tenants or buyers signed up before he begins to acquire units.
He might even prefer to be contractor for another owner, one who might take the
risk of failing to meet costs off his shoulders, but at present the sponsor bears the
risk in these cases of small-scale rehab. Since he is generally dependent upon
others for financing the undertaking, he must prepare a.fairly explicit statement
of what he proposes to do where to win their support of his venture. Before
drawing up the plans, stating what he intends to do, he must obtain options on the
properties, determining where this is all going to occur. The location is a major
determinant of the type of financing he can obtain,(4) forcing him to consider
well before he takes this first step, but he generally enters the maze here -- by
taking options on several buildings. (5)
He must prepare plans for these units, thereby discovering two sets of
pressures: one set pushes him to "bring it up to code," the other allows him to
replicate "as was" if he proposes no changes in use. The first set entails greater
concern for fire safety and open space than was customary in the past, calling
for sprinklers, firewalls, emergency stair lighting, deconversions, and possibly
requiring removal of gutted units, rather than permitting their rehabilitation. To
avoid the prohibitive expense of attempting to renovate wood frame buildings to
modern standards, he is offered the option of restoring the structure "as was. " But
this often entails hidden costs too, in forcing him to adhere to obsolete land use
patterns. (6) The number of units, proposed rent or sales price, layout of
typical unit must be decided before financing commitment and building permits can
be obtained. lilA -6
Having proposed and drawn up plans of what he intends to do, the
redeveloper is ready to face the major institutional hurdles which shape how
he will go about the task. Financing institutions on the one hand, use their
own set of rules and guidelines to determine the feasibility of what he proposes
to undertake; and the Building Department, on the other, with its codes and
zoning rules, also scrutinizes the proposal to determine its fit with the interpre-
tation of the "rules of the game" current in the city bureaucracy. The redeveloper
tackles both fronts simultaneously, engaging in a seesawing act. Each bureaucracy
insists on being treated seriously, and jealously guards its turf of influence from
encroachments. The financiers do not wish to commit money unless they are assured
that city bureaucracy will not stall the project; and again, the city bureaucracy
"weighs" the sponsor on the basis of his financial backing. Without an adequate
backer, the redeveloper's proposals can be stalled for months in "in-Boxes,"
lacking the push to keep them moving.
The small redeveloper who has cleared all these hurdles, is now set up to begin
rebuilding the dwelling units. He now faces more conventional decisions, albeit
those which have attracted the most attention in the media. To speed rehabilitation,
he can contract out the actual task to specialists. By engaging unionized labor, he
hooks up with an established network of relationships, with suppliers of materials,
with work forces, that deliver reasonably reliably, at known prices. But in doing
so, he may encounter unanticipated costs. For example neighborhood forces may
seek indigenous employment from what they view as outside interventionist forces
within their territory. Much of the redeveloper's time can be consumed in IIIA-7
necessary public relations or in political skirmishes until his units are reoccupied.
During this period the sponsor sh6ulders the risks of maintaining the stock of houses
from destruction. If he is shrewd, vandalism can be kept to petty levels, and he
will avoid waking up one morning to find portions of his stock irrevocably
destroyed.
Upon completion of the rehabilitation one hurdle remains: choosing the
new occupants. The "easiest solution" from his standpoint would be to sell off
the package to another specialized in handling these aspects, but such a one is
seldom at hand. He finds himself in the role of the midwife who is given the
baby. The terms of financing assumed a manner of ultimate disposition of the
units (for example, management maintenance-by sponsor, or sales to homeowners),
but all toofrequently, the task of realization still rests on him. The promised rent
yield can only be attained through close and watchful management, which he may
find himself called upon to provide.
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THE CASE OF KING-BISON DUDLEY STREET PROPERTIES
King-Bison (K-B) has been active in rehabilitation since 1964. (8)
Its principal aim has been to devise ways to obtain a better return on the
low income housing dollar, by training indigenous labor in rehabilitation
skills and by remaining as benevolent owner of the rehabbed properties in
run-down areas. In a sense the company acts as a laboratory, having
attempted reconstruction of many types of run-down buildings, from those
still occupied but for sale, to gutted shells available from the City for a
nominal sum. It has completed close to one hundred dwelling units while
training the inexperienced in the necessary skills. King-Bison claims that
rehabilitation can provide desirable dwelling units for half the cost of new
construction, but this is difficult to prove. Typically, they invest about
$10,000 per multi-bedroom apartment in units acquired for sums ranging
from $0 (plus acquisition red tape) to $7000. The result is a finished building
that is a definite asset to the neighborhood. Their efforts can be classed as
autonomous upgrading for rental.
Recently they have been running into trouble with rising costs and
on-site vandalism, which relate directly to the extended untenanted period
during rehabilitation, which in turn, is a function of bureaucracy.
King-Bison's Dudley Street Properties
The case of the bui Idings on Dudley Street on the Roxbury-
Dorchester line reveals the impact of the city agency constraints on rehabilitation 1118-1
57
particularly wel 1. For this reason, we will explore it closely here. This
examination follows the sequence of the simplified model of small-scale
housing rehabilitation, but reveals more complexity.
Selection and Acquisition of Properties for Rehab
On the basis of its previous rehab endeavors, King-Bison has
devised a method of forecasting reconstruction expenditures. These on-site
costs can be predicted as a function of the number of rooms, their sizes, the
exposures of the building, its general state, and particular problems such as
fire damage or strippage by vandals, and the like. They run to a maximum of
about $10,000 in 1969 for a gutted shell four bedroom apartment. In the past
King-Bison has had the courage to buy quite a variety of units offered at low
prices. The costliness of maintaining and managing scattered site holdings
after rehabilitation has pointed them towards clustering, but such a pattern is
extremely difficult to achieve in the Boston market without power of eminent
domain.( 9 )
When King-Bison learned of a cluster of twenty-six units on Dudley
Street, eleven of which were still occupied, held by only three separate
owners, they were interested. These particular buildings are four story brick
row houses, buiIt before the turn of the century when three stories of apartments
above a little store "were the coming thing. " At the time of negotiation for
acquisition, June 1968, the five row houses fronting Dudley Street contained
one store each in the ground floor units; three still had tenants. (See Fig. IIIB .1.)
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Of the fifteen upstairs units in the row houses, the inside nine were
still occupied. The six dwelling units on the ends were vacant and abandoned.
A fire in the top-most apartment at #471 in February 1968 did major damage to
only one room, but fire-fighting damage coupled with freezing temperatures
ruined that arm of the heating system, so that all units in the row house were
unoccupied by the end of the month. $800 in the right time and place could
have refinished the fire and water-damaged rooms since nothing structural was
affected, but timely action was not taken. As a result, three dwelling units
sheltering large families were lost from the housing stock. The vacant units
at the other end at 477 bore evidence of a similar history of rapid departure,
followed by vandalism.
In the rear, accessible through an incredibly narrow private way called
Miller Park, was a gutted three story masonry shell that used to contain six
apartments. It now stood in a sea of weed-covered rubble, the result of
surrounding demolitions.
The owner of the tenanted building had a rent collector. In return for a
$20 rent reduction, she extracted the rent from the other tenants to have it
ready for the regular visit by the owner's agent. She did not know the owner,
only knew that his agent came regularly, and that if all the rent monies were
in order, her reduced rent would continue. Since this was a necessity, she did
a very efficient job and asked few questions. The only way to reach the owner was
to wait for the agent and pass information through him. (10)
Fig. III.B.1.
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The prices at which these properties changed hands reflect higher
inner city costs and the uncertainties of their future. In July 1968 they
were transferred for roughly twice their current gross annual rental income,
i.e. $1800 per occupied unit, (1I) but to most they would be liabilities.
Acquisition was a relatively simple procedure. In retrospect one
can speculate that the previous owner probably considered himself extremely
fortunate to have concluded such a sale at a time when condemnations were
removing other properties in the area.
King-Bison immediately tried to obtain insurance for these properties
through their regular agent. At this time, they could not. The second best
form of insurance for such properties is to keep them fenanted or occupied.
King-Bison endeavored to do this, but word that the apartments were to be
rehabilitated scared tenants. They have learned from past experience that
rehabilitation means relocation, or extended inconvenience terminating in
higher rents. By bending over backwards, King-Bison managed to keep some
tenants in the buildings at all times, as quasi-insurance against damcge by
outsiders. (12)
King-Bison initiated procedures with the Corporation Counsel for the
Real Property Department of the City of Boston b obtain tax forgiveness on
these properties for the period when they were untenanted. They coupled this
with a request for assessment after completion such that annual real property
taxes to the City would amount to no more than 15% of gross annual rental
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income, provided that tenants were low income. Decision on this was placed
in limbo, until after completion of the rehabilitation, adding another unknown
to the ultimate feasibility of the venture.
Plans and Permits
.The preparation of plans was a complex problem for King-Bison
as the conflicting requirements to obtain financing and to obtain building permits
were negotiated. Recall that the purpose of this case is not to reveal the incom-
petence of the redeveloper, but rather the impact of all the hurdles that constrain
(13)the small-scale rehabilitator.
The John Hancock Life Insurance Company, intending to invest in this
effort of King-Bison's, influenced the planning.(14) Jointly, the initial design
target became thirty-one dwelling units, achievable by converting each of the
large, but obsolete stores, into two apartments.
Code and Zoning requirements for type IV buildings in an L-1 zone
straddling an H-1 zone were quite different from what in fact existed on the site.
Not only the wooden joists and rafters, but the high density of lot coverage
(dwelling units/lot area), the fact of a four story building where only three
stories were permitted, the inadequate street setback, the lack of usable open
space around the building -- all were non-conformities. The status of the private
way, Miller Park, added to the confusion. Could its area be included in the
calculations? The various officials showed little enthusiasm to grapple with 111B-6
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the intricacies of the case. It is the burden of the applicant to demonstrate
that his building intentions are within the spirit of the code. Where cases
obviously fall outside the code, the Board of Appeals has jurisdiction within
the limits of "conditional use" -- spelled out amb'uvously in the code, and
really only evident in practice. The Board of Appeals procedure is an
uncertain three month process. To maintain schedule within the John Hancock
financing commitment, King-Bison decided to apply for permits for those
construction tasks permissible without the ruling of the Board of Appeals,
then amend these permits subsequently, when the time to rehabilitate the
ground floor stores arrived. In this way, work on the existing apartments would
not be delayed.
In August 1968 the task of obtaining any sort of permit began. After one
or two false starts, it became clear that King-Bison was applying for permits for
seven , not three buildings. They had prepared the original applications and
drawing for three buildings. The street numbering inspector found that he was
unable to allocate the four building numbers, 471, 473, 475-, and 477 against
the five buildings fronting on Dudley Street. Since he possessed two street maps,
which were inconsistent, he clearly felt the problem was beyond him. Instead he'
recommended examining the files in the legal occupancy division, where cumulative
records on each building are stored. Here the confusion was compounded since
records were. misfi led in the folders indexed by street number. The original permits
were executed in 1897, before there were any street numbers -- the buildings were IllB-7
merely referenced by location between cross streets! The street numbering
inspector's dilemma was resolved by.surreptitiously proposing how the
buildings could be numbered, whereupon he corrected his chart and assigned
King-Bison those numbers.
After spending two full man-days in the Building Department and a $2
fee per building, King-Bison obtained a short form permit, enabling cleanout
and wreck-out of the buildings. They began the process filing long form-
applications for the rehabilitation. It appeared that procedures had just been
revised and assigned to the jurisdiction of Mr. Pepicelli, a benevolent, paternal
brick mason, proud of his authority. He outlined the process of taking the
drawings in triplicate to the Inspector of the Fire Department at Southampton
Street for his initials.
Simultaneously, King-Bison obtained a Xerox of a completed application
permit for rehabilitation on which the Synopsis of the Proposed Work touched on
all the relevant aspects.
Plans were-now revised to show the existing stores remaining as is (for
the time being) to obtain the approval of the inspector in the Fire Department,
Lieutenant Sancsta. Unfortunately, Lt. Sandsta was the only one who could
initial the drawings, and he had just left for two weeks vacation without
designating a substitute. After the two weeks, King-Bison learned that the
Inspector broke his leg on vacation and would be unavailable for another ten
days. Finally upon his return, revisions to his satisfaction were made on the spot.
"Glass blocks in the basement openings . . . 5/8" sheet rock and emergency 1118,9
lighting in the public stairs .... " He initialled the drawing and kept one
copy of each as predicted by Pepicelli in the Building Department.
Pepicelli was not happy about the mom and pop stores. "This can't
be rehabilitation. You better get Martin (the Deputy. Building Commissioner)
to handle these permits." But when Martin was in, Pepicelli was out. Martin
felt it was rehab. 16) (See Fig. IIIB.2. , Rehabilitation Permit Breakdown.)
Upon meeting with the Building Commissioner, Thuma, the problem
became clear, although not its resolution. The Rehabilitation permit was
designed to integrate with the FHA's rapid processing of the BURP program,
and was really only available to BURP sponsors. It was a tremendous time saving
under the Rehab permit. "Do you realize how we'd look if we had riots in
Boston this summer, and 1700 building permits were stalled here?" Clearly
the department could not handle that many under conventional procedures.
To assuage excessive resentment over the conventional procedures, look<-alike
efforts were allowed to be processed like BURP. King-Bison had inadvertently
fallen into this category. But BURP buildings were specifically chosen so that no
zoning and legal occupancy problems could arise. In King-Bison's case, this
posed a dilemma. The temporary solution was a messy compromise. Thuma
suggested to his deputy, Martin, that permits for rehabilitation of the upstairs
apartments be granted under the streamlined $20 fee arrangement, but that
occupancy of the stores be negotiated in the conventional manner. By mid-
September King-Bison had permits. Technically it was in a position to ilB-9
now
Fig. III B.2.
Rehabilitati n Permit Breakdown
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A. File Long Form application with Plans. Synopsis of fraposed
ElectricalSprinkler,Plumbing and Oas modifications. Plans to
be filed in triplicate,
B. The Fire Department will see all plans and ,retain one set
before plans are forwarded to Building Dapartment.
c. A flat fee of $20.00 per apartment to be paid by either
the wner or the developer. The above fee 'includes Gas,
sprinklerplumbing and electrical permits.
Project Director for the Program if Mr. Leo F. Martin.
.Re:Applicant must be present at the time of the processing
of application and plans.
Indicate in Synopsis:
Necessary repairs of Exterior Masenry Walls,
Fire EscapesGuttersproper connection of
roof drains to storm sewersChimeys,ncinerators
basement floors and boiler rooms.
Indicate by legend mn plans.
(a) Existing (b)New Work - Walls to be removed
One hour fire resistive construction
a. Walls separating apartments
b. Walls of stair enclosures
c. Walls of corridors and path of egress
d. Basement ceilings throughout
State in synopsis or plans 13/4" Solid core doors,
redecorating prescribed in F.H.A. Rehab Agreement or
contract.
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rehabilitate the buildings as they were in 1897, but permission for the conversion
of obsolete ground floor stores into apartments still lay ahead of them. Over two
months and several man-weeks were required for even this partial accomplishment,
not to mention the costs of being unable to commence rehab shortly after acqui-
sition.
Change of Occupancy Procedure
Building Commissioner Thuma's June 21, 1968 letter on permit
procedures makes quite evident that going to the Board of Appeals is a lengthy,
cunibersorne process. How cumbersome only became apparent over the next year
and a half. (See Fig. 111B.3., Building Department Permit Procedures.)
After Fire Department Approval and submission of two sets of structural
plans and two certified plot plans, Building Department review begins. Step 4
of this letter indicates that "within ten days" after filing the applicant "should
be notified" if his plan does not conform with the Zoning Acts of January 1, 1965,
as amended. Next, examination for conformity with Building Law requirements
requires ten to thirty working days, depending on complexity. At twenty working
days to the month, up to two months may be consumed determining successive
reasons for rejecting the application.
With the stated reasons for rejection in hand, the applicant has the
right to file an appeal, but "must do so on proper form and within stipulated
periods. It usually takes about sixty days after filing to have the case heard by
the Board of Appeals." 1118-11
Fig. ll1.B3. Building Department Permit Procedures
Short-form applications are designed according to law to allow
work to be dono of a minor non-structural nature not involving hazards
to the public or to the occupants of the building. Those are limited to
$500.00 in the first fire district and $1000.00 elsowhere. Approved
short-form applications will result in an inmediote permit. Long-form
applications, so-called ore for other than minor construction or alteration
and plans are required. Theso applications necessarily tako longer to be pro-
cessed. The procedures are as follows:
(1). For new construction-Approval by the Public Works Depart-
ment, for sewer, water and stroet grade Is required.
(2). Fire Dopartment-Approval is required for othor than one or
two family houses. The Fire Department enforcos the pro-
visions of the Fire Prevention Code.
(3). Two sets of structural plans are required and two plot plans
certified by a Massachusetts registored professional engineer
or architect.
(4). Plans must conform to the provisions of the Zoning Acts
of I January 1965, as amended. You should recoive a card
within approximately ten working days of filing if your plan
does not conform. More complex buildings may take longer
and simple designs less.
(5). After Zoning will como Plan Examination. Should your
plan not conform to Building Law requiroments, you will
receive notico from a Plan Examiner. Depending on
complexity this requires ten to thirty working days.
(6). If your plan fails to conform either to Zoning or Building
Law you have the right of appoal to the Bocrd of Appeal
which Board, aftr a hearing, may decida in your favor
or not. Access to the Board of Appeals is your right, but
you must do so on proper form and within stipulated. poriods.
It usually takes about sixty days after filing to havo the case
heard by the Board of Appools.
(7). Assuming that your plan meets all requiromants of Law or
that the Board of Appeal has givon you a favoroblo docision
a Building Permit will be issued to you. To obtain the
permit your application must be signed by the licensed
mochonic who is to bo in charge of the work.
Assuming that the nocessary inspections have been made and
completed satisfactorily the inspector will file a "final raport" cortifying
to that effoct. You may s.e this report, and may upon payment of a
small fee obtain a copy of it.
Protect yourself before buying property. Chock the records of this deportment for legal occupancy of, and for complaints
against, the property you propose to purchase. IIIB-1
Dutifully King-Bison went through the above procedures. They
attempted to obtain statements of consent to the proposed plans from the
abutters. Since King-Bison was aware that objections principally stemmed
from excess density of land coverage, it was willing and eager to buy
additional land. It set about finding the abutters to obtain either land or
consent.
The Dudley Street site is in the Boston Model Cities area. Jurisdiction
over the cleared land surrounding the properties presumably rested with the
Model Cities Administration. King-Bison prepared a presentation to Dr. Sam
Thompson of the Model Cities Administration (MCA).. He appeared favorably
impressed by King-Bison's dedication to rehabilitationi and "wanted to do all
he could to help. " Decisions regarding actual parcels were being handled by
Ed Teitcher, on loan to Model Cities from the BRA.
A visit with Mr. Teitcher at the BRA site office near Government Center
was inconclusive as well. On the Master Plan, dated January 1965, the entire
area was designated as an educational site. Obviously it would be impossible
for him to support this endeavor. But the fact that two doors up the street, also
within this area, a new drug store had been built, interested him since he had a
store he was trying to relocate. The possibility of relocating the BRA client into
one of King-Bison's vacant stores was examined at length. This fell through,
however.
In subsequent visits, it became clear that the BRA would neither block
nor assist this particular venture. Acquisition of individual adjoining parcels, IIIB-13
foreclosed by the City, and held in trust by Model Cities or the BRA, was not
possible without a more general plan for the area. Teitcher suggested that
King-Bison as redeveloper propose some plans for rebuilding the entire
surrounding area as low density residential. King-Bison gave this a try. Plans
cost months to develop but brought King-Bison no closer to economic viability-
and code approval for the existing properties.
One adjoining parcel, fronting on Dudley Street was ostensibly still
privately owned. It too, was a vacant, rubble strewn lot. But a visit to the
Assessor's Department to determine the owner was most enlightening. Boston's
tax records are computerized. In neat print-out, it was evident that the
property at 479 Dudley Street was a three story frame-building containing three
apartments, sitting on 7,000 square feet of land all belonging to Marvin Peck.
The back of the card showed that taxes on the property had not been paid in
four years; the tax bills mailed to Marvin Peck at the address having been
returned unopened. Discussion with the clerk was no help. He was not interested
that the supposed building filled with apartments had ceased to exist some time
ago. It was a common problem, he said. Meanwhile tax liens on the property are
allowed to accumulate. The clerk indicated that after four years of non-payment,
the property would be referred to the Real Property Division. If no owner were
found, it would be foreclosed. King-Bison learned that for several more years
this property would be out of reach to them. There was no Marvin Peck in the
telephone directory, nor was there any assurance that this was still the real name IlIB-
of a real owner. For the present, the 7,000 sq. ft. lot was unavailable, just
as the surrounding vacant lots were unavailable without an architecturally
appealing master plan.
To present a clear case to the Board of Appeals, it was important to
know the facts and the relevant laws. How many square feet did the property
contain? What was its floor area ratio? How to interpret the status of the
Miller Park "private way" and the lot lines? Could the 2,018 sq. ft. of
Miller Park be included? Did the code requirement of 5,000 sq. ft. for the
first dwelling unit, and 2,000 sq. ft. for each additional dwelling unit apply
to the original lots, or could this be applied to the entire package? Unofficial
interpretations differed. King-Bison was advised to see the Engineering Depart-
ment. This Department advised that.a clue to the status of Miller Park lay in
the size of lettering used in the official street index of Boston.
Miller Park was owned in common by the abutting property owners, i.e. ,
the lot area could not include it, but the abutters own it as a private way, subject
to public use. If King-Bison wished to include it, they were advised 1) to check
whether any utility easements laid claim to the strip, and if not, then 2) petition
the Mayor via the Public Improvements Commission to deed the strip in question
to King-Bison as sole abutter. Although a favorable ruling from the Board of
Appeals was essential for economic viability of the package, there was no way
of ascertaining whether a deed to the 2018 sq. ft. would enhance the case
sufficiently to justify the effort in-obtaining it. IIIB-15
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ZONING COMPUTATION FORM COVERING ALL NEW BUILDINGS, CHANGES OF OCCUPANCY, ALTERATIONS, ETC.
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Floor Area/factor = spaces (for offices. stores, factories, etc.)
(4) (FF-STREET LOADIN: AwTwiLE 24
(only required for uses other than I through 10, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 50, 52. 53, 58, 59)
NorE: All of above data is to be attached to, or incorporated into, the Plot Plan Signed by Certified Land Surveyor or Certified Engineer
Fig. JI.B.4.
BD 534
17,108
8,825
8,283ff
I I I I
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King-Bison returned to the Zoning Inspector in the Building Department;
he could offer little further help. "Reasonable" adherence to code and zoning
could solely be determined by the Board of Appeals. "Isn't there anyone who
can advise us on what has constituted 'reasonableness' in the past?" At this
point the name of an attorney who knows the Board well was surreptitiously
offered. David Bird felt King-Bison could not use such services. "Why, if
we can't get those permits fairly, then no little guy is going to be able to get
rehab permits fairly.
For each building, although virtually all five were identical, the appeal
had to be filed in quadruplicate, stating the aspects and degree of nonconformity.
Of course the area interpretations were prejudicial against the case unless the
package was viewed as a whole. To change the present stores to a lower use
designation, for residential use only,, necessitated an amendment, a change of
occupancy fee and a Board of Appeals hearing fee -- $50, $25, $100 respectively
plus $5 per thousand of additional construction cost not covered in the original
building permit. This amounted to over $200 per store. Fees are paid upon
application, and, King-Bison was given to understand, are non-refundable in
case of adverse decision by the Board.
At this point King-Bison stalled, as the mortgage commitments by John
Hancock lapsed. Due to the rising interest rates and the uncertainty of the
project outcome, there was no extension of the original commitment to provide
financing.(17) 1118-17
Cost Impact of the City Regulations
The time and effort expended in attempting to negotiate the
bureaucratic maze was incredible. In monetary terms, the equivalent of
nearly a one man-year on the part of middle-salaried personnel at King-
Bison was consumed in reaching the present point.(18) This has no doubt
engaged half again as much time and effort on the part of the counterpart
bureaucrats. The direct costs of the procedures in this case must have been
well over $20,000, taking normal overhead into account.
Less direct, but no less real, were the costs of delaying the work force, of
increases in construction expenditures while nothing was happening, and of risks
of vandalism while the units were not occupied. The'extra expenditures actually
exacted by the process -- emergency lighting in the stairs, 5/8" sheet rock in the
halls -- were relatively insignificant in comparison to the costs to'redeveloper and
City alike, of determining what was required.
Finally, the least tangible costs lie in the psychological impact of fighting
and attempting to negotiate such mazes. Statistics state this most clearly. There
has been almost no action in small scale rehab. "The Administrator of the BRA
admitted (May 1969) that, of 1700 housing units promised for completion in 1969
in the South End, only 135 units were under way in May. " King-Bison's efforts in
the South End accounted for a substantial fraction of these. When the large work
force engaged in the seventeen agencies affecting housing focusses on so few
units, it is inevitable that they will consume much of the redeveloper's time. IIIB-18
The CHPA task force, studying the failure of Boston to produce
housing, concluded that "housing functions in the city agencies were too
fragmented to respond to clear policy directions. What should have been
a strong current of municipal policy was broken into eddies and became
sluggish meandering through bureaucracy . . . a job given to many agencies
is not really given to any. ,(20)
Worth noting is that the reconstruction costs of rehabilitation are not
particularly high. While there are no economies of scale, the tasks are well-
suited to the small scale builder. It is in the negotiation with authorities
that the small scale rehabber loses out. In this case, it appears that
bureaucratic, not reconstruction costs hobble the rehabilitator.
1118-19
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EVALUATION OF THE SMALL-SCALE REHAB MODEL
Problems in the Model
The simple model of the rehabilitation process assumes that the owner
has the incentive to rebuild, and that public authorities have the right to channel
this energy into constructive building forms by permitting only those structures
which are neither hazardous nor unsanitary. The applicant seeks permission and
it is his task to prove that his proposal is reasonable. Underlying this is a more
basic assumption that redeveloper and regulator alike, share the goal of providing
standard housing.
The model assumes 1) that the incentive is adequate and probably monetary,
being derived from the market, 2) that the regulatory constraints are relatively
frictionless, promoting healthy and safe alternatives. In fact the incentives of
the small-scale rehabilitators in general are largely non-monetary (derived from
the commitment to do something), and inadequate to the task, once its entirety
becomes evident during the process.
King-Bison was not motivated by economic.gain, but by the commitment to
produce fair housing at a reasonable price. Purely financial incentives ceased to
stimulate conservation in the area some time earlier. Nonetheless, its assessment
of the feasibility of rehabbing the cluster of buildings containing obsolete stores
into apartments seems reasonable based on its own cost figures from prior rehab
efforts. No responsible official found fault with the concept in discussions prior
to ccquisition. Only when plans were well advanced and King-Bison was IIIC-1
negotiating with the BRA as abuttor for additional land or its consent, did the
ephemeral Master Plan of 1965 surface, preventing the BRA from publicly
supporting the project. Nor should the Company have anticipated such red tape and
delays in trying to convert from a higher to a lower land use. Indeed, one would
expect the City to support and expedite the conversion of hazardous, vacant,
obsolete stores into much needed dwellings. (2
The enormity of the task deceptively lay not so much in the physical
reconstruction, but in negotiations with the regulators that dissipated and absorbed
(23)
the original incentive with little justification. Instead of finding the clear-cut
regulatory procedures which the model suggests, the redeveloper faces ill-defined
jurisdictions administering arbitrarily, that engage him in games, rather than guide
.(24)
and support him.
The lengthy change of occupancy procedure for the stores prevented King-Bison
from rehabilitating these units when the trades were already on site, in the
building. Instead, they had to return again later, increasing costs.
The jurisdiction over Rehab vs. rehab, between Pepicelli (FHA) and Martin
(without FHA) was even more farcical, each suggesting jurisdiction in the case lay
with the other. Again we encounter the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which an
unattainable outcome (that nevertheless seems reasonable) can be posited by each
actor so long as they do not coordinate. The excessive constraints appear to arise
from too much regulation by too many actors with too little coordination and too
little communication. It cannot be assumed that common goals and common per-
ceptions rationalize the process. The redeveloper comes to realize that his end goal
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of more decent housing is not uppermost with the authorities. The regulators appear
to him more pre-occupied with justifying their own importance or role within the
overall system. The permit applications simply furnish the grist for the many agencies
which interact thereupon with too little rhyme or reason.
The rationale of the regulatory actions becomesmore evident if we try to see
the situation from the role of the building commissioner. (In fact most of the local
public agencies share this viewpoint.) He is the proclaimed guardian of welfare.
He cannot approve excessive densities, firetraps, or unhealthy conditions. Although
these may abound all around, when specifically asked to afix his signature to a permit
for a project within his jurisdiction, he cannot, for by doing so he might well be
committing political suicide. The most successful gaming strategy would be to avoid
the need for his stamp altogether. Small projects with minor upgrading presumably do
this, but a substantial effort like the Dudley Street properties cannot. In "the old
days" such a commissioner might have been practical, and shared an appreciation of
what was reasonable, but now he holds a political appointment, has "face," and an
importance that must not be slighted.
How General Is the Case of King-Bison's Dudley Street Properties?
There is little we can say with certainty. Herein lies the weakness of
case studies, but impressionistic evidence suggests that autonomous upgrading in
these areas for rental without subsidies has recently ceased to be feasible
economically. King-Bison's problems would have been considerably less if they
had not attempted change of occupancy procedures to convert stores, which some 111C-3
officials still thought "a good thing."
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From this case we learn that the outlook for small-scale rehab for rental is
gloomy without major modifications in the processing system: reducing the number
of actors and multiple regulation, or alternatively increasing coordination and
communication among them. To recommend the latter is a political ploy, since
t is unrealistic to expect coordination among so many agents. In spite of increased
construction costs, small-scale rehabilitation appears ironically to be hobbled not
by the inability to achieve economies of scale in on-site reconstruction, but the
inability to reach sufficient "politics-of-scale" to overcome arbitrary regulations
through influence , or ignore them as it could in the past before subsidies
legitimized them. As a result, many sound structures in marginal areas are rendered
untouchable due to obsolete use classification. Like the Dudley Street properties,
these structures often contain occupied dwelling units that are being forced into "red
tape blight." Clearly the revision of use classification should not be handled by the
present system in such a piece-meal, pin-pricking manner, because the effort dissipated
in the process stops all action.
Change of use.is simply one aspect of the present system that this case brought
to light, but it is symptomatic of other aspects, which other cases -can document.
In summary, the incentive to the small-scale unwary redeveloper who did the
bulk of maintaining and upgrading housing in the past is clearly inadequate. But he
is excessively constrained as well because he can no longer achieve an overview to
judge the viability of a given project without actually carrying it out. Concomitant.
with recent fragmentation of jurisdictions, it appears regulations are devised "in the
process." Each regulator seems to act from an excessively narrow conception of his
IlIC
impact and to hold erroneous assumptions about the incentives and constraints
governing the roles of others. The process dissipates too much of the redeveloper's
energy in requiring that he obtain consent from too many segments of a fragmented
bureaucracy wherein no one shares his goals.
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1II
1. Boston Redevelopment Authority, the local renewal agency, was responding
to the federal guidelines which called for non-profit groups to act as sponsors for 221
(d)(3) and 221(h) new-built and rehab efforts.
2. Each of these steps really compromises a set of operations, but for
simplicity they have been grouped. Most of the small-scale rehabilitators in Boston
follow the sequence illustrated. The process has been most explicitly detailed and
chronicled by Whittlesey in The South End Row House. When the scale of the effort
increases, the process alters as described in the examination of BURP efforts, section
IVE.
3. In small-scale rehabilitation the sponsor often is the redeveloper and
contractor, all in one. In larger efforts, specialization sets in and these functions
are separated.
4. The federal designation of a neighborhood.as a Renewal Area has impact
on financing terms, and insurance availability. Beyond that, different areas have
widely differing "mystiques," governing the willingness of financiers to invest.
5. Direct acquisition of title enhances his bargaining position with
hesitant bankers and insurance agents, but is risky, even foolhardy if he is inexperienced.
6. For example, mom and pop stores in his package, or group of units,
although long since rendered obsolete by some shopping center, cannot be converted
into additional dwelling units without opening the Pandora's Box of bringing all units
up to code, or facing complex Board of Appeals procedures.
7. There are alternatives to contracting the rehabilitation to outsiders.
The sponsor can act as his own contractor. He can insist on training indigenous
skills. Another strategy is to rehab around dwellers who remain in some of the units,
thereby discouraging vandalism. These latter strategies tend to raise the immediate
cost of rehab (even though they may ultimately be beneficial, training takes time
and money; rehabbing around existing families complicates the work flow). They can
be viewed as a crude approximation to insurance premiums that his stock will not be
destroyed.
8. Melvin King, one of the founding partners, is now head of Boston's New
Urban League. The general partners presently responsible are David Bird and George
Sommaripa. College roommates and well-connected in the Boston community (Bird
and Sons, roofing and construction supplies), they were previously operating a
political economic consulting firm. King, Bird, and Sornmaripa became King-Bison. Ill Fn
9. King-Bison's selection criteria were developed from their previous
experiences in the South End. There they had obtained buildings for rehabilitation
from the Boston Renewal Authority under subsidized write-down. On the basis of
plans provided by the BRA, obtaining the necessary permits was relatively simple.
In judging the feasibility of the Dudley Street project, they were unaware of the
high time and effort costs involved in assembling their own package and in obtaining
change of occupancy rulings to enable the conversion of obsolete stores into
apartments.
10. How typical this situation is, is difficult to say. But "slumlord"
ownership appears to be a more tenuous business than is commonly recognized.
When code enforcement threatens, the owner simply vanishes. Holders of first
and second mortgages do not come forward, since the liabilities that can attach
to such a property are overwhelming -- foreclosure would shift these liabilities
onto them.
11. Suburban properties regularly sell for eight to ten tirres current gross
rental income, i.e. an apartment renting at $150 a month has a capitalized value
of $15,000 to $18,000. Note that an improvement that pays back to the suburban
owner in well under eight years is worthwhile; an improvement in the slums must
pay back in well under two years to recommend itself.
12. The passage of the Massachusetts Insurance Act in 1968 eased insurance
problems. Under this measure, risks were assigned to insurance companies doing
business in Massachusetts on an equitable basis. After implementation of this act,
King-Bison's regular agent was able to place coverage for these propertiesi
13. Interviews with the majority of the small-scale rehabilitators in Boston
revealed that these experiences are typical rather than extreme.
14. Planning began with a financial feasibility analysis, done on HUD forms
(HUD 6230A, which is an abbreviated version of the well-known 2013 form). Based
on income and operating expense projections on thirty-one dwelling units on the site,
they were willing to cover up to 75% of the outlay, by committing $180,000 in
financing at 6 3/4% over twenty years upon completi.on of the rehabilitation. Interim
financing or construction loans were to be secured from other banks.
15. It tumed'out that in the thirty line summary, the number of meter loops,
amperage of individual circuits, type and material for water. supply were of
particular interest to the building department. It saved some effort to know this
before typing five permit applications in duplicate. The only other way to discover
what is called for in some of the blanks is by trial and error probing.
16. Regular building permits cover the building process in a fragmented manner,
distinguishing between trades. Electrical, plumbing, pipe-fitting are all covered by
separate additional permits. The Rehabilitation Permit procedure administered by lilFt
Pepicelli was designed to deliver one comprehensive permit, for a flat fee of
$20 per dwelling unit. The sum of fees for the separate permits amounted to
considerably more than that.
17. How will King-Bison's problems with the Dudley Street package be
resolved? On the ninth of December, 1969, the hearing with the Board of Appeals
took place. King-Bison obtained a favorable endorsement of the venture by Thomas
Atkins, Boston's black City Councillor, which it brought to the hearing. The Boston
Housing Authority, which seeks Leased Housing Agreements for placing low income
.residents in private housing throughout the City, has virtually committed itself to
fill all available apartments in the project upon completion. This influence coupled
with the real pressure on the City administration to produce some housing should
enable a resolution, but this has clearly been a philanthropic undertaking. King-
Bison's and the tax-payers' dollars, administered by the Housing Authority, subsidized
the cumbersome city processes.
18. Interviewing church groups sponsoring rehab in the South End, I found
it not unusual for a minister to have spent the better part of three years shepherding
a small project through, over, and around all the hurdles. A large proportion of
this can simply be called "learning," but it goes to waste when the effort is not
repeated, as is generally the case.
19. King-Bison Five Year Report, p. 1.
20. Citizens Housing and Planning Association, "To Rebuild a City," Preface.
21. Most of the non-profits interviewed indicated that they would not
consider repeating their efforts without major changes in strategy or higher subsidies.
22. A clear clue to the impending difficulties lay in the market discounting
of the value of these properties. When properties are traded for only twice their
gross annual earnings, this is a market expression of the uncertainty that they will
be assets much longer.
23. The problem is analogous to congesti6n on the highways, where each
additional-vehicle recognizes the problem as too many cars, but fails to take into
account the contribution of his own vehicle's presence to the congestion. Similarly,
the bureaucrat is aware of the excessive red tape, but fails to see how his own actions
contribute to the friction of rebuilding the housing stock.
24. Arbitrariness is suggested by the fact that procedures governing BURP
were decidedly different; ill-definition is revealed by the fact that King-Bison's
venture was erroneously classified as an FHA Rehabilitation, compounding the
problem with the Board of Appeals.
IliFn
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CHAPTER IV--THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL SUBSIDIES ON METHODICAL
REHABILITATORS
NATIONAL TOOLS DIRECTED TOWARDS DECENT HOUSING
The Catalogue of HUD Programs, of June 1969, contains brief descriptions
of the programs and services administered by HUD and stresses cooperation at all
(1)levels. The preface states "HUD aids may take the form of grants, guarantees,
direct loans, mortgage and loan insurance, technical and advisory assistance, or
training assistance.
The "smorgasbord" confronting the housing conserver is quite bewildering.
(2)
See Fig. IVA. 1. for a partial selection.
As recently as 1965, when the South End Community Development, Inc.
(SECD) demonstration was conceived, it seemed that acquisition cost "write-down"
plus FHA insurance on the mortgages would be sufficient to enable large scale
rehabilitation. "Write-down" utilized Title I of the 1949 Housing Act, and the
mortgage insurance was obtained under section 220, added by the Housing Act of
(3)1954.
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Fig. IV A.1 Overview of Federal Rehabilitation Assistance Programs
Category
Rehabilitation grants
Rehabilitation loans
Various loans and grants
Mortgage insurance in
declining neighborhoods
Planning grants and
technical assistance
Mortgage insurance for
low and moderate income
Interest supplements on
home mortgages
Interest supplements on
rental + coop mortgages
Leased Housing
Mortgage insurance for
homeone rsh ip through
credit assistance
Rehabilitated hoses for
low income buyers
Multiple dwellings for
rental to low + moderate
income families
Rent supplements
Major home improvements
loans and insurance
Low income housing
demonstration grants
Relocation assistance
Authority Admin.
see 115
312
Title I
sec 223e
106
HUD
RUD
HUD/RA
FHA
FHA
221(d)(2) FHA
235
236
FHA
FHA
23,10c HAL
237 FHA
221(h) FRA
221(d)(3) FRA
Title I
see 203
220
207
107
HUD/RT
HUD
Remarks
$3000 total, S3000/yr max
income in renewal areas
20 yr, 3% in renewal areas
urban renewal projects
waiver of actuarial sound-
ness normally required by
FHA
interest free to
non-profit sponsors
market interest rate
insured mortgages
payments to mortgagee to
reduce interest down to 1
payments to mortgagee to
reduce interest down to 1%
lease and purchase of scat-
tered units for low income
voluntary counselling
enables insurance of
home mortgages
mortgages at 1-3% towards
dilapidated, substandard
housing for rehabilitation
and insurance
mortgages at 3% or market
rate and insurance
HUD pays difference between
25% dweller's income and
fair market rent
up to $10,000 loans for
20 yrs for rehabbing one to
four family homes
research and development
grants for innovations in
low income housing
purchase of replacement
dwellings, up to 5000 to
displacees of other UD
programs
Sources abstracted from C44al one of BUD Programs,
June 1969, in order of presentation.
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THE CASE OF SOUTH END COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED
The time pattern of federal support to facilitate low income housing
consists of successively increased incentives to the suppliers. To prevent
misapplication of the assistance, elaborate procedures and mechanisms channel
their distribution. Simultaneously, .roles of many specialists and professionals
are legitimized by this additional regulatory process. In effect, a whole new
set of constraints has come into being along with the increased incentives,
largely offsetting their impact.
The case of South End Community Development, Inc. (SECD), furnishes
a clear illustration of the impact of federal subsidies to housing suppliers, from
which their influence on the pre-existing housing system can be deduced. As with
King-Bison above, it is revealing to examine this case in some detail, so that
inferences may be drawn.
Many of the housing incentives in the federal "smorgasbord" are not open
to all applicants. Rather, they are available only to specifically qualified groups
who follow the application procedures properly. In response to the federal legis-
lation, many limited dividend and non-profit housing sponsors came into being.
In Boston a lower property tax rate for such entities further favored their creation.
United South End Settlements (USES), a group of settlement houses merged into a
single entity, had been active in the housing field for many years in the South End.
They decided to carry out a rigorous examination of the methods and costs of
rehabilitation by rebuilding some row houses. In the spring of 1964 USES filed IVB-1
an application for a low income housing demonstration grant (pursuant to Section
207 of the National Housing Act of 1961, as amended) with the Federal Housing
and Home Finance Agency (subsequently incorporated into HUD). A grant of
$205,300 was awarded to USES in July 1964. USES executed a contract with
SECD, Inc., a new non-profit corporation formed to carry out the program. One
of the provisions of the grant called for detailed study and report of the process.
This was carried out by Robert Whittlesey, director of SECD, and the
report was issued as a paperback, The South End Row House, in 1969. Much
of the information presented here is found in this highly readable, yet well-
documented study.
Case Overview
Whittlesey furnishes a clear overview of the case:-. (
The South End of Boston is a predominantly residential area, just
one mile from downtown Boston. Developed during the last century,
the area has now the largest proportion of families and persons with
incomes under $3,000 of any district in Boston. The typical residential
structure in the South End is a four or five-story, rather elegant brick
row house, built originally as a single family home. An urban renewal
plan has been adopted for the South End which calls for the rehabilitation
of 75% of the residential structures, 98% of which are these row houses.
Success of the renewal plan depends upon whether it is feasible and
practical to convert these row houses into standard apartments and
whether this can be done at costs which will permit rents which the
low-income families and persons now living in the area can afford.
A combination of means was employed including the use of a
non-profit corporation eligible for real estate tax relief, acquisition of
tax-foreclosed properties from the City of Boston, use of the corporation's
own professional staff and construction workers to the extent feasible,
financing the rehabilitations with loans at below-market interest rates
and ownership and operation of the properties on a not-for-profit basis.
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Eleven row houses in various sections of the South End were
acquired and rehabilitated in accordance with HUD/FHA regulations.
The rehabilitations of the houses were financed with mortgage loans
insured by the Federal Housing Administration under the provisions of
Section 221 (d)(3) of the National Housing Act, as amended. Seven
FHA multi-family housing project mortgage loans were obtained to
finance the rehabilitations. Four row houses were rehabilitated each as
a single FHA housing project. The fifth and sixth projects were pairs of
row houses, and the seventh project consisted of three houses on non-
contiguous lots. Each house had from three to five apartments when
completed.
The SECD Rehabilitation Process
The chronology of SECD's Project I is presented as evidence of the
cumbersomeness of the process. This was only one of seven concurrent projects,
each of which was as lengthy and difficult. The reader need not note every
event but should simply sense the maze through which the redeveloper is expected
to move his projects.
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CHRONOLOGY OF PROJECT 1
May 18, 1964 The Committee of the Permanent Charity Fund votes to make a grant
of $75,000 to United South End Settlements (USES) to be used as ini-
tial-capital for South End Community Development, Inc., (SECD).
May 29 SECD is granted a non-profit charter under Chapter 180, Section 3 of
the Massachusetts General Laws.
June 1 FHA advises USES to consult with them prior to the selection of any
properties in order that they may determine that:
(1) location of the properties is acceptable,
(2) physical security is acceptable. and
(3) the property will generate sufficient income to support the mort-
gage-Rental schedule being discussed at this time was between
$50-S90 per month.
June 5 Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) informs Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) that they support USES' applica-
tion for a demonstration grant and that the BRA is prepatred to offer
the following assistance:
(1) provide tax-foreclosed buildings at no cost for rehabilitation,
(2) advice and assistance in the areas of cost estimating, rehabilitation
design and advisory financial services.
June 8 USES submits a formal application to HUD for a demonstration grant
pursuant to Section 207 of Public Law 87-70, for the purpose of aiding
in the financing of a low-income housing demonstration program.
June 16 BRA informs HUD that they will give priority consideration to SECD
for the acquisition of tax-fereclosed building to be rehabilitated under
the demonstration project.
July 1 HU) approves USES' application for Low-income Housing Demonstra-
tion Grant.
August 13 The FHA outlines procedures SECD should follow
These are:
(1) select areas in South End in which they are interested,
(2) get FHA approval of these areas
(3) prepare tentative before and after room layouts
(4) submit these to FHA for feasibility analysis
(5) receive from FHA recommendation for formal application sub-
mission
September 1 SECD suggests that the BRA recommend five or six appropriate tax-
foreclosed buildings for use in the demonstrations. SECD stipulated that
these buildings must be large enough to contain five apartments and
also requests information on the condition of the buildings. Demonstra-
tion project covering a period of 30 months starts.
September 25 The BRA makes the following recommendations to SECD:
(1) conduct rehabilitation in both white and non-white areas in the
first phase of the project
IVB-4
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(2) reconsider the requirement that the buildings must have at least
five units
(3) acquire and rehabilitate some privately owned buildings in the
first phase, and
(4) consider acquiring privately-owned structures and rehabilitate
them with non-demonstration funds.
BRA submits to SECD a listing of 32 buildings which it recommends as
suitable for the demonstration. Only ten of this group are actually tax-
foreclosed buildings, the rest are privately owned. The BRA suggests
that SECD could make a private purchase of these buildings. Of the ten
tax-foreclosed buildings, the BRA describes eight buildings as being in
marginal condition and the other two as in fair condition.
NOTE
Of the four recommendations of the BRA, SECD complied with the
first three. The fourth recommendation, concerning the acquisition and
rehabilitation of a privately owned building with non-demonstration
funds, was impractical from SECD's standpoint because at this time, all
of its funds were committed to the demonstration. Of the second rec-
ommendation, SECD investigated the possibility of reducing the require-
ment for a minimum of five units but was informed by the FHA that
this was a statutory requirement and could not be changed by admini-
strative decision.
of the ten tax-foreclosed buildings, SECD, after inspecting them, deter-
mined that just one building, 216 Northampton, was acceptable as an
initial building in the demonstration.
October 23 The BRA submits for SECD's consideration a new list of twelve tax-
foreclosed buildings. The BRA states that in its opinion the rehabilita-
tion of these buildings is feasible and that all are located in priority re-
habilitation areas. In addition the BRA requests SECD to undertake the
rehabilitation of a vacant building at 161 West Newton Street which
must be acquired from a private owner. BRA strongly recommends that
SECD seek a waiver from the FHA on the five units requirement for
each project.
NOTES:
The above mentioned list of tax-foreclosed buildings was developed at a
number of meetings between SECD and the BRA. From this list, SECD
selected five buildings. These were: 216 Northampton, 38 East Spring-
field, 23 Greenwich Park, 10 Dartmouth, and 45 Dwight. In addition,
SECD agreed to consider the building at 161 West Newton Street.
November 2 SECD submits to the FHA for approval, a list of six buildings which
have been selected in consultation with the BRA. Also submitted were
before and after room layouts, tentative rent schedules and photographs.
November 4 The FHA stresses to SECD the importance of Urban Renewal Certifica-
tion because without it, there is some doubt as to the acceptability of
most of the areas that SECD has selected. FHA asks why the sites that
were selected were scattered all over the South End. SECD replies that
these were the best, vacant, tax-foreclosed buildings available.
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November 30 SECD formally requests that the BRA turn over to thei without con-
sideration, thle five buildings previously mentioned.
December 1 in a further discussion on the selection of sites, the SECD explains to
the FHA that it intends to enilarge holdings in each of thc areas selected
to thc extent possible and feast'bic. FHA. states that it will do everything
possiblc to make the programn a success. To this cud FHA agrees to ap-
prove all six sites as to location as long as they:
(1) meet the statutory requirement for the minimum number of units
(ive),
(2) that the buildings are structurally sound, and
(3) that the rents will be between S50--S90 per month,
FH A states that two or more buildings could be included in one project
as long as they are within one block of each other.
December 4 In a visit to Washington, SECD is informed by the FFIA that the statute
clearly requires a mninimium of five units per project under Section 221
(d) (3).
December 3 The SEC informs BRA that it has verbal approval from the FHA of
five tax-foreclosed buildings. The sixth building at 1 61 West Newton
Street is no longer being considered.
December 4 SEC) stresses to FHA the importance of having market and feasibility
studies done oncqurrentl with the development of plans and specif-
cations. HA 950 binimum standards are to be i.t" It was also agreed
that architectural drawings and construction costs would be handled in
a simplified manner. This would include:
(1) FHA review of room layout draeings.T
(2) SECD prepares detailed drawings, write-up and specifications.
(3) the latter are reviewed and approved by FHA:
(4) joint inspection of the buildings
(5) architect completes drawings;
(6) SECD obtains contract bids and architect prepares cost estimates;
(7) SECD reviews cost estimates with consultants;
(8) SECD resubmits application for mortgage insurance with sub-
stantiation of building costs.
December 7 SECD is informed by FHA that a preliminary application for mortgage
insurance (Form 2013) should be submaitted.
December 14 SECD submits mortgage application, outline specifications and before
and after floor plans on, four buildings; 216 Northampton, 38 E. Spring-
field, 23 Greenwich Park, and 10 Dartmouth. FHA starts feasibility
processing of these applications.
Jan. 13, 1965 SECD submits the rehabiitation specifications for first fous buildings
to the BRA for its comments and suggestions.
January 18 The BRA formally acquires the five buildings that SECD selected.
January 26 The BRA suggests thle following revisions in the rehabilitation specifica-
tions which had been submitted to them for review:
(5) completely remove the unused chimeys;
(2) install automatic heating controls (outdoors)
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(3) not to install a complete fire escape unless specifically required.
With reference to suggestions on methods for holding down re-
habilitation costs, the following were recommended:
(a) the mass purchase of materials;
(b) reduce labor costs through the utilization of youth work
crews and by SECD acting as its own general contractor;
and
(c) use alternative methods of property acquisition such as pri-
vate purchase and utilization of larger buildings.
February 3 SECD submits revised architectural floor plans on the four buildings.
The changes were suggested by the FHA architectural staff.
February 4 The BRA conveys the first ive buildings to SECD,
February 5 The FHA Commissioner announces his decision to put the first five
SECD's buildings under Section 233 of the National Housing Act. This
section concerns experimental housing and eliminates problems caused
by the absence of urban rencwal certification. It still permits SECD to
receive the benefits of Section 221.
February 9 In order to facilitate architectural designs, a contract for partition re-
noval and cleaning of the five buildings is awarded.
February 10 FHA states that the anticipated processing time from receipt of appli-
cation to commitment should be approximately ive to six weeks.
March 19 At a meeting with HUD in Washington, SECD is informed that all of
the demonstration projects must be FHA financed.
March 25 FHA advises SECD to submit drawings and specifications on proposed
rehabilitation. From these, construction costs are to be determined and
then a final mortgage application filed.
April 2 SECD submits to the BRA for its approval, the final plans and specifi-
cations for 38 E. Springfield. BRA approval of plans and specifications
is required by the disposition agreement. SECI submits an application
to the building department for a building permit for 38 E. Springfield
Street.
April 5 SECD submits to the FHA the final drawings and specifications on the
first four buildings.
April 26 The SECD is informed by FHA that FHA needs cost of construction.
This could be done by submitting contractor bids. If SECD wishes to
act as its own general contractor, it should submit a quantity take-off
estimate or submit a construction cost based on subcontractor bids.
April 28 Six bids received on 38 E. Springfield. The range of the bids is as fol-
lows:
1. S21,000 4. S36,500
2. $29,500 5. S41,500
3. $31,500 6. $54,000
Bid number I is withdrawn by the contractor, Bids did not include
sprinklers, fire windows, and other items, the requirement for which
was being reviewed by the Board of Appeals, and appliances and light
fixtures which SECD planned to buy direct from the supplier.
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May 5 SECD submits to FHA the. cost breakdown on 38 East Springfield
Street based upon contractor bids..
May 17 SECD's application for building permit at 38 East Springfield is denied
by the Building Department on the following grounds:
(1) lack of a 3' 6" stairway;
(2) lack of a 2-hour fire-resistive: enclosure around the stairs;
(3) lack of steel windows with wire glass within five feet of a fire es-
cape;
(4) winder stairways prohibited.
The Board of Directors of SECD votes in favor of seeking a variance on
these items.
May 28 SECD files an appeal on the Building Department's denial of its request
for building permit.
June 3 BRA informs SECD that it will support the appeal from the Building
Department's denial of a building permit at 38 E. Springfield Street.
June 17 FHA informs SECD that their calculations indicate that the mortgage
loan on the first four buildings is $50,000 each. After a review of these
calculations, it is agreed that these calculations are high. It is finally
agreed that construction costs are to be carried at $35,000 for 38 E.
Springfield, to which must be added the architect's fee of $3,400 to
arrive at the cost of improvements.
June 24 BRA approves the rehabilitation construction drawings for 38 E. Spring-
field Street.
July 7 SECD files a revised application for a mortgage loan insurance commit-
ment.
July 19 SECD is informed by the FHA that SECD has received an allocatio-n of
$455,000 at 3-3/8% interest.
August 10 The Housing Act of 1965 is passed by Congress. This Act requires for
the first time, the payment of prevailing wages in the construction of all
non-profit 221 (d) (3) projects. This Act also stabilizes the below-market
interest rate at 3%.
August 18 The Board of Appeals grants relief and clears the building permit for
38 E. Springfield Street.
September 9 SECD is informed by FHA that the commitment will be issued the
following week.
September 13 SECD is informed by FHA that SECD must re-file its mortgage applica-
tions to take into consideration the prevailing wage requirements of the
Housing Act of 1965.
September 17 SECD re-files the revised applications to reflect the prevailing wage re-
quirement.
October 4 SECD is informed by FHA that processing on all mortgage applications
is being delayed because the Regional Office of the FHA is reviewing
real estate tax arrangements.
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October 8
October 27
November 1
December 1
Jan. 14, 1966
May 1
May 26
July 25
August 1
October 3
Jan. 26, 1967
SECD received first mortgage insurance commitment on 38 E. Spring-
field Street under Section 221 (d) (3), pursuant to Section 233 (experi-
mental housing).
Pre-construction Conference on 38 E. Springfield Street is held.
Construction begins on 38 E. Springfield Street.
SECD determines that the Standard FHA Regulatory Agreement would,
in effect, bar the Corporation from carrying on activities other than the
operation of one individual housing project. After much consultation it
was decided that the FHA would delete these Sections but that the
SECD would promise to transfer to a non-profit entity satisfactory to
FHA.
Initial closing held.
SECD starts to accept applications for prospective tenants for 38 E.
Springfield Street.
Public dedication of 38 E. Springfield Street.
First tenant moves into 38 E. Springfield Street.
38 E. Springfield Street is completely rented.
Cost certification filed with FHA.
Final loan closing and assignment of loan to FNMA.
Source: R. Whittlesey, op. cit., Appendix C.
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Interpretation of the SECD Case
The chronology of SECD's subsequent projects was similar. (See Fig.
IVB. I.) Comparative analysis of these seven reveals that they are much the same.
While there were benefits gained by experience and repetition, these only produced
minor cost or time savings, generally offset by rising costs and revised procedures.
In each project, the processing time required to obtain the HUD/FHA commitment
exceeded one year and clearly became the determinant of the preconstruction
interval, notwithstanding the need for obtaining variances from the City. By
comparison., the period from start of construction to occupancy averaged under ten
months, never exceeding eleven.
Reconstruction costs were higher than expected by the BRA and FHA. In
part this was due, in a circular manner, to inflation during the period of delay,
but more generally this pointed up the failure to grasp the nature of the experiment.
The HUD demonstration grant was authorized because there were no adequate data
-(5)
on rehab costs in the South End. Yet the BRA Disposition Agreement attempted
to set maximum rents, and the FHA imposed cost limits on the rehabilitdtion.
The role played by the BRA and FHA did little to facilitate rents feasible to
low income families. In pursuit of this objective, SECD entered into negotiations
with the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), as soon as the leased housing program
pursuant to Section 23 of the National Housing Act became available. As a result,
two years after completion of the seven projects, thirty-three of the fifty apartments
were leased to the BHA. In these, the families pay an average of 56% of the rent and
the BHA pays the balance. 6) IVB--1(
Fig. V I. 1.
COMPLETION DATES IN CONNECTION WITH FHA LOAN PROCESSING
Commitment FHA Revised
FHA 20121 Application FHA 2013R 2  Feasibility FHA 2013R Commitment Initial Start of Final
Project submitted requested submitted completed submitted issued closing construction Occupancy Closing
1 11/2/64' 12/1/644 12/17/64 7/6/65 7/9/65'- 10/8/65 1/14/66 10/27/65 6/3/66 1/30/67
2 11/2/643 12/1/644 12/17/64 7/15/65 7/30/655 10/8/65 1/14/66 10/27/65 8/25/66 1/30/67
3 11/2/643 12/1/644 12/17/64 7/15/65 7/30/655 10/22/65 1/12/66 1/13/66 10/24/66 8/7/676
4 . 11/2/643 12/1/64' 12/17/64 7/15/65 7/30/655 10/22/65 1/12/66 1/13/66 12/2/66 8/7/676
5 8/24/65 10/25/65 1/24/66 6/9/667 6/23/66 9/6/66 10/28/66 10/28/66 7/26/67 3/25/686
6 8/24/65 11/15/65 3/14/66 7/11/66 8/12/66 12/29/66 1/26/67 1/26/67 11/28/67 3/25/68
7 9/13/66 12/13/668 3/10/67 8/14/67 -- 11/16/67 12/18/67 11/22/67 6/3/68 1/15/69
FHA 2012 - Request for Pre-Application Analysis of Multifamily Housing Proposal.
2 FHA 2013R - Application for Project Mortgage Insurance.
'FHA 2012 was not submitted at FHA's request, only architectural layouts and site plans submitted.
4 Location approved.
5 A second revised application submitted in September 1965 after National Housing Act was amended.
6 Reprocessing delayed final closing.
7 Commitment issued which was not accepted by SE CD.
Delayed 6 weeks awaiting allocation.
Source: Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 5-3, Table XIX.
In summary the SECD process has engaged quite a cast of characters in
completing each project of five to twelve dwelling units. Because of the nature
of the City, they include at least the Building Department, the Fire Department,
the Board of Appeals, as well as some owners and abutters, as in the case of King-
Bison. As a direct or indirect consequence of the federal incentives, this cast
has been augmented by the following: HUD in Washington, FHA in Boston, the
BRA, the City Real Property Department, and the BHA, as well as architects,
lawyers, and other professionals. The incentives also produced SECD in the first
place, to do the rehabilitating on behalf of its parent, USES. With so many
guardians, it is difficult for the tenant to have a voice in the process, yet his
normal choice to live elsewhere has been constrained.
Some of the direct impact of federal incentives to the small-scale redeveloper
is shown by Whittlesey's findings:
Mortgage loan financing under Section 221 (d)(3) is lengthy
and expensive and found to be impractical for small projects
such as those developed in this study.
HUD/FHA mortgage loan insurance commitment processing.
took more than twelve months for each project after the project
had been initiated. While other necessary steps in the developF
ment of a project also involved delays, the processing time I
required to obtain the HUD/FHA commitment became the limitibg
factor.
Organizational and processing costs to obtain HUD/FHA mortgige
financing are almost as much for the small projects completed
here as for projects of several hundred apartments. Administrat ve
costs to process mortgage loan applications on the study projects
far exceeded the costs allowed by HUD/FHA in the mortgage lkans.
The long processing time of the HUD/FHA commitments was caosed
by difficulties with an experimental program, SECD's lack of
experience with FHA procedures, inaccurate estimates of
construction costs, problems in connection with allocations
of below-market interest rate funds and FHA bureaucratic
requirements.
Notwithstanding difficulties experienced, the Corporation
believes HUD/FHA mortgage financing under Section 221 (d)(3)
was the best financing available. Indeed it was the only HUD/FHA
financing available in the South End during most of the period, so
that the Corpor t in had no choice under the terms of the HUD
grant contract. 7 )
While he is clearly stating that HUD/FHA mortgage financing appears the
best available,. he makes it evident that it is not enough and too encumbered.
Only through the leased housing subsidies was SECD able to achieve low rents while
paying off the initial costs.
Ongoing Problems
SECD discovered, as have many non-profit and other housing sponsors,
that the difficulties of housing management exceed those of housing development.(
They found that expertise for solving the problems in redevelopment was readily
available, but that the maintenance/management of these properties was a relative
terra incognita. Operating costs turned out considerably higher than allowed by
the FHA. (See Figure IVB.2.) Vacancy costs were less than half the allowed, but
repairs, painting, and management were two to three times higher than the amount
covered by FHA schedule. (9 ) These are largely due to the scattered and small-
scale nature of the program. Attempts at involving the tenants in maintenance
and management have so far not been promising. IVB-13
Fig. IV B.2.
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS COVERED BY
ESTiMATED BY SECD PER APARTMENT
FHA APPROVED RENTS AND ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS
Project
1 2 3 4 5 6 7'
Item FHA SECD FHA SECD FHA SECD FHA SECD FHA SECD FHA SECD FHA SECD
a) Vacancies S 69 S 26 S 71 S 26 S 70 $ 27 S 71 $ 26 S 77 S 29 $ 83 $ 29 $ 108 $ 37
b) Fuel 98 115 120 120 116 115 108 95 103 133 97 133 118 150
c) Utilities2  41 62 41 55 40 63 41 47 43 57 38 51 103 145
d) Insurance 42 58 65 63 46 58 48 61 61 64 66 78 88 107
e) Repairs & Painting 61 135 62 135 60 135 64 135 56 148 71 148 106 160
f) Halls & Misc. 20 35 20 30 20 30 18 35 22 27 22 28 17 33
g) Management lee1 46 200 52 200 46 200 47 200 52 200 55 200 72 200
h) Rescrve'4 24 41 24 40 24 40 24 37 29 43 38 44 35 60
Total Operating Costs $401 S 672 S 455 S 660. S 422 $ 668 S 421 S 636 $ 443 S 701 $ 470 $ 711 S 647 S 892
Real Estate Taxes $137 S 198 S 144 $ 194 $ 140 $ 201 S 142 S 198 S 157 S 216 $ 166 $ 222 S 231 S 277
Total Operating Costs
and Taxes $538 $ 870 $ 599 S 863 S 562 S 869 $563 .$ 834 S 600 $ 917 $ 636 $ 933 S 878 $1,169
Average AnnualPent $984 01,316 $1.022 S1,295 $1,006 $1,339 $1,015 $1,318 $1,131 $1,439 $1,187 $1,478 $1,539 51,845
Operating Costs and Taxes
as a Percent of Rent 55% 67% 58% 67% 56% 65% 55% 64% 53% 64% 54% 64% 57% 64%
1Projects 5, 6 and 7 fuel costs include cooking gas.
2 Project 7 rents include electricity.
3Fee based on management of 90 apartments with per apartment cost of $200.00 per annum.
4 SECD RE serve is 10% of items b, c, d, e, f.
5 Project 7 had 50 percent three and four-bedroom apartments.
Source: Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 6-4, Table XX!X.
PROBLEMS ENGENDERED BY THE SUBSIDIES
In the case of King-Bison's Dudley Street properties, the rehab process was
constrained by an excessive number of ill-defined jurisdictions attempting to
regulate or control it. In the case of SECD the provisions of federal incentives
has merely transposed these problems. BRA and FHA support aided negotiations
with the Code and Zoning Authorities, but the procedures requiring the hearing
of individual cases by the Board of Appeals remained. Not only do the original
actors retain their roles, but new ones have been added.
The effects of the present form of subsidies bring about several new aspects
to which we now turn the discussion: 1) such subsidies legitimate the roles of
facilitating beneficiaries, 2) they reshape or distort the market in potentially
unhealthy ways, and 3) they exacerbate the problems of maintenance and manage-
ment in the present housing market.
Facilitating Beneficiaries
The pressures to ameliorate specific "problems" are acute in the
political system. When housing is in poor condition, it seems to make political
sense to set and enforce standards. The substandard housing identified thereby
presumably becomes the responsibility of the owners. If there were adequate
incentives to fix up housing, regulation might work; otherwise it is mere buck-
passing while decline continues. The federal subsidies were to provide sufficient
incentive. Specific subsidies seemed natural as particular purposes became IVC-1
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expedient politically: to revitalize and recast the heart of the metropolis, to
arrest blight, to re-attract the deser'ilng middle class, to provide jobs for
skilled workers, etc.
Over time quite a tangle of separate subsidies got woven together. Listed
below is a partial index of those utilized by the small-scale rehabbers in Boston
(listed in Fig. Ill C. I.) in their attempts to rehabilitate decayed inner-city
housing. Broadly, the "public" is the supposed beneficiary, but there are target
"facilitating beneficiaries" whose support was required to build the enabling
coalition and lobby for continuation of the subsidy.
- Write-down of acquisition costs. Under Title I of the 1949 Housing
Act groups like SECD can obtain an entire building for the nominal cost of $1.
Facilitating beneficiaries (F.b.): all groups with a vested interest in survival of
the city, especially business and industry, as well as the affected ovmers who
thereby manage to sell their run down properties.
- Planning services of the BRA. The agency offers planning
services and innuence, ostensibly to guide and ease the task of properly
redesigning "impact areas. " F.b.: architects, lawyers, and planners in
touch with the field situation to varying degrees. (10
- Below Market Interest Rate (BMIR) mortgages to selected redevelopment
sponsors (FHA administered 221 (d)(3) and other programs like HUD 312) are often
arranged with the BRA as matchmaker between project possibilities and "appropriate"
sponsors. These subsidies are otherwise open to redevelopers who have "earned"
the trust of the FHA. F.b.: the selected redevelopers.
- Leased Housing subsidies. The BHA contracts with owners of existing
dwelling units to rent apartments on behalf of BHA's low income tenants. The
subsidy can be substantial, amounting to the differen between "market" rent
and a designated percentage of the tenant's income. F.b.: present owners
of apartments who find themselves trapped between rising operating costs and
dwindling rent revenues from low income tenants.
- Differential impact of code and zoning provisions are selectively
"negotiated" in determining their application to existing structures, especially
to the renewal of pre-code buildings. F.b,: are hard to identify, since the IVC-2
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relatively arbitrary process is cloaked in politics, -but it appears that the
applicant's "political size" correlates roughly with the size of subsidy obtainable.
- Local tax "understandings. " Tax payable to the City is calculated
in some special way. Such arrangements include 1) forgiveness or amelioration of
past taxes, 2) setting taxes at a percentage of gross rents (15% in SECD's case) under
the stipulation that certain income groups be served 3) tax "freezes" (holding at
levels prior to rehab), or 4) tax "holidays" on improvements. (The last two are
more commonly encountered outside of Boston.) F.b.: the redevelopers and
sponsors involved.
- Federal tax incentives act through income tax depreciation
allowances and sheltered pass-through provisions in the federal revenue code.
SECD was unable to utilize this subsidy, since it is non-profit. F.b.: investors
in high tax brackets. (12)
Further classes of subsidies are less explicit and more diffuse in their
application. Many of the non-profits obtained the following assistance, but
whether their net influence was positive or negative was difficult to determine.
- Expertise and advisory assistance is volunteered or its costs are
underwritten by concerned outsiders. This subsidy can be significant, but its
impact is erratic. Whether it is perceived as constructive by the recipients is
a function of the responsiveriess of the donor. The board of USES and other non-
profit groups receive substantial amounts of this "assistance. " F.b.: establishment
members strongly desiring to "do something."
- Utilizing indigenous or non-union skills. The positive or negative
impact of this subsidy is un 9,rain. King-Bison believes it saves on costs by hiring
and training the unskilled. Whittlesey, on the other hand, attempted to provide
training for Nei hborhood Youth Corps boys, and found the effort relatively
unsuccessful. I43 F.b.: the unskilled who receive' training.
- Losses experienced by the well-intentioned form a substantial subsidy.
Some of the resources spent by King-Bison are unrecoverable through future income
from the properties. The experimental nature of SECD was covered by a special HUD
demonstration grant, but well over a dozen efforts are currently being made by groups
backed by churches and other philanthropies, without HUD grants. These are in
effect, considerable subsidies. F.b.: in the short run poverty warriors; in the lVC-3
long run no one.
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The role of the "facilitating beneficiary" must not be misunderstood. He is
a sincere, well-intentioned actor engaged to relieve some of the pressures generated
by the underlying problem. If symptoms are confused for causes, political understanding
of the problem is at fault. But we must recognize that as the actor becomes engaged,
he acquires a vested interest in the approach that engaged him; it may be that
thereby "he ceases to be part of the solution, and actually becomes part of the
problem. " While this can neither be proven nor disproven at this point, it is wise
to recognize that this effect may underlie our systematic inability to devise alternatives
to pressing social problems. Facilitating beneficiaries can comprise a large inertial
or horneostatic force against change, and the above subsidies legitimate their roles.
Subsidies Reshape the Market
The present form of low-income housing subsidies distorts and overrides
market signals from the consumers of housing services, due to their direct application
to the supply side, thereby increasing the uncertain and contradictory information
already present in this housing market. In the general housing market, the
consumer chooses his housing services according to his tastes and means. He
considers such factors as number of rooms, sizes, location, style, form of tenure,
taxes, maintenance, neighborhood, access to schools, friends, and shopping. When
the mismatch between his present bundle of housing services and a new set within
his means exceeds the effort and inconvenience to him of making the switch, he
exchanges or modifies his bundle. He may move, cease to maintain , or upgrade -
all in a variety of ways. His actions are market signals. IVC-4
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Subsidies distort this process in potentially undesirable ways. The subsidies
to the housing supplier are offers to pay increments of the dweller's housing costs in
cases where the dweller has insufficient resources. To the supplier they constitute
an immediate but otherwise unobtainable incentive. In these cases the subsidizer
is in a position to enable or prevent the success of the sponsor's effort, since
without the subsidy the sponsor would suffer loss. The influence of granting or
withholding subsidy is very direct upon the rehabilitation sponsor; the dweller's
future rent money is much more remote. The irony is that the dweller still pays
the major share of the rent; the compound subsidies account for a minor share, yet
the latter are shaping the sponsor's actions while restricting the dwellers'.
Consider a South End resident who pays $56 in rent for a SECD apartment,
with BHA paying $44 to the sponsor on his behalf. Since he would have to spend
$100 to obtain such a dwelling on his own, his preference is biased towards the
SECD apartment. What he would have done if he were paid the $44 as a housing
allowance is unknown. He might have preferred to move out of the area, or a
different type of unit than the single floor of a former row house. The market might
have responded differently if the dweller allocated the incentive to housing
suppliers. His actions would be identifying obsolete and shunned areas and housing
(17)types for decisionmakers. A drawback of subsidies in present form is that they
mask obsolescence rather than identify it.
In shaping the sponsor's actions, these subsidies inhibit his entrepreneurial
initiative as well. SECD was led to choose units acceptable to the BRA and to
combine them into packages for the FHA to obtain BMIR financing. SECD changed IVC-5
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and rebuilt interiors to conform with FHA requirements. An entrepreneur might
have clustered his holdings, or worked on buildings serially to utilize his labor
crews more efficiently. He might not have revised the interior layout -- a
costly business -- and concentrated on rehabilitation of deficiencies -- new
plumbing, fixtures, mechanical equipment, and finishes. There is no simple
way of ascertaining the cost impact of "guiding" the sponsor's decisions, but this
probably increased costs by more than was saved in preventing unrational choices
on his part. Another drawback of subsidies in present form is that they restrict
entrepreneurial initiative.
The creation of special non-profit sponsors to carry out demonstrations has
already been briefly touched on above. A non-profit may not be as profit-
hungry as a conventional entrepreneur, but it may be lacking in experience, both
in reconstruction and in dealing with authorities. (18) This lack of experience is
compounded by the limelight of demonstration which forces the literal interpretation
of each stipulation of the codes. These aspects also raise costs and tend to reduce
the output from a given amount of subsidies.
A rationing process springs up spontaneously when subsidies are backed by
insufficient appropriations to be offered to all applicants. In this rationing, other
forms of influence determine who gets the subsidy -- reliable performance, a good
image in the media, or political friends.
In response to the above subsidies, some housing sponsors began to treat
each other as rivals, currying favor with the BRA and seeking favorable publicity
in the media, which only indirectly related to improved.housing. This independence IVC-
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of subsidies coupled with their strong shaping influence results in a syst6m where the
control has shifted from the consumers and entrepreneurs to the regulators of the
subsidies. This may have been intended by the designers of the subsidy process, but
it brings with it risks that must be appraised.
These risks are compounded by the rivalry generated by their inadequate
appropriations. Sponsors were led to promise more than they could deliver and to
hide their inadequacies. Jointly the narrow, specific, inadequately funded incentives
to suppliers produced the following effects:
1. Specific subsidies discourage the evolution of alternatives and
communication about them outside their range. They appear to condition the actors
under their influence to assume there is no other way of doing the job and still
getting the subsidy. This is evident when one considers that a man of Whittlesey's
ability can see no role for tenants in the process, while other rehabilitators like
Housing Innovations (HI) atternpt to "rehab around tenants" or work with representatives
(19)from the low income group. Darwinian evolution and selection among housing
options is a healthy mechanism in the general housing system, and its abrogation to
meet low income needs rapidly should not be taken lightly.
2. Consumer sovereignty does not structure the allocation of housing
resources under these subsidies; the guidelines and actions of the regulators do.
Normally market signals of consumer preference carry important information on
preferred location , dwelling type and layout. These subsidies hinder the normal
attemptsof entrepreneurs to meet these needs efficiently within the constraints of
the existing stock. Identification of obsolete areas by onission is also masked. IVC-7
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3. Present subsidies may be inefficient. The arguments of restricted
entrepreneurial initiative, potential lack of sophistication of non-profit sponsors,
and the rivalry and misrepresentation encouraged by subsidies with insufficient
appropriations have been presented above, but the consequences require elaboration.
HUD at present appears less concerned about lack of alternatives than about providing
some form of housing for every sub-group in the low income sector. Until gaps in
coverage are closed, lack of options is considered secondary. Yet without
alternatives for comparison, HUD guidelines may be specifying rather inefficient
models that rapidly consume the resources available for subsidization. SECD
required $12,000 plus acquisition write-down and hidden subsidies per dwelling unit.
A large share of the amortization is borne by the taxpayers through leased housing
subsidies. A potential alternative costing half as much would allow the subsidy
to provide twice as many units. But in a circular manner, the present subsidies
discourage evolution of alternatives which could serve as rigorous benchmarks for
(20)
comparison.
Some would interpret these three points as an argument for generating an
increased range of dweller choices through direct subsidy of alternatives, but
this overlooks the causal connection between highly specific subsidies and the dearth
of evolving alternatives. Subsidies predispose and limit choices to options within
their range. Even the broad homeownership subsidy (through personal income tax
exemption of mortgage interest) discourages the alternative of renting. A subsidy should
be as broad as possible within the objective of facilitating low income housing, to
allow options to evolve and choices to be mode by the dwellers. IVC-8
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Problems of Maintenance and Management under Present Subsidies
SECD encountered high management and maintenance costs after
(21)completion, compared with the FHA schedule of allowable costs. This
schedule is derived from FHA norms for projects of around 90 units at higher
rents but was accepted as a rough normative guide. It should immediately be
noted that SECD had only 50 scattered units, serving a lower income group at
significantly lower rents. Many costs may be absolutes, rather than percentages
of the rent roll. Whittlesey's findings that repairs, painting, and management
costs were two to three times higher than permissible under the FHA schedule
correlate roughly with King-Bison's experience. Since misconceptions on the
origins of these costs are common, some further discussion based on King-Bison's
and SECD's experience is in order. Both had comparable units scattered in the
South End; both served tenants under BHA's leased housing program.
Reasons for the higher costs can be placed under three headings:
1) the buildings are wrongly located, 2) the poor are simply rougher on their
surroundings, and 3) the poor lack the incentives and understanding to treat their
surroundings properly. There is some truth in each.
1. Are the buildings obsolete? In structurally sound, properly
rehabbed buildings there is no particular reason why the heat required or the wear
on apartment interior surfaces should be significantly greater than for comparable new
apartments. Examination of King- Bison's maintenance procedures suggests that
their higher costs stem from the manner of rectifying problems, rather than the task , VC-9
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per se. Not only do minor problems go undetected until they have become more
serious (or until the unit is turned over to a new occupant), but time spent "on
the road" between scattered sites is significant. Both King-Bison and SECD
(2 2)
tried to cluster their units, but were unable to do so. There is little to suggest that
the rehabbed buildings are at fault in themselves. Their separation from one another,
however, probably contributes to the high maintenance costs.
2. Do bw-income dwellers abuse their environment? In fact, in any
income group some dwellers are rougher on their surroundings than others, so "normal"
landlords attempt to screen out undesirable tenants. Under the BHA's leased housing
program, this is not directly possible. To simply accept the fact of high wear and tear
by such tenants is too fatalistic when maintenance and management are the owner's
responsibility. Consequently King-Bison and SECD are experimenting under the third
point, but inconclusively so far.
3. Do low-income dwellers lack incentives and the understanding to
maintain the dwellings and their surroundings? At present this is an hypothesis rather
than a fact, but since it suggests some remedies, it is worth examining further. (23)
A distinct drawback of rental tenure in maintaining housing is that it discourages
the dweller from developing a longer range identification with his dwelling environ-
ment and encourages his moving when he doesn't like his situation. He experiences
no incentive to modify the situation himself. This is exacerbated under leased
housing where his rent is fixed as a proportion of income. As long as his income
remains constant (and programs remain unchanged) his rent does too, regardless of his IVC-
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behavior; and when his income rises, rent rises.. By contrast, a resident homeowner
receives quick feedback from the consequences of his maintenance actions or
inactions. Not only does he feel that the benefits of all his efforts to improve his
surroundings accrue to him, but the nasty surprise of higher repair costs where he
has deferred tasks too long condition him not to let such matters occur. The normal
tenant experiences such incentives in attenuated form. The Leased Housing tenant
does not often experience such conditioning and incentives. He may thereby escape
developing an understanding of maintenance. This leaves it to the owner to maintain
without feedback.
Unfortunately, when landlords think tenants aren't doing what they "ought,"
and tenants think landlords aren't doing what they "should" but just collect fat
rent checks, the situation rapidly polarizes. The landlord neither learns of problems
in time, nor is he in an easy position to effect remedies. If he appears at the
property, he is beseiged by expensive requests or abuse, "teaching" him to keep out
of sight. Maintenance is deferred until the unit turns over to a new tenant, or not
even then, if the landlord feels he cannot afford it.
The present highly specific subsidies to the housing suppliers examined above
allow the concerned actors to hold very disjointed and partial views. There is no
mechanism to assure harmonious pursuit of shared goals. Tenant, owner, civi c
officials and even financial backers acquire polarized "each for himself" attitudes
and easily believe in fault, chiselling and incompetence on the part of the others.
Without shared understanding of the common problems, promising new strategies for
conserving housing are unlikely to emerge. IVC-l
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In summary, the overview required for rational entrepreneurial decisions
is prevented in these rehabilitation efforts. The addition of highly regulated,
specific subsidies has not rendered obtaining this overview easier. There is a
need for subsidies, and a need for regulating the delivery of housing services
in these low income submarkets, but the present over-regulation of those attempting to
rehabilitate or upgrade the existing stock is misplaced and probably has costly
drawbacks.
IVC-12
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THE SELECTED REHABILITATORS
The cases above have shown how the incentives to rehabilitate inner-city
housing have been dissipated and offset by systematic constraints. In the case
of the BURP program, competent developers were selected and offered special
incentives to rehabilitate houses on a crash basis. In a limited sense this program
was a success as the chosen few redevelopers responded by renovating over 2300
dwelling units in Roxbury in an unbelievably short time; but in the longer run,
the housing situation is more constrained than ever due to the special intervention
by the FHA. Reactions by others than the favored few and misunderstandings about
the program on the part of the authorities have further polarized expectations and
perceptions of the generally deteriorating housing situation. BURP's benefits con-
sisted of the rapid renovation of a significant number of housing units, not all of
which were in real need of repair. It resurrected relatively few vacant units. Not
only were the immediate cash costs for this renovation substantial, but a legacy of
hidden costs from this type of political intervention is continuing to surface,
dwarfing the original benefits.
Economic Background to BURP
Although the previous cases have focussed on the considerable time, effort,
and expense entailed in dealing with the red tape attendant to inner-city rehabilitation,
the continuing costs encountered day-in day-out whether the unit is occupied or
vacant, are particularly high as well. First claim on the inner-city housing dollar
is made by taxes, insurance, mortgage and interest, all of which tend to be higher IVD-1
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in the city than in suburbia. The dweller experiences these as housing costs,
and his principal recourse to avoid. them is to leave. The owner, facing these
costs directly, and pushed to cut costs where he can, finds it is simplest to defer
maintenance. The incentive of maintaining resale value is absent, since the low
(26)
market value of his property inversely reflects the costs upon it.
The rehabilitator finds the deceptively low acquisition costs mask high
holding costs, which continue even while units are unoccupied. These make the
process of rehabbing unoccupied dwellings extremely time sensitive, since during
this period there is no offsetting current income from the properties. High costs
in time, effort, and delays, of obtaining permission- for rational changes in use-
(chronicled in the King-Bison case), encourage rehabilitators to adhere to
obsolete plans and land uses. Accepting the high holding costs, the redeveloper
is faced by two alternatives: to rehabilitate as rapidly as possible, attempting
nothing that threatens to delay the process, or rehabbing "around the dwellers"
so that rent revenues continue.
The alternative of "rehabbing around the dweller" is not very satisfactory
where outside labor is involved. While there is offsetting rental income from the
dwellings, the occupants dislike the mess, and their presence can only prolong
(27)
and complicate the actual reconstruction process.
Recent federal incentives have been distinctly encouraging rehabilitation
as swiftly as possible without attempting significant chang6s. As was implicit in
the model of small-scale rehabilitation (see sec. IlA.), the redeveloper's task
would be simplified if he had his financing assured on the basis of a promised
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output, enabling him to choose the units, prepare plans, obtain insurance and
win compliance from the public bureaucracies. The Boston Rehabilitation
Program (BURP), utilizing 221 (d)(3) financing, was designed to fit these ends.
In fact, processing time for the assured financing was reduced to less than two
months, saving the sponsor over a year of holding costs that he would have incurred
under normal processing.
Political Background to BURP
While the economic factors shaping the.BURP model were evident to
many, it is unlikely that such a program would have come into being without the
conjunction of a series of political factors.
Rehabilitation inadvertently acquired considerable glamour as the negative
impact of total clearance under urban renewal became evident. Although little
federally sponsored rehab had been attempted, President Johnson said in 1967
that "rehabilitation is the key of many of our successful urban renewal programs."(28
The key was relatively untested, its costs and benefits unknown, but HUD Secretary
Weaver gave it an aura of great promise in his testimony to the Senate Subcommittee
on Urban Affairs in the summer of 1967. "While recognizing the 'difficulties and
complications that are inherent in rehabilitation' Weaver stated that he 'had some
real achievements to report' and pointed out that 'since we began a series of
experiments and studies in 1961 to improve our techniques, rehabilitation has become
a far more important tool in local urban renewal activities.'"(29) IVD-3
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Notwithstanding Secretary Weaver's promises, the semi -autonomous FHA,
which should have formed the backbone of any HUD efforts in rehabilitation,
had in fact done very little. Senator Brooke, newly elected from Massachusetts,
critically stated his opinion that the FHA was not attuned to the demands of low
and moderate income housing needs in the central city.
The criteria are different. The procedures are different. And
even though Commissioner Brownstein [FHA Commissioner] has
attempted, and I think unquestionably in good faith, to move
low-and-moderate-income housing, the personnel that he has
just are not attuned to doing it. And I think the record speaks
for itself. (30)
At the time BURP was conceived, in the summer of 1967, less than three
thousand units had been rehabbed under the (d)(3) program anywhere in the country.
Under federal programs of any kind in urban renewal areas, less than 200,000
structures had been rehabilitated since 1954.(31)
In effect, the Johnson Administration was challenged to deliver more than
rhetoric in support of lower income rehabilitation. Operating on a directive from
the White House, HUD -- more specifically, the FHA -- established the Boston
Rehabilitation Program, "to demonstrate that the Administration could 'do some-
thing' about rehabilitation in a short period of time, at the massive scale that
had been eluding Secretary Weaver and the renewal efforts across the nation. ,,(32)
IVD-4
115
THE CASE OF THE BOSTON REHABILITATION PROGRAM
Adaptafion of the Rehab Model for BURP
The cases examined above followed the. conventional model wherein
the redeveloper seeks the financing. In the case of BURP, financing sought out
the redevelopers. Revising our outline model, the process looked like Figure
IVE.1. (Compare with Figure IIJA.2.)
Usually the redeveloper spends much effort convincing a skeptical FHA
of the financial feasibility of his operation. With BURP, the situation was reversed.
Edwin D. Callahan, Executive Assistant Commissioner of the FHA became the
"architect" of BURP, with the authority to act unilaterally, and reporting directly
to FHA Commissioner Brownstein and Secretary Weaver.
Callahan rounded up what he felt to be the twelve most
competent developers in the Boston area who had been involved
in rehabilitation or had the capacity to become involved in the
process. In meetings at FHA headquarters he put the following
proposition to them. If they would agree to rehab buildings in
six months for a total mortgage price of $12,000 he would get
them an FHA commitment in sixty days. The $12,000 figure was
based on his careful analysis of previous rehabilitation work in
multi-family buildings in Roxbury by Gerald Schuster which
indicated that roughly $4000 for acquisition, $6500 for construction
and $1000 for financing would rehabilitate BURP-type units. The
six months and the sixty days however, were figures based on nothing
but an over-riding need to get the job underway and completed (33)
before the Democratic Convention to be held in the summer of 1968.
Considering an FHA processing time that always took at least twelve and
sometimes up to twenty-four months, two months was revolutionary. lVE-1
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Selection of redevelopers was similarly unorthodox.. Callahan was able to
go about it in the manner of an employer screening applicants to meet his detailed
qualifications. These consisted of prior experience in Roxbury real estate, in
dealing with the FHA, 6nd with a demonstrated or potential competence in rehabili-
tation. The process of selection was quiet and intricate, and resulted in five
white developers whom Callahan referred to as "a bunch of pros."
Although the upper limit of $12,000 per unit was arrived at by examining the
previous work of one of the selected redevelopers, it simply became a target figure
for average rehab cost within a package. Given a federal stipulation that at least
$3500 go towards labor and materials, the developer nevertheless had considerable
leeway in determining whether to choose "creampuffs" (units requiring relatively
little rehab, but with higher acquisition costs) or "dogs" (which could be obtained
for substantially less but required more rehab). A bias against dealing with the "dogs"
emerged, due to factors that could not be anticipated before actual reconstruction.
To minimize these uncertainties, developers chose as many "creampuffs" as possible.
As a result units requiring extensive rehab were avoided,and many occupied buildings
were renovated instead; the $24.5 million brought few dwelling units dropping from
the housing stock back in, but rather focussed on redoing previously tenable units.
Thereby relocation became a large problem, as recounted below.
Selection and acquisition was a shrewdly designed process to minimize price
increases and delays. Awareness of the extent of the program was carefully guarded
and the individual developers selected buildings to avoid zoning or legal
occupancy problems that would later delay City permits. IVE-3
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Processing by FHA and City authorities was specially streamlined for BURP,
The FHA eliminated submission of extensive drawings and back and forth negotiation
over details that normally takes months, substituting on-the-spot face-to-face
decision-making in many instances. The City's Building and Fire Departments
eliminated much of the multiple jurisdiction ambiguities normally encountered by
such redevelopers as King-Bison and Whittlesey, and set up a special procedure
(34)
under Assistant Building Commissioner Leo Martin.
The conceptual design of the BURP model had carefully taken many factors
into account. The subsequent allegations and outcries on the part of black labor,
relocatees, other developers as well as advocate planners was clearly unanticipated,
shocking and surprising to the designers.
Modifications to the BURP Model
As awareness of the massiveness of the BURP intervention spread,
(35)
criticism came from all sides. There were no black developers, nor provisions
for black labor; relocation plans were inadequate. One Building Department 9fficial
familiar with outside developers remarked, "1 know a good many who'd give their
right arm to get a slice of that action."
To achieve rapid results, the FHA had chosen to deal with a select few, but
the many who were left outside felt a common cause in attempting to modify BURP.
When Secretary Weaver came to Boston to announce BURP on December 4, 1967,
he was confronted by a coalition of militant black leaders. Bryant Rollins as their
spokesman read a prepared statement: IVE-4
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The program being dedicated has given no consideration
to local developers; non-profit developers, cooperative
ownership or local management. It has been marred by
racial discrimination in employment and inadequate re-
location procedures.
The FIA has shown that it can move with unprecedented
speed -- to give high profits to developers from outside the
community and to establish a huge preserve for exploitation
by absentee landlords.
Apparently Secretary Weaver's department can move
quickly only when it is operating against community interest.
The Boston Globe supported some of the objections, stating editorially,
"The objections to the Weaver-dedicated project . . . are not only legitimate,
they also represent in microcosm the plight of the Negro nationally . . . " (37)
Melvin King, Executive Director of the Boston New Urban League (one of
the five agencies signing the statement read by Rollins) sent a long letter to
Secretary Weaver a few days after the encounter, which was reprinted in the local
00 (38)
papers. King stated that in his opinion:
. . black people now are demanding that the equity coming
out of programs be put into the hands of the community. . .
And even though it may take a little longer to accomplish the
goals of physical change. The elimination of the frustration
and the building of a viable and healthy community will be
the result.
The alternative to such an approach -- an alternative which
you have selected in regards to the new $24.5 millions program --
represents a continuation of the method of operating which has
so badly failed to bring about the needed change.
We intend to see to it that the rehabilitation project does not go
-forward as you have designed it. We will take whatever steps
necessary to prevent the project from going forward as currently
planned. IVE-5
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King clearly expressed a broadly shared determination. Ill-timed evictions
plus a prolonged cold spell during which heating plants in several BURP held
buildings broke down were played up by the media, broadening awareness of
BURP and forcing recognition of certain issues. Keyes carefully chronicles the
evolution of modifications through a fascinating process combinirg pressure with
reasonableness, opportunism with altruism. The outcome in terms of "community
participation" was the addition of two black redevelopers and a substantial
amount of black employment by the largest of the original redevelopers, Penn-Simon.
The Creation of the Two Black Redevelopers
There were no suitable black developers in December 1967, prior to the
confrontation. By March 20, 1968, less than four months later, a black group called
Sanders Associates was in possession of an FHA commitment for $996,000 for the
(39
rehabilitation of 83 apartment units in Roxbury. By early summer another black
redeveloper, State Enterprises, was on its way.
FHA went after black developers and sponsors with the same kind
of singleminded determination that the agency had used to package
the original BURP units. .All 'the.reasons. why black developers could
not be included seemed to be swept away when the priority became
that of insuring such participation. And all of the processing (40)
shortcuts of the BURP model were utilized by the two black sponsors.
The actions of King and Rollins were apparently necessary to bring this
about. IVE-6
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Participation of Black Labor
Participation of black labor in BURP came about more by confrontation
than by good will. The-pressuring and yielding of Penn-Simon left the other
redevelopers relatively free; Simon with 50% of the. BURP units was a good target.
Ironically, Simon had decided to have a non-union labor force in its previous rent
supplement rehab projects to bring in local workers. Without the buffer of unions,
Simon's BURP projects were wide open to black hiring demands. As a result, Penn-
Simon acquired a labor force swollen by the untrained and the partially trained.
Keyes' figures show that while Schuster was able to handle 12.5 rehab units for
each man on their construction force, Penn-Simon could handle less than 6, i.e.
Penn-Simon had less than half the efficiency. While there were doubtless benefits
in training 300 black workers in rehab skills, the extra costs fell upon the confronted
(41)
redeveloper who sought to pass them on in whatever ways he could devise.
Relocation Needs
Relocation needs also forced modification of the original BURP model.
At the outset, it was optimistically assumed that the vacant buildings could be
rehabbed first, and that by a process of "musical chairs," displacees could move
into finished units, with rent supplements covering the rent differential. In fact,
this was very unrealistic. Only 380 dwellings were vacant -- less than a fifth of
the total -- due to each developer's instinct to offset each "dog" by enough
"creampuffs. " Also, it was wise to balance each individual.packige, so there were IVE-:
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displacees from the start. Ideally, each developer would have wished for his
tenants to remain in the buildings as insurance against vandalism until rehab
could begin, but then for them to disappear on the day reconstruction commenced.
In fact, an understandable policy of not maintaining the acquired,decrepit buildings
resulted in approximating this strategy. A severe cold snap shutting down a number
of. heating systems, however, brought the plight of the BURP victims onto the
editorial pages, contributing to the pressure to provide relocation.
The original BURP concept did not provide explicitly for the return of displacees
to completed BURP units, a critical consideration when dealing with so many
occupied dwellings. Nor were sufficient rent supplements contemplated to enable
them to do so. There was, however, enough general indignation over the impact
of this intervention to assure relocation within BURP, including moving payments, and rent.
supplements to those evictees still around at the time the modified procedures took effect.
The HUD response to the pressure was an Urban Renewal Demonstration Grant,
earmarked for research -- apparently the only money HUD could find. HUD
announced on January 15, 1968 that the BRA would conduct a study of relocation
and the role of social services in the process. The details were finally worked out
months later. Of the $550,000 grant, $165,000 was subcontracted to Boston
University for the research, $135,000 went to the BRA for staff, $90,000 to the
Roxbury Multi-Service Center for social services, and $150,000 for moving payments.
Only $150,000 - a little over a quarter of the grant - was allocated to cover moving
expenses of.the victims; the rest went to facilitating beneficiaries, including research,
(42) IV/E-4
supervising professionals and services.
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The leased public housing program enabled eligible low income families
to return to the completed buildings. By FHA regulation, only 10/6 of the
families in a BMIR project may be placed under leased housing. Here the
pressure was so great that the regulation was waived. 843 of the families still
around were found eligible by the BRA for leased housing. Of these, 600 are
in completed BURP units. Thereby close to 35% instead of 100/ of the BURP
units are under- leased housing agreements with the Boston Housing Authority.
DIFFICULTIES RELATED TO SPECIAL INTERVENTION
The Aftermath
in the general market, when consumers do not like a product, or think
its price too high, they just do not buy it. When they do not like a service, they
can boycott it. But when lower rents under subsidy have been arranged on behalf
of the dwellers, the option of refusal comes hard. Vacancy rates under the distorting
influence of such direct supplier subsidies are meaningless. Planners and policy-
makers must sift other evidence to determine whether the dwellers have obtained suitable
housing. Without market feedback, how would dwellers express their dissatisfaction?
The BURP tenants tried to present their views through conferences, the media, and
through calling an FHA hearing. They commissioned an outside evaluation and
they have attempted to build a legal case to sue the FHA for non-compliance with
its own regulations. IVF-1
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On January 23-25, 1969, an Institute on Innovative Technology in Housing
Rehabilitation was held at Boston University focussing on BURP. In general, the
speakers presented BURP as a major step forward, making light of the difficulties
and stressing that they were surmountable. Tenants were not included to present
their views. Attempts to present other views were carefully controlled, but wall
placards and some pointed questions from the audience suggested that the presented
picture was incomplete.
By May I and July 1, a small minority of the tenants were engaged in rent
strikes, paying their rents instead to the Tenants Association of Boston. These
were triggered by "minor" rent increases. News of the strike put BURP back in the
(43)
papers, and the FHA on the defensive again. Globe critics had an easy time
obtaining tenant views on the program.
Tenants felt the units were "incomplete," that they were being charged
"finished rents for unfinished apartments. " "The government thinks they can throw
up a couple of badly built houses in Roxbury and then have the black people bow
down in thanks. " Such criticisms were answered by redevelopers and FHA officials
indicating that the BRA, Fair Housing, Inc. and other groups pressed too hard to
house-needy tenants before completion. "FHA director Flynn said he did not see
any reason why developers shouldn't charge full rents for apartments where only 'minor
items' had to be completed. Apartments may be certified for occupancy before a
building is finally inspected according to Flynn. In other words, if hallways are
not finished or washing facilities installed, the apartments themselves may be
(44)
occupied. ". Having apartrnets certified for occupancy -is not so easy for
others, outside BURP. IVF-2
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The Globe critics observed "Tenant complaints about original construction
and present maintenance of apartments is intensified by suspicions that the developers
are making excess profits from the BURP enterprise," and they conclude, "BURP's
. dilemma persists: a program that was designed to radically improve the lives of the
poor has frustrated and angered many of them."
Mrs. Eva Curry, head of the Tenants Association of Boston (TAB), sought
other recourses. She told the Globe critics, "In a few years, these buildings will
be back in their origiml state and people will be pointing to us saying 'the tenants
tore them down!' We want people to know these buildings were never finished in
the first place."(4J TAB requested an FHA hearing to document their charges of
"incomplete work, substandard materials, poor supervision of construction, and
poor maintenance. " While making attempts to broaden the rent strike, TAB
commissioned Urban Planning Aid, Inc. , an independent group of advocate planners
in Cambridge, t6 evaluate BURP's effects on low and moderate income tenants.
UPA undertook a thorough investigation to document the state of BURP units upon
completion. Sampling more than 10% of the units and documenting the evidence
photographically, UPA reports seventeen principal findings, six of which are of
special interest to us. The others corroborate what has already been presented in
this case.
Some findings suggest that tenant feedback is actively being prevented:
1. Community and tenant participation in the BURP program was
hampered first by the failure of developers and FHA to provide an
effective formal role for such groups in decision-making. The Tenants'
Review Panel had only an advisory status. The grievance procedure IVF-3
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developed later was limited to dealing with problems on a case-by-case
basis and could not deal with the general inadequacies of BURP. Further,
decisions of the Tenants' Review Panel and Community Advisory Board were
frequently undercut by the developers and FHA.
2. FIA obstructed,through secrecy of information, tenants' efforts
to protect their own interests.
3. Many tenants live in substandard conditions in incompletely
rehabilitated BURP housing. FHA refuses to take responsibility for these
conditions and has obstructed tenants' efforts to improve them by withholding
information. Developers took action to improve conditions only when required
to do so by tenant economic pressure. (46)
The subsidies to the redevelopers have removed lust the economic pressure
consumers need to modify the process.
It is ironic that the tenants who were living in substandard housing are
pressuring the FHA to abide by its own regulations. The UPA report documents
several ways in which BURP was exempted from the rules applied to other redevelopers,
including:
4. FHA did not use its controls over the developers to require quality
production.
5. Cost-cutting measures by developers, including use of substandard
materials, failure to provide competent supervision, incomplete work, and
failure to fix roof and plumbing leaks, have led to accelerated deterioration
of BURP apartments.
6. FHA failed to take action against a dev. er who was ordered by
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to desist from discrimi-
natory practices in renting BURP housing. (47)
Most recently, TAB has attempted to bring suit against the FHA for non-
compliance with its own regulations through a black law partnership. Although
not officially admitted, the FHA did indeed "inspect units over the telephone" to
meet the deadlines on individual packages. Redeveloper and FHA alike, shared a
common interest in moving Os rapidly as possible. The City and the FHA did not IVF-4
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regulate the process in the public interest because of their special interest in
carrying out the program. This left tenants, without the economic means, and
other community spokesmen and advocates to regulate the BURP program as best they could.
When regulatory agencies acquire vested interest in production, their objectivity in
regulating is compromised.
Apologists for the BURP program stress that the considerable improvement over
prior conditions and the swiftness of process should be weighed in evaluating the
results. "Think where these dwellers would otherwise still be living! " This disregards
the costs in viewing the benefits. Not only did $12,000 per unit produce remarkably
little (twelve thousand dollars to refinish each of the one to four-bedroom apartments),
but the stirred-up dweller resentment, in itself, is an indicator of hidden social costs.
The BURP Product
In section lID a simple graphic analogue for the rehab process was developed.
We postulated that housing decay begins slowly and then increases in rapidity, shown in
the increasing slope of AB over time, Figure IVF.1:.
A A
Fig. IV.F.1. Dwelling Decay Pattern Fig. IV.F.2. Rehabilitation Patterns
In graphic ferms, BURP's stated purpose was to bring units from B to D. (See Figure
IVF.2.) Keyes and the UPA report suggest that many of the-units were not really IVF-5
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down at B yet, but were intercepted when decayed only to B". The UPA report
documents that a substantial number of the BURP units were not brought all the
way up to D. Where rehabilitation is incomplete, the decay trajectory over
time is likely to be steeper, as shown at E, rather than mild, as at A or D, when
new or "as good as new." (See Fig. IVF.2.)
All observers are inclined to doubt the 55-year.economic life of the BURP
product upon which the FHA mortgage is based. The degree to which rapid decay
will be due to dweller behavior or to incompleteness of the rehab is difficult to
judge. The UPA photographs suggest that the share due to sloppy rehab is sub-
stantial. Defects including leaking skylights, missing roof hatches, peeling
paint, loose tiles, rat holes, and draughty windows, furnish a poor starting point.
The spill-over onto tenant attitudes from these defects cannot easily be proven,
but they can only be negative, and may be extremely high, by failing to induce
the tenants to do their part in maintenance.
The Latent Costs in the BURP Process
To the FHA, the BURP program appears an unqualified success. Even
though efforts in Boston under BURP processing continue only on a very diminished
scale, FHA is attempting to carry the program into other cities. To the outside
observer, units selected for BURP are substantially improved by the process, but a
more complete evaluation must consider costs as well. We attempt to do this here.
(49)To cover the initial rehabilitation costs and enable the previous dwellers
to move back in entailed compound subsidies. These included BMIR financing under IVF-
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221 (d)(3), leased housing agreements with the Boston Housing Authority, and tax
sheltered depreciation allowances on the sponsor's equity. These are on-going
and borne by each and every taxpayer. In addition, a major subsidy comes from
all who collaborated "to make the program work" -- including the unclassifiable
subsidy of time and effort of preventing the program from going forward in its
original form.
The indirect costs, in terms of BURP's impact on dweller attitudes, have been
discussed above. Since the effect appears to have had a substantial negative
component, maintenance costs can only be higher, with the dweller playing less
of a role.
Even less direct, but nonetheless real, is the inflationary impact on conventional
redevelopers. BURP has set a new floor on rehab costs and a new level of expectations
regarding financing and processing that can neither be made universal, nor sustained.
To the redeveloper not invited by the FHA, normal financing and the City Agency
regulatory process will seem doubly bitter hereafter. The special advantages of BURP
encourage the selected few while discouraging any others. Its.nature makes it a "this
way only" method instead of an alternative, coexisting with others.
The irony is that this much clout achieved so few required changes. Instead of
altering obsolete practices -- discriminatory hiring, unrealistic urban land pricing,
excessively constraining regulatory processes, non-functional land uses, etc. -
the BURP program sidestepped these issues, by either accepting them or arranging
BURP-only exemptions from their application. The overwhelming regulatory constraints
IVF-7
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remain for others. How can needed adjustments come about if BURP-size ventures
do not actively support legitimate efforts towards change? This requires:
supporting the action brought by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
against one of the redevelopers; not supporting land speculators; not being satisfied
with the Building Department's special FHA rehab processing system under Pepicelli
unless available to all developers and applicable to a broader range of building-use.
types. A handful of King-Bisons cannot change these obsolete practices when BURP
underwrites them all.
The only change that may not be transitory is the more rapid processing by
FHA for this special type of program. But the tendency to streamline is not even
spilling over into other 221 programs like -(d)(2), or -(h), or their successors under
sec. 235 or 236.
In conclusion one can only say that the least evident but highest cost may lie
in the misleading impression gained by the public, including many who are well-
intentioned and serious about housing. Parts of the cumbersome FHA bureaucracy
are already interpreting this venture -- the only serious attempt at rehabilitation
at scale -- to signify the impossibility of rehabilitating housing in general. The
public, on the other hand, has been led to feel that BURP is an "answer" to the
inner-city housing crisis. In the short run a few politicians and bureaucrats gain
from such misinterpretations. In the long run, we all stand to lose. IVF-8
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV
1. The cover sheet notes "All HUD programs are based on cooperation
between government -- Federal, State, and local -- and private enterprise,
and all are directed toward providing decent housing in suitable neighborhoods
for all Americans and toward helping urban communities create a healthy
environment in which people can live, work, and prosper.
2. Abstracted from the Catalog of HUD Programs, June 1969.
3. "Write-downs" are a form of subsidy by the federal government to
enable urban renewal. Under Title I, properties that are no longer profitably
manageable are acquired under eminent domain proceedings, or for a negotiated
sum from the previous owner by the renewal agency (in Boston, the Boston
Redevelopment Authority). This agency then obtains a "re-use appraisal" from
the federal government through HUD. This appraisal reflects the costs of
bringing the property up to the use specified in the urban renewal plan. When
the anticipated costs of this "rehabilitation" plus acquisition costs exceed
the envisaged market value of the project, the acquisition costs are "written-
down" enabling the redeveloper to obtain properties for nominal payments.
The redeveloper guarantees to bring the property up to the standards of re-use
called for in the urban renewal-plan -- in the case of rehabilitation of dwellings,
FHA 220 standards. The mortgages are then insurable under the provisions of
section 220 by the FHA.
4. Whittlesey, The South End Row House, p. x.
5. The BRA Disposition Agreement received inadequate attention in
Whittlesey's chronology. In fact, it represents an important set of operations
connected with acquisition of tax foreclosed properties from the City:
Acquisitions of properties from the BRA required several
steps. After SECD had submitted its request, BRA approved
the request and asked the Real Property Department of the
City of Boston to release the property to the BRA. A twelve
page Disposition Agreement between the Authority and SECD
was then prepared. This agreement set forth the conditions
under which the properties were to be conveyed to the SECD.
After the Real Property Department had released the properties
to the BRA, the BRA's Board voted the transfer of the properties,
the Disposition Agreement was signed and the properties
conveyed to the Corporation.
Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 1-17* IVFn-1
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6. Ibid., p. 5-17.
7. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
8. Ilid., p. 6-1.
9. Real estate taxes were also noticeably higher, but this can be
attributed to their linkage to 15% of gross annual rent coupled with the impact
of the BHA subsidy.
10. By dividing the budget of the BRA departments affecting rehabilitation
by the output of units during the relevant period, someone at Eastern Gas and
Fuel Associates deduced that the BRA planning services subsidy amounted to
several thousand dollars per dwelling unit. The memo bearing this information
was lost; only its memory remains.
11. In SECD's cases, BHA paid 44% of the rent on behalf of the tenant;
in the absence of this subsidy, rents would have increased 93%. This is similar
to the more widely known Rent Supplements to certain sponsors of new-built low
income housing projects. Whittlesey, . p. 5-19.
12. These are not to be confused with the qualitatively different federal
income tax exemption of home mortgage interest payments which subsidizes
homeowners directly.
13. In King-Bison's experiment in plastering similar row houses,
professionals were able to complete comparable plastering of interiors at
significant time and cost savings over their regular work crews. When the
task is narrow and well-specified, fully trained workers carn best do the task;
but in developing new approaches and integrating tasks among various trades
efficiently, King-Bison still believes it pays to train their work forces.
14. Whittlesey notes that lack of motivation, their irregular hours, and
finally the impact of paying prevailing wages discouraged.the use of the unskilled.
He argues that rehabilitation is not for the untrained, and that the increased costs
of such training should not be added to the cost of providing low-income housing.
Training takes time and effort, and should be subsidized accordingly, in his view.
15. The typical case of the Joseph Tuckerman Memorial, Inc. to
rehabilitate houses on Greenwich Street in lower Roxbury, illustrates how an
effort, publicly hailed as a success, cannot be repeated because of the heavy,
unrecoverab le -subsidy exacted from the sponsors. While several dweI lings for
home-owriership under 221(h) resulted -_ at the low monthly principal and interest
cost of only $56 -- the sponsor's cost per unit exceeded the FHA limit of $12,600. IVFr
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The difference was borne by the sponsor as subsidy, and he has not repeated
the venture despite the valuable experience gained. If the 221 (h) ceiling
had been raised to $14,600 (raising the monthly cost to the family to $65
or increasing the federal subsidy under the program) then the sponsor could
have afforded to repeat the program.
16. King-Bison's present negotiations with the BHA to obtain a subsidy
for the Dudley Street properties illustrate this. Drawings for the unrehabbed
ground floor units have been brought to the BHA for review to obtain leased
housing agreements upon these units for future BHA tenants. The demand for
such items as doors on closets, color fixtures in bathrooms is being reviewed by
the BHA, presumably on behalf of the dweller, but his say in the matter is quite
indirect and simply a function of how the BHA arrives at the criteria. FHA and
BRA review of SECD drawings illustrate the same point. Interviewing tenants to
determine whether the "right" product is being arrived at is inconclusive. Some
tenants place more emphasis on process wherein they can play a role in deciding
among alternatives. Allocating limited resources, they might well arrive at the
same ordering of priorities (viz. choosing between a garbage disposer and kitchen
fan) but by participating in the decision they respect and understand it; at present
some resent both the decision made for them and the. decision-maker. This can only
be detrimental to their subsequent care and maintenance of the dwelling unit.
17. This is discussed in greater detail in concluding chapter VI1.
18. Less true of Whittlesey than most Boston non-profits.
19. By ingenious arrangement, HI is trying to enable low income resident
ownership of triple-deckers in Roxbury by combining fifteen year BHA housing
leases for rental apartments with FHA insurance, so that the prospective owner can
obtain and support a conventional mortgage from the Boston Bank pool (BBURG).
Although two out of three dwellers are tenants, the third can have significant
impact on demand in this housing system. Denis Blackett, who directs HI, is a
sensitive and highly trained black architect-planner. Finding such a capable and
imaginative director, who can manipulate the available subsidies to be more
responsive to low income needs, is rare -- too rare to base a housing system upon.
20. For a strong statement of this argument see Welfeld, "Toward a New
Federal Housing Policy," in The Public Interest, Spring 1970, pp. 31-43. The
efficiency of the subsidies in producing more standard housing is more explicitly
examined in the Rochester case, Chapter VI.
21. Figure IV.B.2, and Whittlesey, op. cit., P. 6-4.
22. Under FHA allowances, a single project or continguous properties
containing around a hundred dwelling units become a viable group for professional IVFn-
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caretaker services. Both King-Bison and SECD are well below this size, and
have more scattered holdings. Part-time maintenance personnel have not kept
costs down.
23. This is extended in section VI, focussing on case studies in Rochester,
New York.
24. King-Bison's figures show that after debt service, taxes, and
utilities, only a narrow margin of rent revenues remains for conscientious
management, maintenance, and return on equity. To do more than simply hold
the properties, the alternatives are either to be a slumlord (short-changing
the tenants) or a philanthropist (short-changing oneself), or apply for BHA
subsidies.
25. Residents have few options to alter this. They can go on rent
strokes, vote for rent control, or move out. All three strategies are currently
being attempted in Boston, because the atomistic dwellers are unable to lower
taxes, insurance or interest rates. Boston's functional tax rate is among the
highest in the nation, labelled "confiscatory" by Charles Abrams. By 1968,
insurance had become both expensive and very difficult to obtain as companies
shunned declining areas. The 1968 Massachusetts Insurance Act attempted to
remedy this by pooling and assigning risks to all companies doing business in the
state. Conventional mortgages had higher interest rates vis a vis suburbia. But
without the collateral of a good job or name, they had been virtually unobtainable
for some time previous to the tight money of 1969.
26. Remember that whereas suburban properties sell for approximately
ten times gross annual rental income, market prices for houses in Roxbury average
only two to three times their income. Any improvements must pay back within this
shorter period to be rational.
27. Denis Blackett and Harold Brown have both attempted this in Boston.
While accurate cost figures isolating the difference are unavailable, they both
discourage further attempts under this strategy.
28. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Message on America's Unfinished
Business, Urban and Rural Poverty, March 14, 1967.
29. L. Keyes, "The Boston Rehabilitation Program," 11-1, quoting U.S.
Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Development Legislation Hearings,
1968, Volume I, p. 96.
30. Ibid., p. 131.
31. L. Keyes, op. cit., 11-3. Statistics extrapolated from memo by FHA
Exec. Assist. Commissioner Callahan, 1/13/1969. IVFn-
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32. Ibid., p. 11-4.
33. Ibid., p. 11-12.
34. As elaborated in the King-Bison Case, this was administered by
Pat Pepicelli, and inadvertently applied to a few rehabi litators outside BURP
leading to subsequent confusion. See Sec. Ill. C.
35. L. Keyes, op. cit., has brought together many different views of
the BURP program, some of which are repeated here. For a fuller presentation
of the intricacies, turn to his forthcoming book.
36. Mimeo statement from Grove Hall Development Corporation,
December 4, 1967, cited by Keyes, op. cit., prologue, p. 2.
37. The Boston Globe, December 6, 1967.
38. Quoted in Keyes, op. cit., 111-22, 23.
39. Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates played an intriguing role in this.
Eastern first learned that BURP was about to occur within its franchise area in
October 1967. It swiftly moved to become limited partner in two of the
originally planned ventures. While expanding its market for heating gas sounds
worthy enough, the spillover tax benefits to investors in high tax brackets via
limited partnership appeared extremely favorable. When militant action
jeopardized the whole program, Eastern played a very active role during
December and January in creating and securing commitments for Sanders
Associates.
40. Keyes, op. cit. , 111-43.
41. Training, in effect, is a form of education without immediate payoff
to the trainer. When one redeveloper is forced to train he incurs costs (lowered
productivity in this case) which he must either bear or pass on. All too frequently
they are included in the price of the final product, as an embedded subsidy.
Whether manipulation of financing, rent supplements, or losses on the part of-
the redeveloper are used to cover the increased costs, they amount to an imposed
subsidy. Instead, training could have been provided for explicitly, as part of
the BURP model.
42. Keyes, op. cit., 111-56.
43. All quotes from The Boston Globe, August 17, 1969, Judson Brown
and Janet Riddell.
44. Ibid. IVFn-5
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45. Ibid.
46. Urban Planning Aid, Inc. An Evaluation of the Boston
Rehabilitation Program, p. 3-4.
47. Ibid.
48. Consider a tiled kitchen floor. SECD tenants are inclined to keep
such a floor clean because "your effort shows. " in BURP, however, a simple
loose tile acts as a source of dirt and aggravation to the dweller. He is dis-
couraged from putting in effort.
49. These are taken to include acquisition, reconstruction, financing,
profit, etc. as covered at the FHA closing.
IVFn-6
CHAPTER V - SUMMARY OF INFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FROM THE
BOSTON CASES
This chapter summarizes the impact of federal subsidies upon rehabilitation
brought to light so far. A tentative evaluation of their interaction with pre-
existing incentives and constraints affecting the delivery of housing services
and a preliminary assessment of their drawbacks can both be made. Judgment
on the efficiency of these subsidies in increasing the supply of standard low
income housing is reserved until after presentation of more evidence in the
Rochester cases in Chapter VI.
This chapter is in three parts. The first juxtaposes the inferences fron the
cases; the second summarizes the problems engendered by the present subsidy
system evident so far; and the third part begins to outline remedies.
INFERENCES FROM THE SET OF CASES IN BOSTON
As discussed in Section 11, the decline of areas in the central city manifests
a complex interplay of forces including many which arise well outside the
housing process perse: location preferences, fashion, discrimination, and
labor wage expectations, all compounded by inequitable government policies --
a whole tangle of factors with extensive cultural roots. In particular areas, high
taxes, poor municipal services, rapid turnover of ownership encouraged by
double declining balance depreciation, and dwellers with abusive living patterns
converge. The visible manifestation of these forces registers in a variety of
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separate indices: substandard housing, poor school attendance, high unemployment,
high racial concentrations, etc. which have historically been treated as separate
problems.
To counter the problem of substandard housing, the initial response in
Boston was to set up a host of sanctioning agencies to regulate separately
individual aspects of the narrowly perceived problems. In those areas where the
incentive to act was still present, this may have been effective, but King-Bison,
SECD, and BURP found the normal market opportunities had vanished, and
regulation to maintain housing standards in their neighborhoods was ineffective.
However, as King--Bison and SECD began their tasks, the local regulators arrived
to confront them with a staggering amount of legitimate friction.
The Unwary Rehabilitators
Some of the small-scale rehabilitators saw an interrelationship
between lack of jobs, run-down houses and neighborhoods. King-Bison and
Low-Cost Housing, Inc. set out to cluster their houses and to train indigenous
workers in the necessary skills outside union shops, offering year-round employ-
ment and advancement commensurate with ability and acquired skill. They
achieved finished buildings that were definite assets to their neighborhoods and
workers with "a leg upon the kidder of opportunity. " But due to the "Prisoner's
Dilemma" effect, little of this resulted in equity. to the owners. The benefits
simply "boiled off" as the neighborhood improved ever so slightly and the
VA-2
experienced workers were hired away by contractors able to pay a premium for
black labor (direct subsidy to these contractors enables them to pay more).
King-Bison did not limit its efforts to upgrading buildings without zoning
problems. Instead they attempted quixotically to change obsolete uses into
viable ones -- marginal stores into housing. The process they had to undergo
reveals the blighting impact of red tape in countering obsolescence. While
decline of these areas is caused by a tangle of factors, "red tape blight"
emerges as a significant component that should be amenable to change by
policy makers.
The King-Bison case casts doubt that change of use is being responsively
handled between the appropriate agencies. It seems, as the CHPA report
stated, that "A job given to many agencies is not really given to any.
Autonomous upgrading for rental is thereby placed in doubt. To King-Bison,
the legitimate regulators of upgrading presented too many obstacles for
rehabilitation to be economically possible on Dudley Street, at this late stage.
Without the investment by insurance, and without the need to change the legal
occupancy status, King-Bison could perhaps have proceeded clandestinely to
improve the lot of the tenants in the building (as perhaps others may still be
able to do elsewhere in Boston -- only census figures will reveal that).
The King-Bison case suggests that constraints for exceed the incentives for
unwary rehabilitators of average competence and limited influence.
VA-3
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The Methodical Rehabilitators
Necessity and political expediency reduced the City to the role
of regulating use as best it could, and human nature led to underestimation of
the problems of achieving coordination. The 1949 Housing Act recognized that
the City, by itself, no longer possessed the means to provide incentives to cause
private investment to reappear in its declining areas. And the federal government
found it could provide subsidies more easily than it could revise the local
regulatory mechanisms. (in fact, it had perennial problems in keeping its own
regulatory mechanisms flexible and responsive.) The case for resource redistribution
back to central cities like Boston is generally conceded. Even the need for
subsidies for low income housing is generally accepted. Frieden writes "One
unmistakable aspect of the low-income housing problem is a simple matter of
economics. Families living in poverty are often forced to spend a substantial
share of their income -- one third or more -- for housing."0)Awareness of this
set the stage for subsidies to facilitate standard housing for the low-income
sector, but' the cases of SECD and BURP raise the question whether these subsidies
are being offered in the most productive form, whether they are producing sufficient
lasting and widespread positive effects to justify their costs. Recent housing
appropriations have been parsimonious, thereby not fully testing the provisions
of this legislation, but we cannot thereby assume that lack of money is all that
is wrong. The mode and manner of distribution of the subsidies is equally critical
in detern-iining their impact. VA-4
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SECD pointed up the way the federal subsidies interacted with the
existing framework. Adherence to prevailing wages, work practices, and
local code and appeals procedures were explicitly called for under the program
specifications, in ways which other contractors and upgraders had not been forced
to take so literally. A critical point here is that in the past under fewer regulatory
agents, each actor had a broader grasp of the situation and many of the regulators
had a solid background of building experience. The following line of argument
cannot be proven, but it seems reasonable in light of the present situation. In the
past issues.were probably handled informa'lly and more pragmatically in light of
the field situation, much as they still are in smaller municipalities today. As
specialization and fragmentation set in and actors multiplied, norms and
procedures rose in importance. The regulators became more politically conscious
of each other, and came to interpret codes literally because initiative was hazardous.
Thereby the whole regulatory mechanism calcified. In this situation it became
customary for interest groups to arrange short-cuts -- actors who had worked
together reached understandings on special arrangements which remained under
cover "as among friends. " It is likely that a substantial share of the upgrading
registered by the 1960 census took place in this manner, outside, and not in strict
conformance with the letter of. the codes.
Archaic practices and standards in need of overhaul were lent a new
legitimacy by their explicit recognition within the subsidy pattern. Not only
were local codes and regulations reaffirmed, but the FHA and BRA were
additionally empowered to regulate the undertakings made possible by the VA-5
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subsidies. By attempting to sit in (at a distance) on all decisions, the federal
agencies appeared to place little faith in the ability.of entrepreneurship at the
local level. The amazing thing about SECD was not that rehabilitation of the
gutted shells averaged $12,000 to $13,000 per unit (plus planning grant overhead
and the many subsidies mentioned in Section IV C.), but that it did not cost more.
However, the SECD model clearly overlooked something vital. To other
redevelopers, who might have followed SECD's example, the subsidies appeared
so tightly controlled as to be virtually self-constraining. (5)
In cases like SECD's, direct subsidies to small scale rehab sponsors
produced narrow results. The sponsors viewed their task as implementing the
legislative intent: standard housing. The fact that any change had to pass
through several stages of review, rendering it "not worth the bother," discouraged
the evolution of alternatives. A sponsor like Housing Innovations, attempting to
embrace homeownership and resident participation in a broader view of the task,
found quite a bewildering array of support programs. It seemed to promise so many
types of assistance, yet only some programs were backed by adequate appropriations.
HI found it a full-time job to maintain a realistic perception of what is actually
(6)possible under various programs, and even then, the awards were made to the
most influential or resourceful "grantsman," and not necessarily on the basis of
sound conception. In response to the limited subsidies, some housing sponsors
began to treat each other as rivaIs, seeking favor with the BRA as well as
publicity in the newspapers, which only indirectly related to improved housing.
Economists recognize this as non-monetary competition for a scarce resource:
the subsidy. VA-6
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The case of SECD illustrated how special additional incentives, and
greater competence on the part of the sponsor succeeded in just balancing
the increased constraints encountered in obtaining the incentives. The
subsidies stimulated remarkably little upgrading.
The Selected Rehabi litators
The disappointing progress of the non-profits set the stage for the
BURP program. In the BURP case the federal incentives were escalated for a
particular rehab model which placed limited faith in carefully selected
redevelopers. The BURP model, however, was nearly impervious to the
reasonable relocation and employment needs of the affected dwellers. Because
of the scale of the undertaking, BURP was modified to tenuous acceptability
only by raw political pressure, arising from a concerted effort by a coalition
of militant blacks, respected civic action groups, and prominent business
interests in the target area. Under the present federal incentive pattern,
mounting constraints appear less than a step behind the incentives, consuming
them before they confer the intended benefits. The futility of this approach as
a prolonged housing strategy is evident in the case of BURP. The immediate
gains, though real, are dwarfed by the massiveness of the incentives required
to attain them. And while these modest achievements justify their immediate
price tags only with difficulty, thelatent costs have been discussed in Section
IV F. These costs which register through such ways as the discouragement of
other developers, resentment in the target population, and misled expectations
VA-7
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on the part of the general public, can only further diminish the long term net
result. To many outsiders-, the initial benefits are already outweighed by the
continually surfacing legacy of costs.
Standards were put in a new perspective through BURP. On the one
hand the program was based on the assumption that the condition of the rehabbed
units was the prime determinant of their future life expectancy; and on the
other, the regulators expediently treated standards in a cavalier manner, as if
they were unimportant. In the present situation the FHA is neither able to
conclusively test its premises, nor does it seem able to conceive alternative
models for subsidization that incorporate incentives to maintain the resulting
dwellings. A more useful premise might be that deteriorating dwelling conditions
indicate market imperfections that need remedy in a more basic way, and that
standards simply identify their locus.
Two paradoxes emerge in this light. We noted that in the normal FHA
model, the redeveloper applies for assistance, and is regulated by.the FHA.
Under BURP, the role of regulation conflicted with FHA's interests of
executing the program rapidly. Who then should regulate to see that dweller
interests are not harmed? The City was influenced by BURP to stand aside. Here,
where regulation was needed to prevent the harm of countless evictions and to
assure adequate completion of the dwelling units, the- agencies that constrained
King-Bison and SECD looked the other way. Ironically it was the displaced
dwellers and community groups, the resource-poor, that succeeded in regulating
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the BURP model and prevented it from "going forward as planned." They felt
seriously enough about BURP's shortcomings to."bite the hand that feeds them."
The other paradox is that the mechanism offered by BURP as an opportunity
to investors in high tax brackets -- that of combining double-declining balance
depreciation with tax shelter provisions and capital'gains taxation rates - is the
same mechanism that some experts hold responsible for general deterioration and
downgrading, since it encourages rapid turnover and short term interest in
the affected property. In terms of incentives and constraints upon the various
actors, it seems incredible that this model, in the long run, could assist in con-
serving our housing stock. The BURP case showed that sharply increased incentives,
to developers carefully selected for competence resulted in a burst of housing
production when many of the regulatory constraints were waived. This is not
surprising. That the long range effects upon others -- the autonomous upgraders,
the under-employed, the dwellers, the displaced, all the influence poor -- that
these effects could be ignored in the program design is an alarming indication of
how well isolated from feedback present policy makers are.
SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT APPLICATION OF
SUBSIDI ES
The initial intent was to focus on inner-city upgrading fostered by
federal incentives, to evaluate how lasting and widespread the effects were
likely to-be. In the absence of demonstrable strategies that would work in these VB-1
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grey areas, it may seem unfair to criticize SECD and BURP for their failure to
produce multiplier. effects, spillovers within their respective neighborhoods,
or institutional changes easing the process for autonomous upgrading. We
have no absolute way of identifying decline that is irreversible or where the
odds are too great. The housing fabric upon which these programs were attempted may
have been obsolete before their inception; the political process may be unable (after
the demolition of the 1950's) to consign an area to renewal, selecting instead to set
an impossible task and inadequate means to housing sponsors. But we can neverthe-
less judge the effectiveness of these instruments on less grey areas -- granted the
availability of supporting appropriations -- by their impact in these cases. It seems
the problems they were to assuage would persist, and the ramifications generated by
the mode of application of the present incentives would continue to recur.
Awareness of the nature of the problems attending housing conservation is
clearly broadening, but still appears insufficient to deal with causal factors.
Policy is symptom-oriented and disregards the implications of its own interventions.
Here let us summarize the problems in the present subsidy pattern brought to light
by the cases in Boston. Recall that we are concerned with their efficiency,
their interaction with pre-existing incentives and constraints governing the
delivery of housing services, and their drawbacks.
Initially it was presumed that incentives to maintain housing were not only
generally sufficient but even substantial enough to support reassessment for
improvements and upgrading. Municipal authorities attempted to regulate
the condition of the housing stock through sanctions, and to channel the
VB-2
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behavior responding to the presumed incentives into acceptable forms. As
seen in the King-Bison case, this ceased to work some time ago in parts of
Boston, and -the proliferating sanctions in themselves have become woven
together into a severe' tangle of constraints. Systemic inability to coordinate
red tape is a factor contributing to the decline. This has t'wo aspects which
have not been addressed by the subsequent "remedies":
1) The ill-defined, multiple sanctioning jurisdictiorsare uncertain
and often arbitrary in exercising their authority. The uncertainty is perhaps
more constraining than the actual sanctions per se, leading unsophisticated
redevelopers to hedge their bets, or "fear the worst."
2) This tangle manifests a responsiveness to pressure, i.e. the
standards are more constraining to small individuals than to organizations with
political clout or "bribing" power. Any observer can see, even without
evidence, that corruption and influence-trading flourish in this setting, and
are even legitimized.
As chronic decline became evident, special federal incentives were devised,
as seen in the SECD case. These were not intended to alter the existing regulatory
practices, but to supplement the market incentives sufficiently to increase the output
of housing services in spite of these local constraints. In practice, they contributed
additional problems:
3) The federal incentives were not supplementary to the market
incentives. Rather, they were completely independent of them. By going
directly to the housing suppliers, these incentives have the capacity to distort VB-3
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entrepreneurial decisions. Such subsidies shape the market through signals from
the regulators without sure goals.or adequate feedback from. the consumers.
Such a system is risky. It may produce neither the output best for the consumers
nor that desired by them.. When it fails to achieve either -- as some low income
dwellers feel -- it may alienate those on whose behalf the resources were spent.
4) The subsidies were too specific. It may have been the intent of
policy-makers to over-ride aspects of the low-income housing system to achieve
deliberate objectives. Where such objectives are known with certainty to be
appropriate, they may be attainable through specific subsidies. But understanding
about how best to provide low income housing is just evolving; programs are
experimental. Here the multitude of separate highly specific subsidies confused
the issues, because.they fostered narrow responses and unhealthy rivalry rather
than searching innovation toward the shared objective of improved housing.
5) The subsidies were made available in a self-constraining manner.
Additional regulatory mechanisms were introduced to "review" and to "help"
the production process. Rather than attempting to tinker or reform the economic
market system and utilize its self-regulating aspects, policy-makers chose to
empower political actors to judge specific applications and regulate the output,
resulting in a timid, cautious system, hyper-critical of visible mistakes. Not
only did FHA, BRA and BHA officials join the many city bureaucrats in judging
feasibility, but expensive roles for professionals, as facilitating beneficiaries,
came to be supported. This suggests, even without benchmarks for comparison,
that SECD's approach was an inefficient way to produce more low income housing. VB-4
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While many more actors came to be involved in the process of delivering low
income housing (with vested interests in its continuation), the output continued
to trickle.
Even before introducing the findings from BURP into the picture, it is
already apparent that the trouble with these federal programs goes beyond
inadequacy of funding.
Since generalizing from a few cases is hazardous, it is helpful when
these insights are corroborated. Anthony Downs sees the administrative
complexity of HUD/FHA programs as "serious enough to defeat the intent of
the 1968 Housing Act all by themselves."
Administrative overkill . . . (and resulting delays) .
cause most builders -- even the big ones -- to shun
government projects. . . . Reduction of administrative
complexity is especially crucial in programs dealing with
unsophisticated low-income households, and in attempting
to encourage participation by private developers while
restricting their profits.
This shift in viewpoint would not be just a trivial
concession. It requires an entirely new method of rewarding
program administrators at every level. Now, no matter how
many.new housing units an official expedites, he receives the
same reward. But one visible error costs him serious penalties.
In contrast, administrators should be given strong positive
incentives -- including spot promotions, financial bonuses,
and special recognition -- for their net productivity (total
output minus mistakes) rather than for avoidance of gross
errors. This may require a revolution in Civil Service regulations,
but it is long overdue at all lev els of government. In fact, the
most crucial innovations which any federal agency can make in
the immediate future concern better ways to administer existing
programs rather than new program designs. (9)
Again, awareness of the nature of the.problem increased -- but not
enough. BURP was intended to be a better way to administer existing 221 (-dX3) VB-5
150
programs, but it is very doubtful that devising preferred treatment for a chosen
handful of developers is a "better way." The BURP model created three
additional problems:
6) As examined above, the quick product of BURP entailed such
high production costs that sustaining such an approach is extremely unlikely.
7) It was very inflationary in terms of expectations on the parts
of tenants, other redevelopers, other slum owners willing to sell to subsequent
BURP, as well as the public at large. By nature, it has discouraged previously
coexisting alternatives.
8) The hidden costs of dweller alienation or antagonism are only
slowly surfacing, rendering maintenance difficult and placing the future life
of the buildings in doubt. Altogether, the initially apparent benefits are
already dwarfed by the slowly emerging latent costs.
From BURP we learn that better ways must clearly include more equitable
procedures for all and that "housing" entails more than the simple, rapid
upgrading of dwelling units.
THE OUTLOOK FOR MORE PROMISING STRATEGIES
These Boston cases have focussed on the production of standard dwelling
units through rehabilitations, with little attention to their subsequent maintenance.
The next chapter will introduce additional evidence on efficiency in producing
more standard housing. It will also explore more fully the interrelationship between
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initial cost and long term operating cost, by examining a rehab process that
encourages self-sustaining maintenance. Before turning to this alternative
process, let us summarize promising strategies for overcoming the limitations
evident in Boston rehab:
A) Clarify and rationalize constraints. Simply have one
regulatory authority set standards and-review permit applications, and charge it
with the responsibility for coordinating fire, health, and building codes, as well
as citizen participation requirements. It should be an entity separate from
producers and subsidizers. Its behavior must be governed on a reward basis
for facilitating production, rather than a penalty basis for visible mistakes. (10)
B) Consolidate subsidies and broaden them into one subsidy to
cover all potential aspects of rehab operations. In place of piece-meal subsidies
towards acquisition, interim financing, professionalized services, etc. -- each
of which has constraining strings attached -- subsidize final products to be
developed within market determinants of the cost of land, materials and labor,
and under general market regulation (see A, above).
C) Deliver the subsidies to the demand side so they may complerrent
market signals to entrepreneurs in determining the housing supply. Concentrate
government effort on curbing negative side effects of direct consumer subsidies as
they become evident in labor and location discrimination, inflation, etc. Clearly
such subsidies must be introduced gradually, alongside open occupancy provisions
and fair hiring practices to avoid further inflation of housing and construction costs.
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D) Restore the presently missing entrepreneurial role, and provide for
it in consolidating and rationalizing the incentives and constraints.
Housing is more than the rapid production of standard units at a point in time.
It is a process that consumes resources as inputs and delivers housing services as
outputs with varying degrees of efficiency. Under appropriate conditions, incentives
exceed constraints, and the housing remains self-maintaining. Planners, specialists,
and professionals attempting to regulate and channel this flow to reinforce preferred
outcomes, must learn to work in ways that complement the forces in the flow.
Present attempts to produce BURP without heeding the market signals governing
the flow, simply reveal the limited amount of understanding experts have so far
brought to bear on the problems.
Stemlieb, pondering the tenements of Newark, sought "the optimum bundle
of carrots and sticks with which to secure upgrading of slum housing." He found
there was no one policy variable, whether code enforcement, better financing, or
tax relief that offered major promise in improving the maintenance of slum
tenements or inducing their owners to rehabilitate. He judged the combined
effect of these in a concerted effort would be considerable, but insufficient in the
face of a weak. market and lack of entrepreneurial interest on the part of major
(11)landowners.
In spite of the fact that the buildings were multi-family tenements, he found
"that the prime generator of good maintenance is owner-residence." He notes VC-3
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"If is the resident landlord and only the resident landlord who is in a position
to properly screen and supervise his tenantry." He is quite emphatic:
It is only this factor that produces the degree :of
close supervision required for good maintenance of slum
properties. In addition,. owner-residence provides a substantial
bridge in the tenant-landlord discontinuity.
Notwithstanding the nature of tenement housing, Stern lieb's opinion is that
. this type of ownership pattern should be encouraged
by financing aid which is not available under present
legislation. It must, however, be coupled consistently
with increased levels of municipal service in slum areas,
vigorous code enforcement and, most important of all,
appropriate advisory services for the relatively unsophis-
ticated new owner. (12)
Chapter V, the case of Better Rochester Living, illustrates such an
effort.
VC-4
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V
1. See section I C.
2. CHPA To Rebuild A City, preface.
3. Bernard J. Frieden, "Housing and National Urban Goals: Old
Policies and New Realities," p. 3.
4. Even today, the Deputy Director of Mayor White's Little City Halls
program will confide cases in interview like that of a young Irishman from South
Boston, who spent many years with the FHA and is well-connected with the City.
He has recently been able to find financing and create a number of new housing
units in "Southie" (his area) using his personal influence in the ways described
above.
5. The difficulty of achieving coordination between the local forces and
those engaged by federal programs appears to be consistently underestimated in
federal program design. The subliminal friction between the Boston -Building
Department and the BRA is so great that BRA endorsement of a non-profit's venture
may aggravate the non-profit's negotiations with the Building Department. King-
Bison's tribulations may well have been exacerbated by their well-known association
with the BRA on other efforts. When political agencies like the BRA and FHA
handle subsidies, such careful regulating is understandable. Private enterprise
freely tolerates errors below a certain margin where the cost.of tracing it down
exceeds its value. Political agencies attempt to account for every penny, however,
because the misspent pennies can easily be used to generate adverse publicity. The
media and public opinion do not judge with the sense of proportion of economic
enterprises.
6. Recall Fig. IV A. Overview of Federal Rehabilitation Assistance
Programs. Once HI had developed relations with the various subsidizers, they
were in demand as consultants, and finally issued an advisory report to Model
Cities on the availability of various subsidies and their applications -- a thick
volume.
7. Professors Jerome Rothenberg, Daniel Weisberg in conversation.
8. Processing shortcuts offered BURP by the Building Department were
clearly a special concession to get the FHA program executed, and were not
intended f6r just any rehabilitator. They increased the confusion attending
King-Bison's efforts. V Fn-1
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9. Anthony Downs, quoted by Urban America Inc., in The lil-Housed, A
compendium of recent writing and reports on.National housing policy,(LWV,
Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 42.
10. The New York Urban Development Corporation, known as Logue's
UDC, embodies some of these principles. Its One stop regulatory system should
be considered for adoption or adaptation; but its direct interrelationship with
production seems unhealthy. As state agency answering only to state and federal
guidelines, it has the power to override local code and zoning restrictions and
avoid lengthy hearings normally conducted by various local authorities. As UDC's
behavior attests, such unusual powers must be used with discretion. When coupled
with special direct access to federal subsidies through superior influence, it can
act unchecked by local considerations. Much like BURP, intense dislike of UDC in
solne quarters appears to stem from its combined producer-regulator role which enables
autonomous action rather than from rationalizing the constraints.
11. George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord (Rutgers, 196$, p. xiii.
12. Ibid. Michael Stegman in "Slumlords and Public Policy," in the
AIP Journal( November 1967, reviews The Tenement Landlord and stresses that in
his view "It seems particularly unjust that families like these proposed resident
owners, who have the economic and social stability to invest in and maintain such
tenements, should be encouraged to remain in the ghetto, the one place they would
probably choose to leave if given a choice. " We should note that Sternlieb in no
way suggests proscribing choice on the part of resident owners of the tenements.
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PART THREE - REHAB PROCESS LEADING TO SELF-SUSTAINING MAINTENANCE
The goals of upgrading declining areas and aiding low-income families are
not necessarily complementary -- they may even conflict with one another. The
Boston cases assumed that by upgrading particular buildings for rental in blighted
areas, individual families would be helped. Through this the sponsors and agencies
became preoccupied with standard housing as an end in itself. Better Rochester
Living, Inc. (BRL), on the other hand, was founded to help low income families
.directly. By enabling them to become homeowners wherevet they chose to live,
these families contributed to the upgrading of the marginal areas into which they
moved to rehabilitate houses for themselves. In the process they acquired the
understanding to play an active role in maintaining their own homes.
BRL furnishes an illustrative application of a viable approach to declining
areas in Rochester, corresponding to parts of Allston-Brighton, Dorchester, and
Mattapan in Boston, rather than blighted inner-city areas. It succeeds in
strengthening the housing fabric where it is wearing thin, rather than attempting
to recreate it where it is already worn out.
The case of BRL illustrates how factors promoting low income dwelling
maintenance can develop in a self-sustaining process. It is not presented as
"The Answer" to low income housing, but as a reference point for developing
alternative strategies. BRL is not a hypothetical or normative solution. It is
interesting because it exists and has grown over the last five years. Our question
is not. "Can it work? " but "What are its limiting constraints?"
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CHAPTER VI - REHABILITATION FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP
BACKGROUND ON ROCHESTER, NEW YORK
Rochester is a reasonably large city in upper New York State, near the
shores of Lake Ontario. Its corporate limits include 295,000 persons, within an
SMSA of close to 700,000.
The general prosperity of the surrounding area is noticeable. It has an
agricultural base in fruit and produce, attracting considerable numbers of migrant
workers seasonally from as far away as Puerto Rico. At the same time, Rochester
is the industrial home of Kodak and Xerox. The city has a strong economic base,
low unemployment, and it is said anyone willing to work can find a job.
Rochester has an extremely tight housing market, with a vacancy rate
estimated to be under 1%. According to the 1960 housing census, the SMSA had
107,295 housing units of which about one-seventh were classed as substandard.
This amounted to 15,785 units largely deteriorating, located principally in the
inner city area. Since that time there has been a substantial amount of clearance
under urban renewal for a tight inner loop highway, for some eye-catching
commercial development within this loop, and for a relatively insignificant number
of new apartments. The principal growth has been in the suburbs, while the sub-
stantial stock of single family housing ringing the center has absorbed those
displaced by the renewal. Dominant in this housing stock are single family houses.
At present large numbers of these units are suffering from "deferred maintenance"
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due to high service costs throughout the area. Many are inhabited by their
surviving owners who do not know where to find alternative accommodation,
but a substantial number of these units is changing hands at any given time, in
spite of the tight housing market.
These units sell for around $7,000 without ever really coming on the
market. The price reflects their indirect substitutability for smaller, newly
built, suburban houses. Abandonment has not struck parts of the Rochester
inner-city housing market, as it has in many larger northeastern cities. In common
with these other cities, however, the construction trades are uninterested in rehabi-
litation. Working on scattered sites, on tasks with which they are unfamiliar, and
which they are unable to program on a large scale, is too difficult for them.
Apparently it is not the actual tasks that must be performed that are so costly;
rather coordination and managerial overhead are an excessive burden upon so many
fragmented odd jobs. The relatively few renovation tradesmen that exist are in such
fantastic demand that one can get them "neither for love nor money." Dearth of
housing maintenance services at reasonable prices is blighting some of -the existing
stock without affecting its structural soundness. This deferred maintenance is reflected
in depressed housing values.
The BRL program bridges a gap in the present housing maintenance system
which existing owners, unionized labor, and renters are no longer inclined to fill.
Under the incentive of new ownership, certain families are willing to devote
otherwise unproductive time into renovation of these dwellings. . BRL merely
harnesses and channels this drive into a particularly fruitful-form both to the VIA-2
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family and to society. While the families engaged in the process are largely
low-income, the process is simply a modification of the way middle income
families and the well-to-do acquire and renovate existing houses. The modi-
fications -- counselling, know-how in arranging BMIR financing, help in
dealing with City Hall - merely formalize the more loosely organized assistance
that middle class families draw on among associates, friends and politicians.
BRL widens the choices open to these families, rather than developing special
products for them under subsidy. By creating new opticns for a sector whose
range of choice is presently constrained, it is a market widening operation rather
than a market substituting operation.
BRL does not pretend to "solve the housing problem" tackling neither the
worst problems, nor the worst slums, but lubricates the unover process. The
principal benefits do not lie in the marginal amounts of money saved by having
families paint their own rooms, seed their own lawns, or hang their own storm
windows; they lie in the education each family experiences in doing these tasks,
and which carries over into the maintenance phase and, many believe, into their
other endeavors by transference.
REHAB MODEL WITH DWELLER PARTICIPATION
A simple flow chart of the BRL rehabilitation process is presented in Figure
VI B. 1. If we refer back to the corresponding chart for the general small-scale
rehabilitation process (reproduced here in Fig. VI B.2.), we note a number of changes. Vli
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In that case the sponsor, SECD or King-Bison, was the principal actor. His
primary problems arose from trying.to reconcile the financing requirements with
the conditions set by building and zoriing codes. The dwellers only came onto
the scene at the end of the rehabilitation process, having been planned for "by
proxy.
In the BURP rehabilitation process (also reproduced here in Figure VI B.2.)
the financing bottleneck was solved by beginning with 221 (d)(3) financing
commitments which were promised certain developers if they rehabbed certain
types of buildings following special procedures. Dwellers, again, were planned
for "by proxy.'"
Here, in the BRL rehabilitation process, the prospective dweller makes an
application with the sponsor, BRL, and has a decision-making role throughout the
entire process. He selects the actual property, thereby initially determining its
"acceptability" to him. The take-it-or-leave-it approach in helping these families
assures that the BRL services help them. No decisions on behalf of the family are
made without discussion with them. BRL plays a supportive role in counselling and
enabling the dweller to evaluate, select, rehab, and take title to his own dwelling.
- BRL also catalytically obtains financing which is eventually recorded in the dweller's
name, but uses its influence to shield the dweller from arbitrary or discriminatory forces
from the financier and others during the rehab process. BRL utilizes only one FHA
subsidy to subsidize the overall process: below market interest rate mortgages under
sec. 221 (h). The dweller moves in early rather than after rehabilitation, but complete
reconstruction is spurred by the fact that he cannot take title until the dwelling is
accepted by the FHA. VIB-2
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THE CASE OF BETTER ROCHESTER LIVING, INC.
The Sponsor
Better Rochester Living, Inc. (BRL) was formed in 1964 in Rochester,
New York, to demonstrate private enterprise preventive renewal, to counter blight
of people as well as blight of housing. At present, BRL has reached the scale to
provide homeownership opportunities to 300 limited income families during 1970,
but the demand from families seeking to join the program is several times as large.
The board of BRL is made up of a cross section of the Rochester influentials.
The staff of ten is both experienced and indigenous. It includes alumni of
the program in paid positions. Each staff member, whether construction super-
visor, administrator, or clerical worker continues learning by direct experience;
college degrees are irrelevant.
Myers, the director, describes himself as a "black sheep from farming," but
has worked with migrants, in construction, with real estate, and has a knack for
business and marketing.
The Rehabilitation Process
BRL is weaving physical and social rehabilitation together, with the
physical strand serving as vehicle for the social strands. The approach begins with
families who desire to own houses, not with houses per se. In this discussion we will
VIC-1
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follow the set of operations in the housing rehabilitation process (Fig. VI B.1.)
to see how they support the social action.
Counsel Dweller
The BRL approach seems valid for any stable low income family that
chooses to own a house in Rochester and is willing to devote a substantial number
of spare hours to earn downpayment.
The typical entering family consists of two parents, several children, with a
steady $4,500 a year or better income, but is over-extended in installment buying
and often has been garnisheed. It cannot make ends meet. Applicants used to
come to the program by referral from social agencies and realtors, but more recently
word of mouth has broadcast its success. Frequently families have been talked into
applying by an alumnus who found that BRL offered him a way out of a similar mess.
No family is turned away due to its present situation. To qualify for the
program, it must demonstrate ability to live within its means, whatever they are.
In effect some families screen themselves out or do not apply because they simply
have insufficient resources. BRL's reputation of facilitating homeownership for
monthly outlays smaller than present rent for many of the families brings in a flood
of applicants.
The first step is to reduce the outstanding debts to manageable proportions --
which averages five months, but can take up to three years of patient counselling.
BRL orders a credit check made on the family. Working from this, committed VIC -2
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volunteers, mostly concerned suburbanites, counsel the families on a one-to-one
basis. The counselors acquire a keener awareness of the problems confronting
those in poverty; the families learn to budget.( 2) At the same time BRL refers
special problems to the appropriate agency whenever possible, and follows up the
resu ts.
When outstanding debts are reduced to a reasonable proportion of income,
BRL gives the family credit clearance, so that it formally may begin house-
hunting. This is the only hurdle for entry into the program, and its attainment
is left up to the family, with counselling offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.(3)
Select and Acquire Property
With BRL credit clearance attained, the family begins househunting with
a conventional realtor, to whom BRL indicates the appropriate price range. When
the family has selected a house, BRL examines the dwelling closely to evaluate its
feasibility for rehab to FHA specifications, and sets out to acquire it on behalf of
the family.
During 1968-1969:
Acquisition prices average around $7,000 ± $1,000
Rehabilitation costs, incl. BRL services 3,700 1 1,000
Total costs 10,000 t 1,500
The low acquisition price is the result of shrewd bargaining on BRL's part.
The units are not listed on the market at that price. BRL's inspector knows the
VIC-3
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codes and impresses the previous owner with the details of all the remedial tasks.
Before acquisition, BRL works out with each family exactly what has to be done
to the house. Know-how of rehabilitation costs is essential to avoid overrunning
the mortgage limits under FHA. These, in turn, determine the upper limit on
acquisition price that BRL will pay. Most of the houses are obtained directly from
willing sellers who have excessively deferred maintenance, but BRL's ability to
pay cash on the spot coupled with its presumed influence to bear down on code
violations enab.les it to buy the property at reasonable prices. The BRL approach
deals predominantly with deteriorated but previously inhabited dwellings. They are
generally single family detached, nine room frame houses on tight lots; also some
are duplexes. BRL has dealt with some boarded up units, entailing slightly higher
rehabilitation costs, which were simply offset by lowering the initial acquisition
price.
The houses selected by the BRL families cluster into several neighborhoods
in Rochester which are both physically and socially grey areas. Some of the neigh-
borhoods are racially mixed, but it is unclear whether these are transitional or
balanced. The participating families (black and white) are joining others migrating
to these areas.
When BRL is set to acquire the property and has negotiated a price, the FHA
inspects it. By now, FHA approval has come to be a relatively quick, automatic
process. Next BRL has the title searched and then acquires the dwelling. VIC-4
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Prepare drawings and specifications
Conventionally, drawings and specifications are executed by the
architect to reconcile the owner's intentions with the tasks the contractor agrees
to perform. Between such a trio of actors, a fair amount of documentation is
required to hold them all in agreement. In BRL's case, the owner is the contractor.
Such documents become internal memos within one and the same organization and
an architect is not needed. In the initial assessment of each house prior to acqui-
sition, BRL executes a detailed work write-up. As indicated above, the family
(as future owner) participated in the determination of what needed to be done.
Since the roles are simplified, a detailed job description can serve as all the
documentation that is necessary. Using it as a basis, the family and BRL work out
and sign a work agreement specifying which tasks in reconstruction the family will
do to earn its closing costs. In effect, the family assumes a temporary role as
subcontractor to BRL, the contractor and interim-owner.
Obtain Permits
The local authorities share BRL's goals-of bringing deeriorated' units up
to standard and have come to respect its methods, so obtaining permits is a pro-forma
matter. Plans are not even required, since the proposed work entails neither
structural changes nor changes in occupancy. This eliminates the need for an
(5)
architect or engineer. VIC-5
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Move -in Dwellers
Interim holding costs (taxes., interest, utilities, insurance, watchman)
frequently present a burden in rehabilitation, particularly during the period when
the building is vacant. BRL surmounts this by making the house available for
move-in as soon after acquisition as possible (two weeks average). Reconstruction
that would severely inconvenience family living is executed immediately before its
arrival, but even if the dwelling is still substandard the family is eager to move in.
There is no need to obtain a special permit for occupancy from civic authorities as
is required when violations have been served or condemnation instigated. Holding
costs are minimized because the families occupy the units and make payments to
BRL in lieu of rent. Projecting themselves into an ownership role, they tolerate
much that would irritate a conventional tenant. Their relationship to BRL as land-
lord during the rehabilitation period is not the typical tenant-landlord relationship,
since they are a!so in subcontractor and trainee roles. Not only are there net
benefits to both BRL and the future owner by his presence during rehabilitation, it is
the cornerstone of the program.
Execute Reconstruction
Rehabilitation tasks typically include new or renovated heating and
electrical systems, plumbing, modernized kitchen and bath, and extensive interior
and exterior refinishing. As indicated above, rehabilitation costs run $3,700 + 1,000,
of which $700 covers BRL's technical and advisory services to the family. Repair costs VIC
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per house average $3000, but the way BRL supervises and executes the job,
this money is several times as productive as inputs into.conventional housing
renovation. Subcontractors on BRL payroll (other than the family) are utilized
strictly for the major tasks (installing new mechanical equipment, electrical
service, plumbing, etc.) accounting for up to 25% ($750) of the repair costs.
"Sweat equity" -- labor contracted for by the family (pai.nting, refinishing,
planting) - covers 30% of the repair costs and earns the future owners around
$900, which BRL applies to their down payment and closing costs. The balance goes
for materials, cabinets and fixtures, which are obtained at discount directly by
the family from the suppliers. BRL sets up accounts for each house that avoid
middle-men mark-ups and the percentages towards overhead and professionals that
conventionally pyramid basic costs.
Since closing and ownership are contingent upon completion of the specified
rehabilitation tasks, the family is spurred to complete them; since the future owner
is building his own equity, he generally errs on the side of doing more than required.
BRL's technical assistance and job supervision to the family is provided by alumni
whom BRL has hired to teach the new families.
Financing
As the flow chart (Fig. VI B.1.) indicates, the financing operations
have been separated from the rehabilitation process. Nevertheless they are complex.
One of BRL's principal contributions to the limited income dweller lies in its
catalytic role in handling the complexity. VIC-7
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To sustain its operations, BRL requires three different types of money:
1) mortgage commitments for the families served by the program
2) interim financing for acquisition of properties, and
3) a self-sustaining pool to cover BRL overhead
1) Mortgages upon completion of rehab to FHA standards must be lined up
to make the process work. At present these are provided by FHA 221 (d)(2) and
221 (h) assurances, which serve to obtain $9,500 - $12,000 mortgage loans from
local savings banks and FNMA respectively.
2) Interim financing is provided in three ways. Each family ties up $9,000
to $11 ,000 in short term credit, depending on the size of the house, its initial
cost, the necessary rehabilitation, and the red tape in obtaining the final mortgage
commitment. Most fluid is the $1 million line of credit with the local banks. But
this has a drawback: BRL pays 8 1/2% interest on it, which increases the family's
monthly carrying costs. The second way utilizes zero interest loans from the New
York State Development Fund for interim financing, but obtaining this money entails
red tape and time costs, such as court orders at time of sale, etc. which wipe out the
apparent advantage of 0% interest . Finally, the third way is a $120,000 loan
to BRL from the Martin Luther King Fund for this purpose. This can only support a
turnover of twelve houses annually, but is otherwise ideal.
3) From local contributions, BRL has built a fund that enables it to help 120
families per year. Each family repays its share of BRL's outlay and overhead on its
VIC-8
behalf when it assumes the FHA-insured mortgage at closing, replenishing the pool.
There is no explicit way of entering the substantial subsidy of voluntary
counseling, which is qualitatively different from anything available on a paid basis.
Transfer Title to Dweller
After the family is released for househunting, it requires between one
and five months to acquire an appropriate property; the subsequent period of
rehabilitation takes the family 10 to 14 months; one more month elapses before
the final closing, to allow FHA to make its inspection. Altogether it takes the
family 12-20 months from househunting to homeownership, but it is able to move
in directly after acquisition, within one to five months.
Under sec. 221 (d)(2), the FHA insurance commitment is obtained in the
name of the family, but this does not guarantee temporary financing. Under sec.
221 (h) the indirect way in which the family obtains the BMIR mortgage is worth
noting. The FHA makes the commitment to BRL as the contractor or housing
supplier. BRL is responsible for carrying out the rehab. Only when the -family
is no longer a credit risk, and the unit is no longer substandard, can closing occur.
After a final BRL inspection, the FHA inspects the unit. Thereupon the title is
transferred and the low interest mortgage is registered in the new owner's name.
Clearly there is a lower limit to the income groups that 221 (h) or 235(j)
can reach. The lower range of BRL incomes, of $4000-4500, illustrates this
statutory limit. Even with substantial assistance payments to bear the high interest
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rates, the family cannot carry more than a $12,000 mortgage under present
market conditions. BRL, howeverr* enables them to get a surprising amount of
housing for that $10,000 to $12,000.
In the final tally, the tenant-become-homeowner does extremely well.
Due to the assistance he has received, and the arranged long term mortgage,
he is embarked on homeownership, developing equity in his property, yet only
spending an amount comparable to what he used to spend on rent. At the same
time the range of opportunities open to him as homeowner in our society is con-
siderably wider.
Subsequent Maintenance
For those familiar with the way in which these families lived before,
(6)
the transformation is remarkable. Some have become almost fastidious. Others
simply exude confidence and competence as they tackle ordinary home repairs in a
thoroughly middle class manner. Figures on actual maintenance expenditures are
difficult to obtain., much as they are from other homeowners, An owner may recall
specific bills or services purchased, but there are countless tasks that he performs
and never counts. It is important to note, however, that maintenance as a problem
never reaches the BRL owner's awareness, it is acceptable to him. From the policy-
maker's viewpoint, the houses are self-maintaining.
An interesting by-product of the operation lies in the neighborhood spirit
generated by the BRL families. In the racially mixed residential areas strong
neighborhood organizations are springing up, which exert influence on property
standards in the area. (7 VIC-1 0
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The Scale of the Program
The BRL process resembles a pipeline, with cohorts of families moving
thrqugh it.
Figure VI C.1. BRL Activity Status as of Dec. 31, 1969
Program 1 2
Under FHA sec 221 (d)(2) 221 (h)
7 1/2% int. 3% int.
local banks FNMA
Families beginning &
in counselling 780
Families credit
problems resolved,
house-hunting 317
Families found
houses, in FHA
processing 36 36
Families, FHA
commitments
received 68 33 35
Houses owned
by BRL, families
remodeling 82 36 46
Houses completed,
families taking title 119 104 15
Total families in
BRL Program (incL.
counselling) 1402
From the table above we can see that over 300 families are entering the
house-hunting phase, and that within the next year about twice that many will VIC-1 1
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be ready to join them. It takes time for over-extended families to pay off
their credit balances.
The drop-out rate after selecting a house has been under 1% and there
have been no defaults among the families that have taken title. The few
drop-outs resulted from divorce or illness.
The pipeline is constrained by 1) the number of available mortgages, and
2) the staff to supervise rehabilitation. BRL is attempting to overcome both by
obtaining additional HUD FHA mortgage commitments, seed money, and an
expanded line of credit to support self-sustaining operation at a higher level
of output. Sharply speeding up transition time of each family would go against
the objectives of the program.-
Summary of Actors
To recapitulate the program, it is useful to summarize the actors
engaged by the process.
Committed volunteers counsel the families and refer them to other agencies,
as appropriate. Once the family seems ready to BRL for homeownership, it chooses
a suitable house through a realtor, familiar with BRL's criteria. BRL inspects, does
cost estimates and work write-ups, and buys the house from the prior owner on
behalf of the family.
The family subcontracts with BRL to do a certain portion of the rehabilitation
(painting, planting, refinishing, etc.) as "sweat equity" to cover closing costs and
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down payment. Other subcontractors handle the major rehabilitation under the
supervision of BRL as interim owner.
BRL obtains interim financing from 1) local banks, 2) from New York State
Development Fund, or from.3) Martin Luther King Fund -all entailing more or
less red tape, lawyers, etc.
Final mortgage commitments are negotiated by BRL between the family and
FHA under 221(h)or 221(d)() which again involves local banks to issue long term
mortgages.
BRL seeks to avoid expensive professional services, like builder contractors
and architects with their concomitant overhead. Instead it sets up charge accounts
for the families with local building material suppliers.
As is apparent upon reflection, Myers has blazed a path in the multiple
interactions with all these actors in ways that offer enough to each and every one
to engage their compliance.
The approach developed in Rochester uniquely combines four separate goals:
1) rehabilitating deteriorating and boarded up houses and arresting physical blight
in areas presently threatened, 2) guiding and enabling low income families to remake
their lives and thereby their surrounding neighborhoods by opening new opportunities,
3) furnishing a meaningful role (through 1:1 counselling) to the previously unutilized
middle class who share a general concern for the city but were unable to discover
what part they could play, and 4) innovating and developing alternatives in the
Rochester housing system for ongoing institutions to adopt or adapt. Indeed, the
uniqueness of BRL lies in the joining of so many different roles and skills into a VIC-13
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into a complex, but coordinated attack on opportunity deprivation -- in ways that
vastly broaden the understanding of all actors touched in the process.
Evaluation in Terms of Incentives and Constraints
To understand more fully how the final result is arrived at, it is useful
to examine in greater detail the carefully orchestrated roles, incentives and con-
strain ts underlying the process.
1) Distinct and potentially separate roles are simplified by combining them
in one actor. BRL is sponsor, developer-contractor, and owner of the dwelling;
it largely assumes the conventional role of architect and lawyer as well. The
dweller is night watchman, subcontractor, and trainee, while he perceives himself
as owner, having selected the building. Through this interlinkage of roles,
potentially divergent interests are held together, and friction from possible conflicts
of interest is avoided.
2) Total number of actors engaged in the overall process is minimized. The
services of architect, lawyer, and other professionals or middle-men are avoided.
3) The number of actors engaged in any given operation is minimized. Where
too many actors would jeopardize a given operation, it is broken into discrete steps.
For example, in Acquire Property, prospective dweller, previous owner, realtor, and BRL
each have distinctly defined roles. In selecting the property, the dweller deals with
the realtor; in acquisition, BRL negotiates with the previous owner.
4) A given man stays "on the job" carrying out serially linked tasks. The man
who starts on a given operation stays with it, as well as those linked to it. He who VIC
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does the initial property evaluation, does the work write-ups and provides the
technical assistance to the family.. BRL follows this to. a much greater extent
than is customary in more bureaucratized organizations. Similarly, "contacts"
in the municipal and federal bureaucracies made in previous efforts, are developed
and built upon, to avoid the education costs of starting afresh.
5) The dweller carries out many of the tasks. Bearing in mind that each
operation involves effort and time costs that must be borne by someone, be it
owner, taxpayer, or unwitting subsidizer, it may seem logical to let the dweller
do all that he wishes and is able to. Yet strict cost-effectiveness considerations
argue for subcontracting many of the tasks to professionals. The issue has at least
three interlinked dimensions which require discussion: financial, emotional, and
longer range considerations.
Financial. In certain operations, it is simply cheaper to train the dweller
and provide him with the tools, than to rely on existing trades. In many tasks, the
principal costs are getting there, sizing up the job, going back for tools and
materials, or even coffee breaks. Plumbers are notorious in this, but even carpenters
are guilty. In rehab there are many minor jobs that must get done, and in subsequent
maintenance, most are minor. As specialization continues, training the dweller
(8)
will become even more rational than it already is for many tasks. Other more
major tasks, like Redoing the Heating System are sensibly delegated to a professional.
The know-how and judgment to enable the dweller to decide when to call the
specialist, whether to trust his word, and what to do himself must be developed, howe
7
ver.
ViC-1 5
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Emotional. Contractors simply do not do some things the way the dwellers
want them done.( 9  The would-be owner will undertake them as a hobby,
devoting leisure hours to the task if he chooses, whereas the contractor would
simply "rip it out" or "board it up," knowing it was more "rational" than
spending chargeable time on a labor of love. BRL simply offers the future owner
the freedom to be "rational" or to exercise his love. Herein may lie a critical
difference between homeownership and low income housing production.
Long Range. Even when his participation in a given operation cannot be
justified within the initial cost, it is frequently rational as education. In the
long run the dweller copes with recurring situations that professional maintenance/
management services find impossible to handle at reasonable cost. The BRL dweller's
roles as trainee and subcontractor equip him to make his own future entrepreneurial
decisions.
For his efforts, the dweller draws benefits in a variety of ways. As subcontractor,
he is credited at the time of closing with the cash equivalent of the labor inputs he
furnished. As future owner, the fruits of his extra efforts also accrue to him; and as
trainee, he has learned skills that will save him money in the long run, or even that
he can market. He is largely recompensed in ultimate benefits, rather than
immediate pay -- a situation analogous to education.
The impact on the dweller of selecting his own property must not be under-
estimated. As he makes the choice from the selection provided by the realtor as
market agent, he makes personal trade-offs between many complex parameters VIC-1
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including size, style, number of rooms, neighborhood, and access to transportation,
that are difficult for another to make on his behalf. More important, even if the
identical selection were reached by another process, the situation would be different
because he would not have experienced the trading-off among alternatives. BRL
offers responsive participation in decision-making to the dweller.
EVALUATION OF THE BRL APPROACH IN ITS PRESENT CONTEXT
This section introduces additional evidence for contrast so that three aspects of
the BRL approach can be more fully understood. The aspects for further examination
are 1) the unusually low rehabilitation costs; 2) dweller education towards main-
tenance, and 3) FHA constraints upon BRL. Each requires separate development.
BRL Rehabilitation Costs
Here we investigate two contrasting rehabilitation models.
Comparable Rehab for Rental
The efforts of CPT Housing Corporation to rehabilitate under
conventional FHA practices furnish an interesting contrast to BRL. The CPT
Housing Corp. (CPT) was set up as a non-profit venture by the Third Presbyterian
(10)Church of Rochester. CPT rehabilitated nine houses, -btermixed among those VID-1
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of BRL. They are similar houses, neither larger nor smaller, on the same streets,
done for a similar income group at roughly the same time. However, the project
was designed for rental, and executed conventionally by a contractor, resulting
in substantia.lly higher costs. The physical products are neither better nor worse
than BRL's.
Figure VI D. I. presents the cost breakdown on the nine CPT houses. It is
a direct quote from CPT's May 1968 Newsletter. Below it, for comparison is
Figure VI D.2., the costs for the nearby BRL houses.
The CPT average purchase price of $8600 is a good $1600 higher than BRL's
average. This can be due to inexperience or to CPT's reluctance to "push"
previous owners too hard, but it does not appear to reflect substantially more "house"
at the outset.
CPT's average rehab expenditure of $8000 per unit is more than double BRL's
average direct expenditure of $3400 on equivalent houses. To this point CPT has
already invested an average of $6000 more per house. In addition, CPT incurred
professional fees and financing costs averaging $1940 per unit; BRL provided
.comparable services, plus keeping rehab costs down, out of an average of $640
in overhead. Cumulatively, CPT spent over $9000 -more per unit on initial rehab costs,
without apparent impact on the unit.
There is no evidence of higher "maintainability" having been purchased through
CPT's rehab. Maintenance cost figures are not available, but there is a consensus
in Rochester that units for rental to families like CPT's entail higher maintenance
expenditures, leading to their inclusion in the Rochester Housing Authority's leased
housing program. V1D2
181
Fig. VI.D.I.
C. P. T HOUSINL, tPORATJ0N
N E W S L E T 1 E R
F L A S H
At long last the first C P.T. Housing project is finally concluded. On April 25,
1968 the 35-year 3% mortgage on the nine C.P.T. houses was recorded in the Monroe County
Clerk's'Office. Until Thursday, C.P.T. has been
to purchase and rehabilitate the houses
The sad statistics aie:
paying 6% interest on the money borrowed
Pro Rata
.% rchI-iteet ,
Pur,-nase RehabiK i- Legal, litle
BR Price tation Expense
72 Arch St.
73 Second St.
59 Fourth St.
25 Magnolia St.
44 Carson Ave.
419 -Flint St.
70 Lenox St.
12 Gladstone St
,02 Flint St.
Total
$10,500
8,500
8,900
7,500
9,900
9,500
6,900
6,000
10,000
$12,500
8,953
6,245
9,292
5,225
10,910
6,711
7,951
4,213
$77,700 + $72,000
Fig. VI.D.2. Comparable BRL Houses
Address
71 Arch St.
67 Arch St.
48 Fourth St.
31 arson Ave.
43 Garson Ave.
59 Garson Ave.
389 Flint St.
432 Flint St.
499 Flint St.
35 Lenox St.
36 Lenox St.
39 Lenox St.
47 Lenox St.
56 Lenox St.
Purchase
Price
86,800
7,500
(,700
6,900
7,200
7,000
5,000
7,000
7,500
7,000
7,500
6,500
7,020
6,800
Rehab
Costs
$3,500
3, 100
5,409
3,500
3,500
3,110
4,650
2,165
3,375
3,250
2,850
4,874
2,075
2,755
$ :;7U
570
570
570
570
570
570
570
570
$5,130
Pri Rita
Expense
$1,370
1,370
1,370
1,370
1,370
1,370
1,370
1,370
1,370
. $12,330
Total
Cost
Per
House
$ 24,940
19,393
17,085
18,732
17,065
22,350
15,550
15,891
16,150
$167,160
Pro Rata
Overhead
S600
600
700
700
700
600
600
600
600
600
600
700
600
600
Sales
Price
1 0,900
11,500
12,809
11,100
11,400
10,710
10,250
9,765
11,475
10,850
10,950
12,074
9,695
10,155
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CPT was not chosen as an extreme example, but simply because it offered
cost figures for comparison. It reveals the conventional pattern of rehabilitation
presently fostered by the federal subsidy system. The CPT approach is standard
for a non-profit, church-sponsored effort. The Corporation bought the houses and
contracted out the rehabilitation. Not only was there a separate contractor, but
other professionals like architects and lawyers played a role in facilitating the
rehabilitation.
Upon completion, CPT placed families in the houses, but market rents were
inadequate to cover the initial costs. CPT had overspent on rehab. Each actor
felt he had rendered legitimate services and was entitled to his fee. The principal
headache was how to finance the completed project, since it required a substantial
subsidy.
It turned out it was not necessary for the sponsoring church to subsidize the
CPT effort. A member of the church was a.Iso director of the Rochester Housing
Authority. He was instrumental in lining up section 221(d)(3) BMIR (below market
interest rate) financing to cover the initial expenses. But even that was insufficient
to make the rents acceptable. Further subsidies to cover operating expenses under the
leased public housing program finally enabled families to occupy the units.
It is important to recognize that the belief- in the necessity of more and more
subsidies is structured into the approach fostered by present federal housing legislation.
Aided by facilitating beneficiaries -qualified professionals and recognized
contractors 'performing legitimate services -- the sponsor finds himself entangled in a VID-
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web leading to such high initial costs that only substantial subsidies can rescue
him. Efficiency on his part is not-encouraged or required. Influence obtains
the subsidy.
Publicly Sponsored Rehabilitation for Ownership
The Rochester Housing Authority, aware of BRL's success, has .considered
developing a publicly sponsored rehabilitation effort which would turn over completed
houses under section 235 subsidy to owners who could not or would not choose to
(12)
participate in the rehabilitation. In interview, the RHA's director, Robert
Siprell, outlined a homeownership program which he felt would have broader appeal.
Closer inspection reveals that a public agency cannot offer many of BRL's advantages.
Figure VI D.3. lays two models side by side, BRL (private) vs. RHA (public). Both
only cover initial costs. Note how the RHA process requires more expenditures to
execute the equivalent quality of rehabilitation because it is public, and thereupon
because it engages conventional trades and facilitating beneficiaries.
Some of the points in the comparison require more detailed scrutiny.
Acquisition: There is much disagreement about the value-of existing property.
Constraints and interests of the actors distort the "willing seller-willing buyer" concept
in declining areas. Private interests assess the value of these properties through
the demand for them and the opportunity to alter them for resale. BRL operates within
the confines of market resale, and determines acquisition costs by subtracting the costs
of its efforts from the resale value.. Public interests are more influenced by potential
impact on tax appraisals and "fair price" as interpreted by the press and politicians.
(13) VID-5The RHA ignores resale value.
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Fig. VI.D.3. Privately and Publicly Sponsored Rehabilitation for Home Ownership
BRL - 'yers (private) RHA - Siprell (public)
1000 - 3000 lower than
public authority because
PRL knows rehab costs,
subtracts them from resale
value, allows only slim
margin
"code enforcement" can be
used with discretion
through informal influence
patterns to bear on absentee
owners
BRIL passes wholesale, con-.
tractor ,rices on to
dweller
dwellers willingly overrun
on contracted commitment
because benefits accrue to
themselves
conventional ,ercentages and
overhead trimmed from hudget
through tight administration,
commitment and no
prof-ssi 'nals
dweller eagerly moves in,
paying "rent" for "substan-
dard accomodation" which he
willingly accepts; no unpro-
d',ctive idle time while
holding empty property
til,100 house ,ricett within
market
235(j) with assistance pay-
ments to pay off t11,400
sales price over 35 years
"fair market" appraisal
required by experts,
to see the original owne r
is not shortchanged, tax
appraisals are not undermined
"code enforcenent" must be
impartial, b- act of legis-
lature, allowing astute
sl'umlord to hide
normal retail mark-ups charged
ngainst project; more material
and waste inadvertent
prevailing wages and labor's
normal pre-isposition "not to
overwork" are present
percentages for overhead, profit,
contingency all pyramid the
price; presence of professionals
architects, lawyers, naid coun-
selors, e'c. - part of nackage
RHA never moves family into
such "substandard housing"
"unfair to the family, and the
public wouldn't stand for it.";
i.e. empty units for a time,
while contractors rehab
i15,100 house priced in
excess of market, preventing
owner from selling or moving
235(j) with assistance pay-
ments to pay off 415,00
sales price over 35 years
VID-6
tequisition costs
Rehab 'Costs
1) Materials
2) Labor
3) Overhead
4olding costs
Resultant
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Code enforcement: BRL can use discretion in bargaining to obtain a
feasible acquisition price by selectively demonstratirg its awareness of codes.
The RHA, as public agency, must appear impartial. Where code enforcement
is used to bring units on'to the market for rehabilitation, it must be broadly
applied. This allows the shrewd slumlord to go into hiding, while the unwitting
(14)
resident owners stand exposed.
Rehab costs: General upgrading is largely handled by small, experienced
contractors without drawings, specifications or competitive bidding. Conventional
wisdom holds that uncertainties in rehab are greater than in new construction. This
may reflect inexperience on the part of bidding contractors coupled with practices
Qidding) and professional skills called for under federal guidelines. The dominant
construction industry is simply geared to new construction, and rehabilitation is not
in its acquired repertoire. BRL, having acquired the capability, comes closer to
its preliminary work estimates than most contractors in new construction. The
accepted practice in prevailing construction of adding percentages to every bit of
materials and labor compounds the cost. On the basis of prevailing wages and
practices the market has already determined that rehab of these units is not feasible;
but whether existing practices or the existing stock must be scrapped is indeterminate.
Holding costs: A public authority cannot move dwellers into substandard units;
a private effort like BRL is not constrained in this way. In dealing with a previously
occupied substandard unit, the rehabbing family can move in when it wishes - there
is a turn-over in other substandard units all the time. A BRL family willingly covers
the holding costs on such units since it thereby can occupy better housing than that VID-7
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delivered by slumlords. Ingeniously this model avoids the biggest obstacle to
conventional rehab: crippling holding costs.
Resultant: Thus when we come to compare the final product, the results
on an objective basis are indeterminate. Under section 235, housing cost to a
(15)$4800/year family of three would be identical. Similar to CPT we have
comparable units, side-by-side; the ones by BRL requiring $11,400 mortgages,
and the ones by RHA requiring $15,400 (or higher), but having employed more
labor at prevailing wages, services and professionals, as well as giving the
original owner a better break.
The BRL example illustrates how private allocation in self-interest found a
lower cost route to the objective: a house rehabbed to FHA standards. The RHA
example takes note that not every family can -or wants to rehabilitate their own
house. As a public agency, however, RHA is poorly equipped to do it for them
at low cost. It requires competifive bidding and involves professionals, and cannot
act flexibly to respond to unusual opportunities. RHA's nearness to roles regulating
in the public interest prevents it from pursuing the least cost route guided by self-
interest.
It is extremely important to note the market context for this illustration. The
units presumably deteriorated initially because conventional maintenance within market
incentives was unfeasible. BRL was able to link the subsidy of BMIR mortgage
financing with perceived net incentives to the necessary actors to produce upgrading
within the confines of market resale value. RHA is not able to do this. The signifi-
cance of this critical difference is discussed further in section VI D.3. , below. VID-8
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BRL illustrates unusual efficiency in orchestrating incentives and constraints
to various actors, but it would be senseless to build a special program around its
approach. It simply constitutes a pragmatic response to the opportunities and
obstacles in the path to the family's goal, and it must be free to alter in response
to shifts in these. Public policy should encourage the evolution of such pragmatic
responses, rather than attempt to. regulate production through guidelines outlining
preconceived variants. CPT and RHA require more subsidies to cover inefficiencies
in their allocation.
From this part of the case we have learned that private allocation has distinct
advantages, and again that the role of producer conflicts with the role of regulator.
We do not conclude that resident-ownership and "sweat equity" are essential; we
simply observe that these can coordinate and rationalize the available incentives
so that upgrading is still possible in areas judged marginal by the market.
Dweller Education Towards Maintenance
The BRL case has already stressed that while maintenance costs of the
families are unknown, they are viewed as acceptable by the families.
The director of CPT's rental rehab, George Bridgman, found that management
and maintenance were a much more serious on-going problem than initial costs. After
CPT, he came to play a leading role in Rochester Neighbors (RN), a group in close
touch with BRL. This effort parallels BRL in attempting to provide rehabbed houses
for rental to low income families. Until recently this rehabilitation has been
supported by Leased Housing agreements with the Rochester Housing Authority, but VID-9
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then the FHA began to discourage use of double subsidies. Coupled with the tight
money market, Rochester Neighbors' efforts have now been curtailed.
RHA collaborating with RN was, in effect, a joint venture in rehab.
Rochester Neighbors, adapting BRL's counselling strategies, attempted one-to-one
counselling with their families, focussed on spending. Families were told, but did
not come to understand what their role in maintenance might be, nor did they
experience incentives to carry it out. Siprell, director of the Housing Authority,
is proud of the scatteration in the public housing of Rochester, made possible by
placements in RN's units. A concomitant drawback, here too, lies in the high
maintenance costs. Their causes appear as indeterminate as they were in the Boston
(16)cases.
In Siprell's view these are inevitable with scatteration and have little to do
with family behavior. He argues that government subsidies to cover only the initial
mortgage are insufficient to provide low income rental housing; the upkeep expenses
of the housing must be underwritten by subsidy as well. Although RN and the RHA
face unfeasibly high costs in maintaining the scattered rehabs, both Bridgman and
Siprell'see no way of restructuring the incentives under the present system so that
(13~
tenants would strive to reduce costs. Bridgman and Siprell are aware that BRL
is not having such maintenance problems. Siprell has even attempted to copy
aspects of the BRL effort, and protests that he sees the validity of Myers' approach,
but neither of them has effectively been able to relate one-to-one counselling or
"sweat equity" to their predicament. Federal guidelines and their underlying spirit
seem to preclude the evolution of a suitable restructuring of incentives to the tenant. VID1
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They feel the only solution lies in extending the subsidies presently promised by the
1968 Housing Act through sufficient appropriations to meet all comers. The long
term costs of this "solution" would be prohibitive. If the CPT, RN, and RHA
efforts can be taken as references, the price of extending present subsidy patterns
would not only be very high, but it would be as inflationary in expectations as the
Boston efforts.
Constraints upon the BRL Approach
Viewing BRL as a program, it is natural to ask whether BRL is restricted
by an inadequate supply of suitable houses at feasible prices, by limited numbers of
families willing and able to invest time and effort in the rehabilitation of their own
houses under skilled guidance, or by civic red tape. In a way these are all constraints
upon a very special process. If the market changed, influencing available houses,
available jobs and available capital, the program in its present form would be
jeopardized. But BRL is simply an approach assisting low income families to
maximize their opportunities and to overcome the abstacles they face.. It happens
to be in its present form because it has found a target group within the low income
population that it can effectively assist; given new opportunities and obstacles it
would respond with a different form, forgetting homeownership and focussing instead
perhaps on job training, for example.
Among the many opportunities utilized by BRL to help low income families are
the FHA section 221 (h) and 235(j) mortgage interest subsidies. The relatively
inflexible criteria under which these programs are administered emerge as the most VID-1
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immediate constraints upon BRL. These come under the headings of: program
definition, turnover time, incentives, time horizons and the nature of the non-
profit sponsor. We discuss each in turn.
Program Definition
Under the 221 (h) program, assistance was limited to families under a
defined income ceiling and required "substantial rehabilitation," defined as a
certain percentage spent on labor and materials during upgrading to FHA specifi-
cations. This restricted BRL to a narrow range of low income families and deteriorated
houses. Indirectly, but no less firmly, this also limits the approach to families willing
to undertake a substantial amount of work. To broaden the appeal it is easy to
conceive of a less demanding program wherein standard, hand-me-down housing is
simply fixed up by low income families, to enable them to earn their closing costs
under guidance -- but this would require broadening the subsidy. BRL deals with
one and two family houses. Retaining dweller participation but with less work re-
quired, a variant of the approach might be suitable to three fa'mily structures,
enabling the owner to rent out the other two units -- we have no way of knowing.
Turnover Time
Under BRL the families take months of spare time to accomplish what
professionals could do in weeks. Even though interim costs are borne by the family,
FHA is impatient with the median fourteen month time laspe between commitment VID-121
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and closing. Ironically, much of this period is consumed in title-search
(individual inner-city properties frequently have tangled titles), FHA
inspections and red tape. (See Figure VI.D.4.)
Figure VI.D.4. Operations and Events between FHA Reservation and Closing
Operations Time in months .Events
(1) Select property
(2) Application to FHA
for commitment of
reserved funds
(3) FHA approval of com-
mitment
(4) Search and clear title
(5) Acquire property
(6) Execute designated
rehabilitation tasks
(7) FHA inspection
(8) Close FHA mortgage
12-20 mos. total.
Fig. VI.D.4. reveals that three relatively simple operations must be closely
coordinated with four FHA events -- through an office several hundred miles away.
The FHA provides for grouping the individual units into packages of eight for
processing under section 235(j). This introduces minor benefits and major drawbacks.
VID-I
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Commitment is obtained in the name of the sponsor, which enables acquisition before
the families' credit profiles are actually in order, but all indicators suggest this
point is only several months away. The rehab process can thereby begin that much
sooner. On the other hand, acquisition and rehab of existing properties is not
devoid of uncertainties., When these delay progress on one of the units, the entire
(18)package is held back. Making changes in the "contents" of the package is
bureaucratically very difficult. Even though technically the completed units could
be "spun-off" from the blanket commitment, BRL has encountered tremendous
difficulty in doing so. Instead, the FHA has recently come to charge BRL with being
too slow. Drawing the line at one year, the FHA regional administrator in Buffalo
has recently determined not to make any more reservations for BRL until it can
demonstrate a more rapid rate of production. In his view, FHA "is not supposed to be
(19)a social action program. Such decisions could be made better on-the-spot, by
market forces through assessment of costs incurred by the delay, than by remote
time-consuming conferences and executive decrees.
Incentives under FHA Programs
The BRL case description stressed that homeownership was the guiding
incentive. The approach simply harnesses it to educate dwellers and upgrade
houses. Under the 1968 Housing Act these incentives are considerably diluted.
The family's payments are fixed at 20/6 of their adjusted monthly income,
independent of mortgage amount. A family in the middle of the eligibility range has VID-11
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no immediate incentive to minimize housing outlays on its behalf. The benefits of
"sweat equity" seem to reduce only the share borne by the government through
subsidy. There are, however, two less apparent benefits. If the family is near the
lower margin of eligibility, "sweat equity" may determine whether it can obtain
a house or not. And if the family ever sells the house, it regains larger equity when
the outstanding mortgage is lower. The section 235 subsidy removes the incentive
for the family to participate in the process, again rendering it less likely to
understand and experience the-forces "disciplining" early maintenance.
To illustrate this important point, we return to the comparison between
BRL and RHA, between private and public sponsorship, Figure VI.D.5. We recall
that BRL produced an $11,400 house, priced within the market, and that RHA
(20)produced a $15,400 house, priced-in excess of the market.
Examining the cost figures closely reveals some interesting effects of the
section 235 provisions.
1) The taxpayer's burden with the RHA dwelling is roughly twice as large
as that with BRL. Any and all appropriations would result in only half as many
accommodations.
2) The family with the RHA dwelling is right at the lower margin of
eligibility on three counts: a) the housing cost is only within the recently increased
VID-15
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Fig. VI.D.5. Comparative Monthly Payments under Sec. 235
BRL (private)
>111,400 house priced within
market
235-j with assi.stance pay-
ments to pay off >11,400
sales price over 35 years
For a A4800/yr
family of three:
9 Total monthly
mortgage payment
a 20% of mortgagor's
monthly income
aMonthly federal
.AsSistance payment
*Esffective interest
rate on mortgage
1100.64
71 .00
29.64
RIA (public)
$15,400 house -riced in
excess of market, preventing
owner from selling or moving
135-j with assistance nay-
ments to pay off A15,400
sales price over 35 years
1127.18
71.00
54.18
1%
VID-16
Resultant
Mortgages
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limits, b) the family is receiving the maximum interest subsidy presently available,
and c) the house price to income ratio is high by FHA rule of thumb criteria, easily
knocking them from the program for another with more income. This amounts to saying
that if the family's income had been only a bit lower, or rehab costs slightly higher,
the housing would still have been out of reach for this family. In spite of the
massive subsidy - it is almost ineligible! (At 8% interest rate, it is ineligible.)
3) From an incentive point of view, the impact of section 235 is even more
fascinating. The builder, is somewhat freed from the market forces restraining his
costs. Experience suggests that builders will-generally build close to the FHA limit,
which allows overexpenditure to arise in the first place. As long as subsidies go to
sponsor-builders, they will continue to be more adept at arguing for additional
(21)
subsidies, than devising less costly alternatives, The familysimilarly has no
immediately apparent incentive to minimize rehab costs or to put in "sweat equity"
when its share is pegged only to its income. It will easily assume that RHA's dwelling
is better, because more was spent on it.
If the products are really identical, the BRL house is incomparably better for
any owner, simply because it is still priced within the market. To see this, imagine
an increase in income to a BRL owner (or simply the effects of inflation after five
years). His subsidy would decrease, but if he wishes, he can sell his $11,400
dwelling at a price that covers his equity and probably housing inflation as well,
and simply move. The RHA dweller is not so well off. His subsidy would also
decrease, but he is saddled with the red tape of trying to extricate his equity, while
the Housing Authority looks for another would-be owner, He finds himself constrained
by the overinvestment in rehab. VID-17
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But the owner is only one of many actors in the process. (The taxpayer on
the other side of Congress, is too remote to argue for BRL even though his burden
is thereby halved.) Most of the other actors are facilitating beneficiaries. They
are inclined to prefer the RHA approach, because they see more in it for them.
Architects, lawyers, planners, unionized tradesmen and contractors - to each
alike the higher earnings are immediate, and the higher costs borne by the taxpayer
seem remote.
Here again narrow subsidies directed to a public housing supplier seem to be
not in the public interest. It should be possible to combine private incentives
paying prevailing wages with independent public regulation to rehabilitate the
(22)
illustrative houses for less than $15,400. This need not even require resident
ownership or "sweat equity" on their part.
Time Horizon
FHA tends to compare alternative programs on the basis of initial costs.
Under turnover time, FHA's steep trade-off between time and initial cost was
noted. It appears willing to pay more to get housing units sooner. This fails to
consider that higher maintenance and operating costs may result after completion.
In evaluating housing alternatives from a 20-year point of view, on-going
(23)
maintenance considerations far outweigh initial cost considerations. Any
system that potentially reduces maintenance, or engages the dweller in sharing
it, is enhanced by the long range view. The net evaluation of CPT and RHA is
thereby rendered more negative, and BRL's enhanced. BRL simply offers some VID-18
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relevant ideas in how to begin. It suggests that, for its particular low income
clients, education and incentives for maintenance can be provided, even within
the more stringent initial cost criteria. The case suggests that the understanding
arises in some way -from participation in the rehab process, and ownership
furnishes the incentive.
The fact that BRL was able to furnish dweller education without apparent
additional cost is misleading. As yet, rehabilitation is without adequate cost
yardsticks. Due to inexperience and legitimate pay-offs to facilitating beneficiaries
the other cases examined above may all have been inflationary. Within BRL k more
time and effort are consumed counselling and guiding the families less able to live
within their means, and less time with those more able -- but this is independent
of income. The easy families subsidized the more difficult ones, within the $700
overhead. Even if it increased rehabilitation costs, dweller education and choice
. (29
appear a good investment. ( The case merely suggests that the key lies in
providing the dweller a substantive role in the decisions affecting him.
FHA programs, subsidizing particular rehabilitation models and attempting
.to guide selection in specific areas, while concentrating on rapid production to an
initial standard, severely hamper efforts like BRL's that attempt to pursue a broader
aim couched within a longer time horizon.
The Nature of the Non-profit Sponsor
The principal enigma of the case is the motivation of the sponsor. What
incentives prompt such a capable performance? Welton Myers approaches the task VID-19
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with missionary zeal. Independent of his many talents and business acumen, he
(26)
is dedicated to making converts. He is rare.
How could such approaches be induced elsewhere, in each and every suitable
community? They must be non-profit under present legislation because rhetoric
about the urban crisis has led the prospective dweller to mistrust profit-oriented
housers. In the mid-sixties, belief in rapacious slumlords gave rise to the concept
of non-profit housing sponsors. Church groups were courted by local renewal
agencies. Short on expertise and resources, long on concern or altruism, these
sponsors attempted to act without the profit motive to guide them. Many of the
resulting actions were naive, and concluded in a tremendous amount of disillusion-
ment. The emerging fact that inadequate resources lay at the root of neighborhood
decline was thereby masked.
Normally, altruism and the economic balance sheet contradict each other:
what one permits the other forbids. In BRL, they have been brought into a kind
of balance. It clearly operates with a Robin Hood double standard: on the one
hand it offers generous, onstinting support to its clients "beyond the cal I of duty";
but on the other it can really bargain forcefully with the relevant authorities, like
any skilled politician or businessman. The efficacy of the BRL approach lies in its
selective sensitivity. How can one enlist the required talents into such a Robin
Hood-type program? Either ability, separately, is in ample demand elsewhere,
yet to be effective they must be exercised jointly. This may severely limit the
possibilities of establishing the BRL approach elsewhere.
VID-20
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SUMMARY EVALUATION OF BETTER ROCHESTER LIVING, INC.
BRL Approach Potential
BRL has been competing with other low income housing efforts on the
basis of short range FHA criteria, viz. suitable houses, reputable contractor, low
initial costs., rehab to FHA standards(6ftc On a 20-year basis, it would rank
head and shoulders above many of the alternative rehab patterns, to which it is
presently judged equivalent. If such longer range criteria could be made more
explicit, BRL would certainly be ranked as one of the most promising low income
housing rehab strategies available at present. In fact, this says littley because
(27)there are so few other promising models. Low income home ownership and
dweller enterprise in housing are virtually terra incognita. From a close analysis
of FHA incentives and constraints, it appears that these forms are systemically
discouraged and their evolution made unlikely. This is fully as plausible as the
belief that the poor are incapable of ownership and enterprise as present incidence
of low income home ownership suggests. It just seems more reasonable -to explain
BRL's uniqueness as a function of FHA policies than as evidence of insufficient
low income demand and abilities for carrying such a program. The rarity of BRL
renders it more interesting for study, but also more difficultfor generalizing.
Conclusions drawn must there be much more tentative than they would be if we
had a broad range of low income home ownership rehab cases from which to draw
inferences. - VIE-1
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Two sets of inferences emerge from the analysis of BRL, which must be
differentiated: 1) those about actions made possible by complementing dweller
incentives and manipulating constraints, and 2) those about the suitability and
availability of non-profit housing sponsors in developing such approaches.
The potential housing contributions from providing incentives and a decision-
making role to dwellers in the delivery of their housing services, are an untapped
reservoir, whose extent is unknown and masked by FHA practices. Low income
entrepreneurial- ability may be much more widespread than is assumed under
current housing policy. At present it is impossible to tell. Projects probing its
extent might reveal some substantial alternatives to simply more SECD's, BURP's,
CPT's and frustrations.
To assess this entrepreneurial potential, such alternatives must be devised
as options, otherwise the conventional criteria of vacancy rates, number-of
applicants, etc. -will be as meaningless as they are at present for low income
housing in a "no alternative"context.
The suitability of non-profit sponsors in developing home ownership approaches
-is much more dubious. Non-profits were spawned by the housing legislation of the
'60's. But without incentives of profit and loss to guide them, too many have
been unable to separate opt naive altruism, in developing their potential under
the lavs. BRL is based on shrewd expertise suitable for profit-oriented ventures,
which has been put into non-profit guise to utilize state and federal advantages
developed exclusively for non-profits. Arriving at non-profit status from a profit
orientation, as BRL has done, is unusual; the majority are simply incorporated VIE-2
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philanthropic bodies, shaped by people with diffuse social concerns in response
to the legislation (and fashion).
The ends which BRL presently pursues through the guise of being a non-profit
contractor could be attained more directly through housing allowances (or interest
subsidies) to these families, coupled with guidance to help them realize the
opportunities and circumvent the obstacles facing them. To design such a system
equitably for application on a broad scale requires consideration of each role so
that the participation of each necessary actor is enlisted by "something in it for
him." As we have suggested, the motivations of BRL are not universal enough
among present housing sponsors to make non-profits the keystone in such a program.
In the final chapter we offer some alternatives to overcome this handicap.
Comparison with the Boston Cases
Although BRI.. and the Boston cases are examples of rehabilitation, they
differ critically in a number of dimensions which must be considered before drawing
any conclusions. We deliberately do not present a scorecard here on the products,
comparing individual dimensions directly, because we wish to stress the process
whereby the product was arrived at. All the dimensions are interlinked and BRL
should not be viewed as another potential program for a specific target population,
house type, and neighborhood setting, to be contained by guidelines.
The following brief narrative summary on products is presented for those who
nevertheless seek a comparative recall of the Boston cases. The incomes of the VIE-3
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families served by BRL ($4000 - $7000) are comparable to BURP, but higher than
SECD; the families tend to be complete, having both mother and father plus young
children. The products are single properties containing one or two dwellings,
rather than groups of four-story row houses as in SECD, or 10 to 20 unit apartment
buildings like BURP. The properties are clearly deteriorated due to deferred main-
tenance, but generally still inhabited prior to acquisition like BURP, rather than
gutted shells in the heart of the blighted area like SECD. The state of the individual
units and degree of transformation during rehab is roughly comparable to BURP, but
the size of the dwellings is considerably larger -- typically, nine-room detached
houses on tight lots, in place of BURP's six-room apartments. Although total costs
and the fraction spent on rehab are comparable to BURP, the families obtain
(28)
substantially more space and the quality of rehab is higher, apparently because
private initiative, pursuing its own ends is more efficient. Contractors, bidding
for publicly supported jobs "make allowances" to cover regulation, uncertainties,
and clearly take the source of funding into account.
Viewed in terms of process, several critical differences emerge. The BRL
approach encounters less regulation, it utilizes principally one overall subsidy, and
this subsidy complements the resources of the families.
The significantly lower amount of regulation has several aspects. Firstly, the
level of upgrading is such that no structural changes nor, changes in occupancy are
encountered, similar to BURP. In addition, BRL's efforts appear to be viewed as
benefits to the city of Rochester, leading authorities to do their part in helping
bring it about. There is no evidence of special treatment for BRL, or jealousy on VIE4
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the part of others not receiving special federal incentives. The City of Rochester
appears to have a more realistic grasp of the extent to which regulation is sensible
and does not attempt to go beyond it. Its regulations appear more reasonable and
equitable, but the city is significantly smaller than Boston.
Turning to FHA constraints, BRL was not forced to change room layouts.
Even though BRL and SECD were meeting the same standards, these were only
constraints upon SECD because it was converting existing housing into minimum
apartments. South End row houses in Boston frequently have alcoves that are
technically too small for bedrooms. If the sponsor nevertheless intends to include
them in his bedroom count to obtain higher rents and leased housing subsidies, he
must shift the partition. BRL leaves such odd spaces for a child's crib or play area.
Had BRL tried to maximize its bedroom count, it too might have moved partitions
to meet FHA minimum standards. There do not seem to be significant differences
between SECD and BRL in the manner in which FHA plays its regulatory role.
The BRL approach is based on attaining one final mortgage subsidy under
section 221 (h). Low interest loans for interim financing and voluntary assistance
are obtained when they do not impair BRL's ability to help families. Urban renewal
units under write-down and planning assistance are'viewed sceptically when they
impair or distort the decisions made by the family. Compound subsidies with
facilitating beneficiaries are avoided.
Under BRL the goal of upgrading housing is secondary to assisting lower income
families. The subsidies are carefully utilized only to complement the resources of VIE-5
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the dwellers. The families, rather than the FHA or renewal agencies, make the
choice of the area into which they move. Marginal areas adjoining sounder stock
happen to be appropriate to their needs and means. Halting further deterioration
of these neighborhoods is a consequence rather than an initial concern. Areas
from which the families come, as well as areas not selected by them, are left
to further decline by the BRL approach, suggesting that the constraints upon their
upgrading are probably more serious. To planners and policy-makers this consti-
tutes vital market information, identifying potentially obsolete housing and
neighborhoods.
There is no illusion that the present BRL inodel deals with gutted shells,
ghetto areas, female-headed households, welfare cases, and l low-income
or unstable families. But it does deal with a low income population p&%ree to
BURP,and properties that need substantial rehabilitation to halt their acceleration
towards dilapidation. Comparable stable blue collar families exist in abundance
in all cities, and are presently not offered such an alternative; physically suitable
houses exist in large numbers in a broad ring around the inner city, lying in the
transition zone between the deteriorated and the solid lower class. For example,
it is likely that in and around Boston, areas including Mattapan, A lIston-Brighton,
and Somerville have many suitable properties.
The interesting aspects of the BRL model to us lie in the approach used to
upgrade housing, which represents an adaptation of the general housing system to
situations of lower class resource poverty, rather than a variant of the special
. approaches devised over recent decades for the poor. BRL illustrates a general approach
VI E-
that could be extended in many ways to cover ghetto areas, welfare families, renters
a 9)
and the like.
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Judging by dweller responses and emulation of aspects of BRL in Rochester,
the BRL process is viewed with far greater enthusiasm than any of the Boston rehab
strategies, and clearly should be available as an option. Yet even in its
Rochester setting, FHA reluctance to accept the program because of its mismatch
with its own sights (inability of the sponsor to move fast enough, slowness of re-
habilitation by families, reluctance to spin off completed units) renders its
existence precarious.
VIE-7
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI
1. Recall the charges that BURP rehab prematurely ceased when dwellers
moved in, section IV F. Incentive to carry out the rehabilitation must be main-
tained until the task is completed.
2. It is likely that the Hawthorne effect -- attention per se producing
better performance -- is a significant factor in producing this remarkable change.
3. Other criteria, like appearance of previous quarters or previous
employment history are considered spurious.by BRL. As a staff member puts it,
"A tenant who fixes up his apartment in the slums, like as not, finds himself
asked to pay higher rent, or evicted to make way for another who will. They
learn not to improve their houses." Similarly, employment history is considered
equally likely to reflect the constraints these families are up against.
4. As we shall see below, other sponsors pay substantially more for
comparable dwellings -- due to slowness in making payment, publicity, etc.
5. Ease of this operation is contrasted with Boston in section VI E.
6. 1 interviewed one owner who was just receiving his final BRL inspection.
He was describing his acrophobia in repointing his chimney, when he suddenly saw
something was amiss amongst his shrubs. It turned out that someone (kids, dogs?)
had shifted the stones he was using to define the border of his new lawn. He was
agitated and furious, while he restored the stones to order under his shrubs.
Another, using his BRL acquired skill, was insulating and panelling his attic
to convert it into usable space. The manner in which he told how he would deal
with the tax assessor if he came to give him any trouble, revealed that he had
learned more than just to handle a staple gun; he had acquired a self-assurance
that is invaluable in dealing with authorities.
7. Springfield-Micah, in Massachusetts, has a very similctr homeownership
operation. Here the families have organized their own tool-loaning cooperative.
Joining it costs little, but thereby one gains access to the tools commonly used on
home paint-up fix-up, as well as the advice of others with similar problems.
8. Consider Installing or Puttying and Painting Storm Windows. The
necessary operations are quite simple for the resident dweller who understands them
and cost less if he carries them out.
9. Repair and Clean Stained Glass Window at stair landing, or Clean and
Refinish Carved Oak Mantle. VI Fn-1
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10. CPT is arrived at simply by taking the initials backwards.
11. The introductory remarks are included because their tone conveys
as much as the statistics. Although CPT completed two more packages to which
it was already committed, it did not become a self-sustaining operation.
12. Personal interview at Rochester Housing Authority, May 12, 1969.
13. There have been instances of BRL and RHA seeking the same house.
Take an extreme case: after BRL's bid was accepted, the RHA offered $3000
more, not knowing it was sold. BRL pays cash on the spot, whereas RHA takes
months to follow through, somewhat offsetting the disparity. RHA is simply not
as attuned to the market and the quick cash needs of sellers.
14. It is likely that awareness of this built-in bias and the absence of
a suitable alternative prevents many activist administrators from enforcing codes.
15.~ Costs in this example are realistic, but only illustrative. The example
is elaborated further below, in terms of incentives to the family. See footnote 20.
16. See section IV C. ,."Problems of Maintenance and Management."
17. Bridgman, who has now left Rochester to direct a community action
program in Lowell, Massachusetts, questions the wisdom of renting rehabbed houses
to low income families altogether. He feels the houses are delicate and often the
families do not understand them adequately (Telephone interview, September 22,
1969). This is clearly true when the family is simply moved in, without the
incentives or understanding of maintenance.
18. Since the described process is serial, a delay in any one of the
operations results in a delay of (Step 8) FHA Closing. When eight dwellings are
packaged into a group, a delay in any one of these operations on any one building
holds up the entire package. Given the nature of tenure in the existing stock and
the nature of the rehab process, such a delay becomes statistically quite possible,
even where the overall process is logical and the likelihood of delay in any given
operation extremely small.
19. The decision on what time trade-offs to allow BRL, since it confers social
action benefits, has passed up within the HUD hierarchy to Secretary Finger's desk
(one of Romney's right hand men).
20. Calculations are based on the HUD 235(j) Handbook, Nov. 1968, FHA
4400.9, pp. 21-26.
VI Fn-2
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For a $4800/yr. family of three, we find adjusted annual income = $4,260.00
1/12 of 20%. of annual income 71.00
For the BRL house: $11,400, 6 3/4%, 35 year mortgage
Total monthly payment on mortgage: $100.64
(Principal and interest are 70.91
+ mortgage insurance premiums 4.73
75.64
+ taxes and insurance estimated 25.00
100.64)
- 20% of mortgagor's monthly income - 71.00
Leaves monthly federal assis. paym't 29.64
(effectively the family holds a 3% mortgage)
For the RHA house: $15,400, 6 3/4%, 35 year mortgage
Total monthly payment on mortgage: $127.18
(Principal anvd interest are 95.79
+ mortgage insurance premiums 6.39
102.18
+ taxes and insurance estimated 25.00
127.18)
- 20% of mortgagor's mcn thly income - 71.00
Monthly federal assistance payment 56.18
(effectively the family holds a 1% mortgage)
The complexity of the calculation, like everything touched by the FHA is
unbelievable I Try and figure the impact of a $400 rise in RHA's costs. A
new set of criteria govern I
21. As we shall see in the next section, there is no rational force that
encourages BRL as contractor to continue doing what it is doing; only its Robin
Hood motivation keeps it going.
22. Present subsidies apparently do not encourage evolution of such
alternatives for comparison. The concluding chapter outlines a potential
incentive system to accomplish this.
23. The fraction of annual expenses devoted to debt service wanes from
close to one-half in the first year to insignificance once the initial costs have VI Fn-%
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been amortized. Even during the amortization period the share wanes, due to
inflation, and rising maintenance and operating expenditures.
24. The conviction of BRL staff members, probed in interview, is that
having the family present in a decision-making role and observing the rehab
process on its own dwelling contributes to developing this understanding. While
they need not "drive all The nails," substantive involvement and tangible
accomplishment are essential ingredients in transforming families with problems.
25. The families choosing the BRL program are clearly affected by the
process, rendering them more capable citizens in dealing with middle class
institutions. Also, Sternlieb's findings in Newark corroborate that resident
owners would be the strongest defense possible against blight. It is critical that
the dwellers be allowed to choose, and are not "pushed" to select in particular
neighborhoods.
26. Springfield-Micah, in Massachusetts, has evolved a program similar
to BRL's, but somewhat smaller and more recent. Paul Sears, its director, knows
Welton Myers, and has analogous character traits. This shows that similar programs
can be launched elsewhere.
27. St. Louis' Bi -Centennial Improvement Corp. and Springfield, Massa-
chusetts' Micah, are two that have manifested similar promise. Significantly
they stand out in studies of low income homeownership -- Jo Anne Newman,
"Homeownership for Low Income People," 1968 MCP Thesis, MIT -- as well as in
studies of self-help or sweat equity strategies for low-income housing: Richard
Margolis, "Self-Help Housing in Urban Areas," Rural Housing Alliance, Washington,
D.C., January 1968.
28. FHA/Buffalo's inspecting architect has stated that the quality of BRL's
finished products is higher than any other rehabs in his area, particularly the
contractor executed 221 (h) projects. To get this statement from him in writing
would be difficult, however.
29. For example, in Boston, Housing Innovations (HI) tried vainly to
develop resident ownership of triple-deckers on a significant scale in Roxbury
during 1967-69. The fault lay not with their concept, but in their inability to
piece together the requisite subsidies under the present system. HI enabled low
income resident ownership of a few triple-deckers by presenting signed leasing
agreements with the BHA to the FHA to obtain mortgage insurance. With FHA
insurance, in turn, they approached local banks for financing. See footnote 19
in Chapter IV.
VI Fn-4
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PART FOUR - SUMMARY
CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This concluding chapter has three parts. The first repeats the issues
posed at the outset and briefly summarizes the evidence relating to them.
The second part evaluates some potential policy changes in the application
of subsidies in light of evidence from the cases. The third and final part
offers some illustrative policy recommendations.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE IMPACT OF THE PRESENT SUBSIDY SYSTEM
This section serves to recapitulate the evidence relating to the three
sets of issues raised at the outset of this study. These issues are stated and then
the evidence is briefly summarized for each set in turn.
I. Are these subsidies efficient in producing more standard housing?
Are they producing more housing per dollar than conceivable alternatives?
II. How do the subsidies interact with the forces that governed the
delivery of housing in their absence? Do the subsidies complement pre-existing
incentives or reduce pre-existing constraints to stimulate an increased flow of
housing services?
Ill. Subsidies generally are used to distort market operations towards
desired ends.' Do these subsidies have drawbacks that have been overlooked, and
if so, how. might they be overcome?
VI lA-1
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There was too little evidence to judge the efficiency of subsidies
at the conclusion of the Boston cases, in Chapter V.. The case of CPT Housing
Corporation in Rochester, in which substantially higher costs were required to
produce rehabilitation comparable to BRL's, is the firmest evidence encountered
in the cases that present subsidies are not efficient in producing more standard
housing. Here compound subsidies served to support or. "bail-out" a venture
that was clearly a failure in market terms. The implications are serious because
CPT followed the same set of procedures that present FHA guidelines encourage
non-profit sponsors in Boston and elsewhere to follow. These procedures involve
drawings, competitive bids and professionals that are generally dispensed with
in conventional upgrading. Significantly, the BURP effort avoided these
complex procedures, suggesting that they are inappropriate to certain forms of
rehabilitation and may be unnecessarily called for by civic and FHA regulations,
raising constraints and thereby costs.
In the case of the Rochester Housing Authority additional costs were seen
to arise from encouraging quasi-public producers to act in public interest instead
of private action in self-interest. The entrepreneurial role was constrained
throughout the process by the public interests of the producer. Acquisition costs
were influenced by impact on tax values; rehab costs were increased by adherence
to prevailing wage standards and practices in new construction; and holding costs
were raised by the inability to allow occupancy of substandard units before
completion. VIIA-2
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Evidence supports the conclusion that quasi-public and non-profit entities
are inefficient sponsors for low income rehabilitation. Their interests are ill-
defined and -they lack the profit-motivated drive to be efficient in production.
Present federal assistance and guidelines do little to help improve their efficiency
because 1) they legitimize adherence to potentially obsolete codes, practices and
values; 2) they introduce additional regulation and limelight; 3) they discourage
the evolution. of alternatives for comparison, and 4) they encourage petty
rivalry and grantsmanship in sponsors due to insufficient appropriations. Informa-
tion sharing and efficiency are clearly not promoted by the present narrow and
specific forms of assistance.
The interaction of the federal subsidies with pre-existing incentives and
constraints governing normal delivery of housing services was given more detailed
examination in Chapter V. All the cases except for BRL emphasized producing
standard units-over their subsequent maintenance. The BURP case in particular
demonstrated the overall disincentives to others, resulting from granting special
concessions and waiver of normal constraints to a select few to facilitate rapid
production. The special intervention adversely affected the already existing
web of constraints and insufficient incentives governing the delivery of housing
services in the existing stock. Lack of complementarity or integration with these
forces results in a continued and increasing need for further intervention and
subsidies to cover rising operating costs. Special assistance tends to require more
special assistance. This is already becoming manifest in SECD, BURP, and the
units under leased housing in Rochester. VIIA-3
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These drawbacks or shortcomings were traced to the specific form of the
present subsidies. They derive from viewing housing as a standard product rather
than a continuing process in which the dweller inadvertently plays a critical
role. Dweller behavior is a major determinant of maintenance costs. Feedback
to him on his own adverse behavior is important to minimize resulting costs.
Rental tenure -- presently encouraged by policy -- only weakly disciplines
dweller behavior because it prevents the tenant from identifying with his
surroundings and seeing consequences as resulting from his actions. Leased
housing and mortgage subsidy payments which fix the dweller's housing costs to
his income level further restrict disciplining feedback.
The limited incentives presently offered to suppliers are coupled with
vitiating constraints in all except the BURP and BRL cases, and in these only the
sophistication of those directing the efforts seems to prevent the same from
happening. In one way or another present housing policy tends to distort and
p-event the entrepreneurial role from finding the least cost way to improved low
income housing services.
The next section evaluates how present inefficiencies, adverse interactions
and drawbacks resulting from the application of present subsidies within the
general housing system might be overcome. ViIA-4
CONCLUSIONS ON THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY
There is a general consensus that many American families are either
receiving inadequate housing services, or are forced to spend an undue
proportion of their income to obtain them. The role of public policy is to
improve this situation. This study has focussed on subsidies as incentives,
recognizing that these are interlinked with constraints like codes, zoning,
and discriminatory practices, as well as other forms of incentives like tax
relief or waiver of regulations. These were beyond the scope of the study.
The public policy conclusions relating to subsidies fall under six
headings. Each will be discussed in turn, drawing together the supporting
evidence from the cases.
1. Private allocation should be maximized for efficiency
2. There should be housing subsidies
3. Subsidies should be broad rather than narrow
4. Subs idies should go to demand side rather than supply side
5. There should be subsidies for homeownership
6. There should be dweller education for maintenance
As prelude to the discussion, recall the thermostat analogy to housing
conservation developed in section 11 D, which stressed the importance of the
entrepreneurial role. We stated there that someone must desire adequate heat
in the dwelling, and assumed it to be the dweller. As heat is lost, he must
1) recognize the signs when more heat is called for, 2) be able to select the
214
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most expedient ways of restoring the temperature to the previous level, and 3) arrange
for heat to be supplied by the appropriate component. We reasoned that the desire to
maintain an adequate flow of housing services was linked into an analogous system.
To continue the heating analogy,, consider that the dwelling may be a run-
down tenement room in which the thermostat is located-above the radiator on an
inside wall. As the room cools in cold weather, the thermostat calls for more heat
from the radiator. Even if the windows are smashed or missing, the thermostat may
be satisfied there is enough heat as long as the radiator continually steams and
burbles away directly beneath it. A thermometer on the far side of the room would
reveal the inefficiency of the operation as the heat escapes through the open windows.
The thermostat is close to the radiator, and confirms that heat is being supplied.
As the room cools, the thermostat calls for more heat, even if the heat loss is out the
window. Those drawing direct benefits from the boiler and heating plant cannot hear
from the dweller who is receiving less heat than to be expected from the system. Noting
the high heating costs, they propose larger, more efficient heating plants, while
Fig. VII. A. 1. Heating Analogy for Housing Conservation
VAL'J. ItILI)
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the dweller suffers and fails to get his window fixed. Since the thermostat is
not next to the thermometer on the far side of the room, the .futility of its call
for heat is not apparent.
In the analogy, public opinion is close to the housing suppliers, and confirms
-that standard housing is being supplied. As the general stock decays, public
opinion calls for better housing, even if the system is quite inefficient. Benefi-
ciaries, tied into the present housing system at various points cannot hear from the
dweller who is benefiting less than to be expected from. the housing allocations.
Aware of high housing costs, they propose more subsidies and study alternative ways
of upgrading housing, while the dweller suffers and fails to get improved housing.
Public opinion is out of touch with market value indicators, which register the
discounted value of future rental return on the dwelling. The feedback loop
to deliver a more adequate flow of housing services is too long and imperfect.
The analogue caricatures the housing supply situation, to stress the need for
an. entrepreneur who can best determine how to maintain and conserve heat in the
dwelling. Maintaining a flow of housing services requires immediate feedback
from an on-the-spot decision maker. Systems with remote indicators, whether
housing authorities, absentee landlords, or HUD program administrators, are simply
too remote to play the entrepreneurial role. On-the-spot incentives and understanding
are required either to fix the window or to recognize when to abandon the dwelling.
BRL suggests that low income dwellers might be educated to play this role when
furnished with incentives. -How could the housing market system be modified to
foster more widespread conservation of the marginal stock? VIIB-3
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1. Private Allocation Should Be Maximized for Efficiency
The case evidence supports two conclusions: 1) that allocation of
resources in self-interest is more efficient than their allocation on behalf of
others; and 2) the entrepreneurial function of conserving suitable housing is
best executed on-the-spot.
Judged from a self-interest standpoint, King-Bison's allocation of resources
to facilitate low income housing was not very competent. Few others would
have so quixotically attempted to turn obsolete stores into units, and to train
the unskilled without subsidies. More experienced.entrepreneurs would not
begin to tangle with so many problems at once. The purpose of the case was
to illustrate the gamut of constraints facing inexperienced upgraders of average
competence whose actions in the past (we assume) largely conserved the existing
stock. No doubt many of these continue their efforts, but less according "to the
letter of the law."
SECD showed greater sophistication in playing the entrepreneurial role,
but it was severely constrained by the public demonstration nature of the program.
It seems likely that SECD could not cut corners that local contractors cut with
impunity. The selection of the dwellings was dictated by the purposes of the
demonstration, and the costs of their rehabilitation may well have been
distorted by the limelight on the program. Private enterprise, acting in self-
interest, judges the hardness of legitimate constraints, and uses influence in
overcoming the less reasonable regulations. It finds the least cost route to the
VIIB-4
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goal of rehabbed houses more easily than an equivalent enterprise that is held
accountable to the public.
BURP clearly produced better living conditions for some Roxbury residents,
(2)but UPA's conclusion "$27 million buys a lot of paint," expresses the feeling
that the allotment of $12,000 per unit achieved less than should be expected
from this amount of money. Acquisition costs are normally influenced by
whether the bargainers are using their own money or the government's. BURP
kept knowledge of government backing reasonably well-hidden, and the fact
that each extra dollar spent on acquisition was cutting into their own profit
margin probably controlled the normal inflationary impact of acquiring with
government funds. The program's promise was to produce more standard housing.
While it literally accomplished this, it rehabilitated relatively few vacant
units, but largely selected occupied ones with less cost uncertainty. The entre-
preneurial function was ably handled locally, but by redevelopers acting in their
own self-interest. The selection of "creampuffs" instead of "dogs" can be
interpreted as the winning out of the developer's self-interest over the public
interest.
Even clearer support of the two conclusions is found in the comparative cases
in Rochester. CPT, which ended with substantially higher rehab costs than BRL
(3)for comparable units and effort, was guided by altruism on behalf of the poor,
rather than self-interest. CPT followed standard practices of new construction --
bids, architects, legal papers, etc. -- rather than the procedures more common in
upgrading -- selecting a contractor and bargaining with him, then trusting him.
VIIB-5
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The BRL costs reflect an unusual degree of sophistication and shrewdness in
bargaining but it is likely that with guidance any average dweller acting in
self-interest would have been able fo rehab for considerably less than CPT.
The comparative analysis between rehabilitation sponsored by the Rochester
Housing Authority and BRL, reveals a systematic discrepancy in costs resulting
from public accountability and inadequate heed to the self-interests of the inter-
dependent actors. In our illustration, the costs were at least one-third higher
for RHA.
So far we have been considering private vs. public allocation (without
subsidies). One of the commonly cited drawbacks-to private allocation is the
inability to achieve economies of scale. Scale is associated with the distinction
between private and public. The private efforts are atomistic, whereas the public
ventures are grouped into programs of multiple units. Economies of scale were
perhaps anticipated in rehab in public program design, but even under BURP
there were few in on-site. rehabilitation. To attain economies of scale in rehabilitation
requires a cluster of identical houses, available at the same time -- and rarely
(4)found. Yet the grouping of units into packages has been part of the SECD,
BURP, and BRL programs, serving bureaucratic expediency rather than reducing
on-site reconstruction costs. In BRL's case, inability to spin-off completed units
grouped into "packages" under FHA's 221-(h) program burdens the families that
finish early with delays and higher costs.
To minimize rehabilitation costs appears to require pragmatic decisions.
The flexibility of the small-scale private entrepreneur seems more suited to the
VIIB-6
220
task than large scale government programs, but at present local entrepreneurs
seem to lack the incentives to overcome inner-city constraints.
2. There Should Be Housing Subsidies
There seems to be surprising unanimity on this issue, but it is
important to note two points at the outset; 1) that subsidies always seem an easy
solution to complex problems, and 2) that subsidies come in many forms, with very
different impact. The general agreement on the need for subsidies probably
derives from the abstractness of the concept.
For upgraders and redevelopers of average competence in these inner-city
areas, constraints exceed incentives. Where action occurs, it is subsidized in
one way or another; if not from federal sources, then by inadequate return on the
effort invested, discouraging repetition of the venture. King-Bison, with its
spiralling costs, finally leased units to the Boston Housing Authority to obtain
higher rents under subsidy. SECD and BURP would have never been attempted
without federal subsidies. BRL, with its high competence and fewer local
constraints, nevertheless found that the income level that could be served was
inversely related to the subsidy. (5)
The drawbacks of subsidies are subtle. The need for subsidies arises from
natural and man-made causes largely outside the discussion in this study. There
are monopolistic effects induced by the location and durability of the existing
stock; there is discrimination in access to housing and to the dwelling construction
industry. These are compounded by archaic codes. Jointly, these result in VIIB-7
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benefits to a relative few, and increased costs for many. A proper role of the
government is to reduce deception, discrimination, and market imperfections.
Subsidies do not get at the causes of the inflating housing costs and they may
even mitigate the pressure for reform. In other words, they may simply be inf la-
tionary. But if we want to improve inner-city housing in the near future, some
form of subsidy is the quickest way. How the subsidy is applied can make a
considerable difference in this.
3. Subsidies Should Be Broad Rather Than Narrow
Narrow subsidies are connected specifically to particular programs;
their application tends to be closely defined and carefully regulated. Most of the
(6)HUD subsidies for declining areas are in this category.
"Back-door" subsidies like double-declining balance depreciation are
somewhat broader in the type of housing they affect, but the incentive they offer
is limited to investors in higher tax brackets.
Tax deductibility of mortgage interest, even though it only applies to home-
owners, is broader yet in its effect on housing type. Widest would be housing
allowances or income subsidies which are applicable to any type of housing, and
would make universal code enforcement feasible. (7)
The supporting evidence from the cases is largely against narrow subsidies.
Recall the list of subsidies with facilitating beneficiaries presented in connection
with the case of SECD and other non-profit sponsors. We noted that these
VIIB-8
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subsidies 1) induce rivalry to obtain them, 2) displace consumer sovereignty,
3) each take considerable time and effort to obtain, and 4) are individually
regulated. As incentives, the subsidies exert a strong shaping influence on the
housing sponsor. As their attendant regulation comes to constrain the sponsor, he
comes to believe the subsidies were inadequate.
Rivalry springs up when there is competition for a limited good. Many of
the non-profit sponsors were led to exagerate their potential, and to hide their
difficulties. Instead of identifying their difficulties openly and working jointly
towards their solution, they found it politic to maintain a good front. Like the
Joseph Tuckerman Foundation, quite a few retreated gracefully after only one
try.
The displacement of consumer sovereignty is ironic since the dweller still
pays the lion's share of his housing costs. The individual incentives, like Leased
Housing guarantees from the BHA, are in the position of facilitating or preventing
the sponsor's endeavor by furnishing him the critical resources that make the
difference between non-profit and loss. After he is committed to the endeavor,
the sponsor discovers unanticipated constraints. He welcomes any assistance he
can get at these critical points, but his entrepreneurial actions are often distorted
thereby.
The incentives take time and effort to obtain because their suppliers have
specific goals in mind, and wish to ensure that the subsidies work toward the
desired ends. This accounts for the considerable regulation in their application.
For example, the BRA offered SECD planning services and facilitated acquisitions
VIIB-9
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under "write-down;' but in turn regulated the subsequent rents and occupancy of
the property through the Disposition Agreement with the sponsor. SECD found
itself constrained by unrealistic rent ceilings, which led them to seek help under
Leased Housing.
The point here is simply that one subsidizing agent and one separate
regulatory body would be more efficient than the present pattern. The BURP
process partly accomplished this, with the result that the redevelopers found
their incentives exceeded their constraints. From the housing production stand-
point, BURP was relatively successful. One drawback was that adequate regulation
was waived by the subsidizer's (FHA's) overriding interest in rapid production.
Another criticism is that the program was inequitably offered to a select few --
others could not obtain the subsidy of streamlined processing and reduced
constraints from City officials. Moreover, its goals of simply producing standard
housing units were too narrow. The program was too specific to allow automatically
consideration of relocation of the displaced, or incentives and education of the
dwellers towards maintenance of the units after completion. This was because
1) the subsidy was too narrow and 2) because FHA's traditional role of regulator
in the public interest was compromised by its own interest in production. Offer
BURP's unconstrained City processing to upgraders in general and invest $27
million directly to lower the interest on housing mortgages, and the housing
production might well surpass BURP's.
FHA's section 235 and 236 programs are further steps in broadening
assistance. The BRL case offered some insights into the potential impact of 235(i), VIIB-
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From BRL's standpoint one broad subsidy~is more rational than many incremental
ones. BRL would prefer 3% mortgages for low income families directly from
local banks in place of the present red tape through BRL with FHA in Buffalo
and GNMA in Washirigton. At present BRL is constrained by the "packaging"
into groups, the red tape in "spinning-out" completed units from FHA's blanket
commitment, and FHA's concern over BRL production time, which has no
rational cost basis.
The narrow subsidies, by their multiplicity and inadequacy, make it
difficult for entrepreneur, policy-maker and evaluator alike to obtain an overview
of the housing market. When are units obsolete? What does it cost to rehabilitate
a row house, a triple decker, or an apartment house? How should they be
compared? Normally markets handle these functions, but here, in effect, the
pattern of subsidies and their regulation succeeded in "jamming" market signals,
confusing the unwary and demanding high levels of sophistication in order to
succeed. A housing strategy that has no appeal for those with average competence
loses out to the suburban housing production system, which rewards average compe-
tence nicely.
The fact that narrow subsidies "jam" market signals does not prove that broader
subsidies are the solution, but it seems likely that under broader subsidies many of
the special headaches encountered by non-profits would be mitigated. Approaches
could be compared, progress could be judged, and obsolescence identified more
clearly. (Or was there a Machiavellian purpose in preventing this when government
resources to the task are so inadequate?) VIIB-11
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4. Subsidies Should Go to the Demand Side Rcther Than Supply Side
The case evidence under this heading recalls the arguments under the
first heading: allocation in self-interest is more efficient, and the entrepreneurial
function is best executed on-the-spot. Essentially it is an argument for placing
allocation decisions with the housing consumer rather than the housing supplier.
When dwellers initiate the demand, entrepreneurs respond within the market
constraints by delivering the housing services to meet that demand in ways that
require least effort on their part. Independent market regulation is probably
necessary to prevent exploitation of unsophisticated dwellers.
After the small-scale sponsored rehabilitation cases, the facilitating
beneficiaries connected with various individual subsidies to the suppliers were
discussed. Many actors acquired legitimate roles in regulating resources spent on
behalf of the poor. Rutledge Waker, black director of Low-Cost Housing, Inc.,
caustically described the process: "For every $10 put into the pipeline by the
government, only $1 of housing for the poor comes out. Those cats get the rest."
While this probably exaggerates the case, countless civic officials, government
officials, architects, planners, lawyers, and bankers have become tied in with
the subsidies.
Under BURP this occurred to a much smaller extent, but the FHA and the
redevelopers jointly were able to set goals for the project which consumers and
local interests found hard to accept because the problem definition was too narrow.
With economic power in the hands of the tenants, modification of BURP would not
have been as difficult. VIIB-12
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To classify BRL as a supply-subsidized or demand-subsidized approach
is difficult. From FHA's point of view, BRL is a licensed contractor, supplying
housing to low income families. The full benefits of the subsidy are passed on
to the families, however,. strengthening the dweller's entrepreneurial role. The
dweller is educated by participating in decisions, weighing the trade-offs in
choosing a particular house, and deciding what is to be done to it. The subsidies
enable the families to enjoy increased choices and a sense of control that enables
them to cope more responsibly with other problems confronting them as would
normally be possible only under subsidies to the consumer. But BRL, the sponsor,
manifests a rare lack of self-interest. One cannot identify "what's in it" for such
a capable, sophisticated sponsor. To expect generally such altruism from housing
suppliers is unrealistic. However, BRL does suggest that with gutdance some low
income families are able to allocate resources responsibly and resist'exploitation.
There seems more promise in direct consumer subsidies coupled with education, than in
continued subsidies directed to suppliers.
There are drawbacks to demand subsidies which should be mentioned. If
introduced suddenly, they may be inflationary, since the housing supply responds
very slowly to changes in demand. However, the present supply-subsidies, with
their emphasis on prevailing wages, adherence to local codes, and uncertainties
have probably been as inflationary in less obvious ways. Demand subsidies would
have to be gradually introduced, alongside rational market regulation and
monitoring of fair hiring and open occupancy practices, which the government
should be doing anyhow. VIIB-13
227
Another frequently mentioned drawback is fear that the dweller will be
exploited if the government's $10, mentioned by Waker, were placed
directly in his hands. To what extent this wculd actually occur is uncertain.
Curbing exploitation of the poor is a suitable government role that can be
handled in many ways, including dweller education as well as regulating the
"exploiters" - the landlords, the housing suppliers, the bankers and realtors.
Offsetting the resource poverty of the poor is also a suitable government role,
that likewise can be handled in many ways to redistribute income and opportunities.
But curbing exploiters and redistribution are best kept separate. When they are
linked, interests come into conflict, and the multiple possibilities are reduced to
a very few.
Broad demand subsidies are much less appropriate to attaining particular goals.
Broad goals include assisting low income families, and facilitating homeownership.
Particular goals include developing a certain new rehab technology, or
upgrading a specific neighborhood. Particular goals may relate to the broader
goals, but it should not be assumed, d& priori, that a particular goal is the most
efficient approach to the broader goal. In effect the Boston cases pursued the
particular goal of upgrading specific neighborhoods. Linking separate goals
like assisting low income families with upgrading specific neighborhoods, as SECD
and BURP attempted, brings the risk of compromise strategies which subordinate the
broader goal, or suit neither well. BRL set out to assist low income families and
found themselves helping families move to less blighted areas. A specific goal like
upgrading a neighborhood could be approached in a variety of ways -- by a continuing
subsidy to the dwellers who remain there, by subsidizing suppliers to perform
specific operations like rehabbing houses, or by clearing the area and building
new. Under a clearly enunciated goal, alternate strategies can be evaluated by
how well they support a broader goal like assisting low income families. Under
blurred goals, comparative evaluations are difficult. This is why SECD, BURP
and BRL, which all profess to assist similar income groups, are hard to compare,
Under the multiple mini-goals of the narrow subsidies, comparison becomes
almost impossible. If particular goals are sought, they should be pursued
independently to prevent their displacing .the broader goal.
So far our incentive and constraints analysis of the cases has led us to
outline the type of subsidy that offers the most promise in assisting low income
families obtain better housing services. The outline begins by recognizing
that the low income sector has insufficient resources to provide incentives to
any agent to produce adequate housing under the present constraints -- thus the
need for a subsidy.
The subsidy should be as broad as possible to avoid the confusion generated
by rivalry under a multiplicity of narrow programs, and to allow evolution of
as many choices as possible. It should go to the demand side of the market to
minimize the obliteration of market signals normally influencing allocation
decisions by suppliers, and to make apparent where regulation, by separate
agency, is required to alleviate market imperfections. Families may move but
the.strategies causing entrepreneurs to act through the market will conserve the
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most suitable portions of the existing stock. Shunned and obsolete areas would
thereby be identified for special -consideration by policy makers. The autonomous
upgrading which apparently worked'well in the 1950's would thereby be
supported; and the less efficient special interventions which threaten to
discourage or displace autonomous upgrading would be stopped.
In summary, our analysis has led us to housing allowances, with the observation
that they should be introduced gradually and paralleled by regulation to minimize
their inflationary impact. Regulator and subsidizer should be separate but
coordinated agencies. In section VII. C, a possible housing allowance is illustrated.
5. There Should Be Subsidies for Resident Ownership
Homeownership occupies a hallowed place in the American culture
rendering it difficult to evaluate objectively. Our reasoning about the incentives
and constraints upon housing conservation in the general housing system showed that
under homeownership the incentives to maintain are more focussed. It also showed
that the incentive required to produce maintenance on any dwelling increases with
ti.me, since deferred maintenance eventually leads to substantially higher
constraints in restoring the dwelling to its previous condition. In all cases the
available incentive is limited. These effects come together in the resident owner.
He desires action most keenly, can supervise his tenants, and is in the best
piosition to "patch the leak in the dike," before the higher constraints of deferred
maintenance overwhelm his limited incentive. This is a classic feedback control VIIB-l1
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situation, wherein mounting costs of errors discipline the owner to act before he
loses his control, and thereby his investment. In the absentee-owned rental
situation the incentive to maintain is diffused, and the feedback call for remedy
is hampered both by the dweller's limited understanding of the need for main-
tenance, and his more limited communication with the owner.
Fortunately there is sufficient slack in the normal housing system so that in
various forms of tenure the incentives are adequate to overcome the constraints.
In marginal areas, however, the process breaks down, and as our analysis leads
us to expect, the rental situation is overwhelmed earlier. The tendency of
resident owners to be more resilient in the face of constraining forces in
declining areas, noted by Sternlieb and many others, suggests that policy to
conserve marginal areas should give homeownership special consideration.
Supporting evidence is found in all the cases. In King-Bison the fire in
the top floor of the end four-story row house damaged one room. We noted that
$800 at the right time would have saved the building. Lack of incentive or
resources deferred this action and soon all the units in the building were lost from
the stock. In this particular area, incentives may have been overconstrained
initially, but the resources required to hold the building were minute compared
to what was required to rehabilitate it later.
Under SECD and BURP we have circumstantial evidence on the drawbacks of
rental under the BHA's leased housing program. Tenants under this program have
their rent fixed purely as a function of income. They experience no disciplining
feedback on the consequences of their actions and inactions. Even the VIIB-171
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rent-collecting process, normally a time for tenant feedback, is complicated
by the third actor, the BHA. This leaves the manager with. limited understanding
of where timely action is required, and the tenants with fewer controls on their
behavior which can degenerate from neglect to abuse. Tenants in the general
housing system are significant suppliers of their own housing services -- such as
cleaning their own dwellings and reporting problems to the super. SECD and
BURP experienced higher maintenance costs than anticipated. It seems reasonable
that in part this can be attributed to the lack of incentives and responsiveness
encouraging dwellers to play their part.
The BRL model is developed on the concept of homeownership as a
stabilizing influence in marginal neighborhoods. The incentive of obtaining
ownership induced families to undertake some of the rehabilitation. The quality
of their work was acceptable to FHA standards, and their actions in self-interest
were clearly a factor in the remarkably low rehab costs. They would not have
worked as productively subcontracting on someone else's house.
It is too early to conclude definitively, but BRL homeowners moving into
marginal areas appear to influence one another and their neighborhoods to
arrest blight. Certainly they have been instrumental in creating neighborhood
organizations. Significantly, the families interpret the BRL process as
extending their opportunities, and in this spirit they appear able to accomplish
more upgrading and conservation of existing housing than constraining codes.
If they can sustain these efforts, then homeownership subsidies for such families
are a good investment for society. The benefits to the family exceed the VIIB-18
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motivating incentives. The family gains the equity resulting from its own
efforts -- a form of forced savings. They acquire status.
HUD 's section 235 program under which BRL presently operates, does
not fully take the nature of incentives and constraints into consideration.
Section VII C outlines a form of resident ownership incentives that is consistent
with our analytical approach.
6. There Should Be Dweller Education for Maintenance
The evidence under this heading is closely interlinked with the previous
one. Sponsors in all four cases would vigorously agree with the need for dweller
education.
King-Bison avoids difficulties by attempting to screen out problem families--
the standard solution of the private landlord. Even the tenants under Leased
Housing agreements are initially accepted by King-Bison, and referred by them to
the BRA. For King-Bison, this is an answer to the problem of families with
negligent or abusive behavior, but it is not a general solution. Normally BHA
assigns tenants.
The theory that rewards and punishments in early life shape lifelong behavior
patterns seems reasonable, but it does not justify the belief that problem dwellers
are purely the result of early influences. The consequences of a housing policy
are necessarily limited, but they should not ignore their shaping impact on
dweller's lives. We noted above, under Vll-.B .5, that SECD and BURP tenants, whose
rent is a fixed percentage of income, and who are buffered in dealing with the
management by the BHA, are relatively isolated from the positive and negative VIIB-1
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consequences of their actions and inactions. Without these disciplining or
shaping influences, their behavior lapses more easily into negligence. Abusive
behavior may even be reinforced if it is the only means of obtaining attention.
The SECD and BURP program designs are not equipped to deal with this. Having
ignored the dweller in their conception, they have no incentive available to
shape his behavior more positively.
The BRL model evolved around dweller incentives, and his "education"
naturally followed. The BRL dweller initially has consequences and alternatives
revealed to him by his guidance counsellor. Throughout the process from
counselling to taking title, he is helped to learn from his mistakes. He learns to
minimize maintenance costs, both through calling the repair man in time, and
by avoiding him when he is unnecessary and doing it himself. He comes to deal
with regulatory authorities without being intimidated. He acquires some marketable
skills which few use directly, but which by transference sometimes improve his
job situation. Above all, he acquires a knack for realistically appraising the
circumstances confronting him, resulting in more reasoned action. As drawbacks,
it should immediately be noted that the obstacles a low income family has to
overcome in pursuit of its goal of homeownership are considerable, especially
since only dwellings requiring substantial rehabilitation can be considered under
present programs - that too, is haltingly changing.
Dweller education, to be effective, must be coupled with sufficiently strong
incentives. The discussion of the BRL case noted that the fixed 3% interest VIIB-20
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mortgage under section 221 (h) presented a strong incentive to minimize. rehab
costs. Under section 235(j), where payments are related to income, this
incentive is largely lost, since higher rehab costs are shifted to the sliding
subsidy alone. The subsidy reduction as income rises, further acts as
disincentive, albeit a mild one, for the dweller to "improve." The stronger
the perceived incentive seems to the dweller, the more likely it is that he
will take counselling and guidance seriously. Thus a fixed interest home-
ownership program is better able to carry dweller education along with it; and
ownership, even on a sliding interest scale is a stronger incentive than rental
programs can offer.
The purpose of dweller education is to increase understanding of the conse-
quences of action and inaction. Rochester Neighbors, whose counselling program
for tenants attempted to adapt BRL's approach, found it considerably more difficult
to influence them. Doubtless this might be explained in other ways, but these
tenants were also in housing leased to the Rochester Housing Authority, and had
few incentives to put into practice whatever understanding they gained from
their counsellors. It is probably not sufficient for the content of a counselling
program to be attuned to relevant concerns of the dwellers. It is necessary to
couple it with incentives meaningful to them so they are encouraged to put into
practice and benefit from what they have learned.
To design tenant education is not easy, but the functioning of the general
rental market yields some clues. It seems important for the dweller to allocate VIIB-21
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his own housing resources as much as possible, so he comes to experience the
cost consequences of his own behavior. This corroborates the selection of
housing allowances under VIL. B.4 'above. All should be able to select
housing in the general market system with guidance available to those who.
are being "screened out." Such guidance might be conducted in a manner
analogous to the county agent in agriculture extension and coupled with
referral assistance to landlords willing to participate. Pay for the agents would
have to relate in some way to the number who remain placed successfully.
Outlines for possible approaches would again be defined by the incentives
and constraints faced by the interdependent actors.
This set of policy recommendations extends the general housing system and
urges the abandonment of special strategies that inevitably separate and may
attach stigma to certain housing types, areas, owners, dwellers and entrepreneurs.
Special interests like facilitating beneficiaries are quick to take advantage
and legitimize situations where non-comparabi lity prevents detection. It is
beyond proof, but it seems likely that placing more faith and complementary
resources in the common dweller will result in better conservation of the existing
housing stock and better regulation of the suppliers of housing services than
increased controls over the application of subsidies. That is the lesson from the
BURP case. The BURP model was modified in spite of the fact that direct subsidies
to the redevelopers removed just the economic pressure tenants needed to modify
the process. VIlB-22
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Under the strategies outlined above the structures selected
by King-Bison or SECD might not have been rehabilitated; those for whom BURP
was intended might have moved to the suburbs. This in turn might have pointed
up more clearly the blighting effect of bureaucracy in the Boston regulatory
agencies and forced reform, instead of masking the need for it. Whatever
their actual effects, these strategies would clarify and assist in reducing the
complexity of the apparently intractable housing problems presently confronting
planners and policy makers.
ILLUSTRATIVE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This concluding section offers some policy recommendations to illustrate
programs that would be consistent with the conclusions of the analysis. We can
now outline performance specifications for subsidies that look relatively promising
after this review of the cases. Doubtless political expediency would modify them
prior to implementation, but they are presented here for debate. They illustrate
1) a possible housing allowance, 2) a way of adapting middle-income home-
ownership incentives to lower income needs, and 3) an adaptation of the BRL
counselling service to educate dwellers. They are specific illustrations. Once
the approach is grasped, variants consistent with it can be developed.
1. The Outlines of a Possible Housing Allowance
Section VII.0 .3 concluded that a housing allowance should
be paid to the dweller. It should be a function of his income. To avoid undue VIIC-1
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inflation it must be gradually introduced. To avoid stigma to the dweller, it
should be handled like social security payments. To prevent profiteering
by owners of run-down property , it should be coupled with appropriate standards
and market regulation. 9Under this stipulation, it would provide a market
incentive to owners to upgrade their property to attract the dwellers who now
have more means.
A workable plan could be administered through the Internal Revenue
Service, which already obtains income information from everyone. Each
household head would receive monthly payments scaled to his income and
number of dependents, if he obtained certification that his normal dwelling
was up to the national standard, regardless of form of tenure. The household
head would obtain such certification from a specially commissioned government
housing inspector, possibly an F HA agent. The incentive to the dweller must
be large enough to enable and motivate him 1) to live in some standard quarters,
and 2) to get the inspector to certify that fact, otherwise nothing would happen.
Present consideration of extra subsidies in high cost areas should be ignored so
that location remains an unconstrained choice of the dweller. The housing
allowance might even resemble a policy instrument by encouraging dwellers
to move out of high cost areas. Assistance to unusually large or fatherless
families should remain a separate issue, to be analyzed in terms of its own
particular incentives and constraints. VIlC-2
238
.2. Outlines of a Possible Resident Ownership Subsidy
The conclusions in VII.B revealed special aspects of resident
ownership in relation to housing conservation. The process provides the owner
with incentives and feedback to maintain the property. The case of BRL
illustrated ways of stretching the general housing system to serve lower income
groups, enabling the dwellers to overcome gaps in ability, resources, influence
and understanding. The subsequent analysis stressed that it seemed unusual for
a non-profit sponsor with relatively short range interest in serving the dweller
to be able to provide such services. But BRL's existence provides a model for
adaptation.
To augment the resources of low income dwellers, while adapting present
middle income homeownership incentives, the provisions allowing deduction of
interest payment from taxable income could be revised. At present the impact
is a function of the marginal tax rate, i.e. a family in the 40% tax bracket has
a much stronger incentive to tie up its money in a mortgage (since the government
effectively pays 40% of its interest for it), than a family in a low tax bracket.
To offset the present regressive impact of this incentive, a progressive schedule
could replace the present straight deduction provision. Under this schedule,
resident owners in lower tax brackets would consider progressively larger
percentages of their mortgage interest payments for credit as payments in lieu of
federal taxes. Such a system would be remarkably simple to administer, since
it is entirely based on data presently submitted by each taxpayer to the Internal
Revenue Service, and merely modifies the tax calculation. VIIC-3
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As a possible illustration consider Figure VII.C.1, which displays the
incentives for resident ownership as a function of income -- both under the
existing and proposed systems. The illustration assumes that the predominant
appeal would be for single family ownership, but that two and three family
(10)buildings would be covered if the owners had the means.
VIIC-4
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Fig. VII C.1. Tax Incentives for Resident Ownership
VIIC-5
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Rows A - F are incentives under present laws, and G - J below the
double line reflect the proposed modifications. All figures are
approximate but plausible for a family of four with average deductions.
Row B shows the marginal tax rate for the income classification in row A.
Row C revea-Is the tax the dweller would have had to pay, had he spent
$1000 of his income on taxable goods rather than interest. In effect, the
government pays this share of each $1000 he allocates to interest payments.
Row D states outstanding mortgage balance at the commencement of
ownership, when these incentives are most pronounced. The amounts
are approximately twice annual income, but taper in the higher income
brackets to reflect the actual situation. As the mortgage is amortized,
outstanding balance, of course, decreases.
Row E states annual 8% interest payments on the balance in row D.
Row F reflects the impact of the marginal tax rate, B, upon annual
interest, E.
Row G proposes a schedule of tax credits, graduated by income, to
offset these effects which principally benefit those with incomes over
$10,000. Portions of the money spent on interest in resident ownership
are to be considered as payments in lieu of taxes.
Row H again reflects the share paid by the goverriment of each $1000
allocated by the dweller to mortgage interest paymants. These are akin
to mortgage interest assistance payments under section 235, sharing and
finally underwriting the entire interest as dweller income drops. The
critical difference is that they are offered to the dweller, not paid to
the lender/supplier on his behalf.
Row I applies the tax credit incentives of Row G to the mortgage
balances under row D. The attempt was to keep them roughly the
same, but schedule G is continuously variable if alternative distributions
are sought.
Row J, finally, presents the total effective subsidy under the comple-
mentary plans. At some point where income falls below $5000, certain
families would begin receiving tax refunds, which is not inappropriate.
For perspective, consider that the present interest write-down from 7%
to 1% under section 235 on a $15,000 mortgage has a direct cost of $900
in actual mortgage assistance payments, plus indirect costs of FHA and
FNMA administration, annual income recertification and other red tape.
The graph, Figure Vll.C.2, displays the general impact of the existing
and proposed system graphically. VIIC-6
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Fig. VIl.C.2. Value of Tax Incentive-byIncome.
Until one views the incentives graphically , it is not appa rent how
strong homeownership incentives are for middle and upper income groups, and how
dilute in impact they are for lower income segments of the population. This
proposed subsidy should be seen as extending a generally available subsidy to
lower income groups, to whom it presently is no incentive because they are in
too low a tax bracket. Like the middle income housing system, banks would
Investigate the properties before committing mortgage funds, but the cumbersome
FHA duplication of regulatory and income monitoring functions presently connected
with interest subsidies would be dropped. (FHA mortgagbe insurance would remain,
however.) VIlC-7
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A major advantage of this strategy is that it can modify the impact of
interest rates upon resident-owried housing mortgages without having to loosen
credit throughout the entire economy.
3. Outlines of a Possible Dweller Counselling Service
In designing services to educate dwellers and enable them to
obtain better housing, assume that housing allowances, as developed under
Vll.C.1, are generally available. Some families, "problem families" even with
sufficient resources, might be screened out by landlords in the general housing
market. Perhaps others would not avail themselves of opportunities open to
them. These would need some form of guiding and counselling from agents in
a broker role. Such agents would need to have a broad understanding of the
various housing opportunifies available. They would point these out to the
families and counsel them in what they would need to do to realize their
opportunities. This broker role would resemble the guiding and counselling
role played by BRL, but the agent would not offer accommodation or rehabili-
tation services. His principal role is enabling choice, and he must have no
interests in a particular selection.
If it really helped them find better housing, dwellers would willingly
utilize the service. But how would families of limited means pay for such a
service, or if it were subsidized, how would the broker and guide be
motivated to help families? What would encourage him to seek out those
who needed help the most? VIIC-8
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The role of the county agent in agriculturewas created to provide
analogous services to farmers. Some research would be required to determine
how well this functioned, but it seems critical that a government guiding and
counselling service would need some performance criteria, otherwise it would
grow in a Parkinsonian manner. If agents worked on a fee basis for execution
of identifiable tasks, they would have incentive to help "problem" families
and those unable to find housing. The fee might have to be considerable, if the
tangled problems of these families severely constrained their placement.
BRL performs this type of service for families with limited problems.
For the task of beginning with a low-income family that cannot obtain its own
dwelling and assisting it through all the hurdles to take title to a house rehabbed
to F HA specifications, it obtains a fee of $650. ThisJ of course, covers consi-
derably more than just guiding and counselling, but BRL acknowledges that to
work with families with more problems would take more time and effort on their
part.
Performance criteria for the service are necessary to develop an incentive
fee schedule. Roughly, it seems likely that the lower the family income, the
greater would be the task of enabling it to obtain satisfactory housing (even
disregarding lack of resources), because of the more limited awareness and
more objectionable behavior to be overcome. Research would be required to
develop appropriate criteria, but they need not be very refined. (Only simple
positive or negative correlations with various dimensions of the problem need to
be identified.) One critical aspect of performance is success. BRL obtains its VIIC-5
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fee only whenthe family takes title and its F HA mortgage. In ownership,
foreclosure would be an indication that BRL did not perform its service well;
in rental, eviction might be a similar indicator. For the fee system to encourage
good service, early foreclosures and evictions should result in penalties to
the agent but only a fraction of the fee).
Fees are best paid by the recipient of the service. In view of the
inverse relationship of the task to the family's income, this would be impossible.
In the case of homeownership, it could be amortized within the mortgage, as the
BRL approach does it. More generally appropriate would be for the government
to offer the service under the fee system. Only when the recipient of the service
signs a statement that he had used the service to obtain better housing would the
agent receive the allocation for it.
There are many steps between this illustrative conceptual design and its
implementation, but the program designer who sets out to develop a functioning
system will find it helpful to weigh perceived incentives against constraints for
each of the roles engaged in the process.
This section has presented a set of strategies whose effects, taken
jointly, offer promise of significantly improving conservation of existing
housing. The principal thrust is to enable and maximize choice in all possible
cases, while trying to minimize the risks and strains upon low income families.
This set of case studies has attempted to show how potential contributions of
the low income sector to housing conservation are systematically discouraged
VIlC-10
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under some present programs and institutions set up to serve this sector, and that
there is unrealized potential available through modifying our present approach.
The strategies suggested above, acting in tandem, will not assure the
conservation of severely dilapidated and obsolete dwellings, nor will they solve
all the problems of those who are severely dependent on custodial care -- but
neither will present strategies. It is likely that they can do substantially more
to conserve and encourage "a decent home and suitable living environment"
for every American family as well as to curb trends towards increased dependency,
because they relate the incentives more immediately to the dwellers.. From a
long range viewpoint, these strategies will be more efficient in helping
substantial numbers come to terms with their housing problems than present
efforts to induce quick responses from suppliers on behalf of the poor. Our
first task is to bring about acceptance of such a longer range perspective.
VIlC-1 1
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CHAPTER VII - FOOTNOTES
1. Recall that suburban housing sells for 8-10 times gross annual income,
roughly reflecting a half-life of ten years; Sternlieb found Newark inner-city
housing selling for 3-4times gross annual income in 1966; and King-Bison found
Roxbury property selling for only twice annual income as adjoining abandonment
set in on a major scale. The market was giving existing units a 50-50 chance of
surviving two years.
2. UPA, Evaluation of BUR, p. 60.
3. See section VI.D.
4. Priorities, Inc. in Newark has developed such a program with mixed
success.
5. Higher income families simply obtain FHA 221 (-d)(2) mortgage insurance;
lower income families obtain mortgage interest subsidies under section 221 (h) or
section 235(j).
6. See Figure IV.A. 1.
7. See sec. 11.B for broad income assistance strategies related to
improved housing.
8. See discussion in Appendix A.
9. Defining such regulation would be suitable for a separate study and
cannot be undertaken here. In the cases it was observed that regulation in
Rochester did not manifest the ill-defined arbitrariness encountered in-Boston. Keeping
regulations broad and simple no doubt rationalizes the process of their application.
National standards would help.
10. Some BRL families presently own duplexes: insured under sec. 221 (d)(2).
VI1 Fn-1
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Due to their frequent repetition' throughout this study, acronyms are often
used. Initials and the programs, agencies or sponsors to which they refer are listed below.
BBURG Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group
BHA Boston Housing Authority
BMIR Below Market Interest Rate (mortgage)
BRA Boston Redevelopment Authority
BRL Better Rochester Living, Inc.
BURP Boston (Urban) Rehabilitation Program
CHPA Citizens Housing and Planning Association
CRP Community Renewal Plan
CPT Housing Corporation of the Third Presbyterian Church in
Rochester, N.Y.
FHA Federal Housing Administration
FNMA "Fannie Mae" - Federal National Mortgage Association
GNMA ''Ginnie Mae" - Government National Mortgage Association
HI Housing Innovations, Inc.
HUD U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development
IRS U.S. Internal Revenue Service
JTM Joseph Tuckerman Memorial, Inc.
K-B King-Bison Co.
LCH Low Cost Housing, Inc.
MCA Model Cities.Administration
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R HA Rochester Housing Authority
RN Rochester Neighbors, Inc.
SECD South End Community Development, Inc.
SMSA Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
TAB Tenants Association of Boston, Inc.
UPA Urban Planning Aid, Inc.
Relevant Government Assistance Programs are summarized in Fig. IV.A. 1.
APPENDIX A - CASE STUDIES AND THEIR METHODOLOGY
This section investigates the pros and cons of various social science research
techniques to justify the choice of the case study approach used in this thesis.
As a preliminary generalization, social research can be viewed as spread
across a spectrum ranging from broad surveys to individual case studies. Given
fixed outlay, breadth is traded for depth as one moves from surveys to cases --
facetiously stated, surveys point out how often "it" occurs, without telling what
"it" is whereas a case can study what "it" is, without any clues to its
generalizability or uniqueness. Depending on the ends sought, the researcher
can choose a combination developed from strategies on this spectrum, including
random sampling, polling, , interviewing, in-depth and longitudinal
studies, etc. The chosen mix reflects the balance between causal understanding
and representativeness that one seeks.
Causal understanding of factors influencing housing as a system is just
beginning to develop, if we take "housing" to refer to the "ecosystem" including
supplier, dweller, maintainer, destroyer, etc. Theories on what causes
deterioration, blight, or the rebuilding and replacement of the existing housing
stock are practically non-existent. There is an absence of hypotheses to be
tested in the conventional manner. Rather, there is need for causal hypotheses.
These can be derived from functional analyses. At this point it may be more
important to refine our understanding of "what it is" than merely determining
"its prevalence. " If we accept that there is a lack of coherent theory about
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the housing ecosystem, theory building and hypothesis generation become more
important than theory substantiation and hypothesis testing. The distinction is
important, because many of the conventional research strategies are developed
primarily for the latter purpose, leaving theory building to intuition or creative
insight.
If there is a dearth of adequate housing theory, where is it to come from?
Can more orderly search processes improve on speculation and insight? Hans
Zetterberg examines the applicability of the "scientific method" to social research,
and proposes an approach that combines theory building and testing in a way that
suggests separating insight and information gathering may be crude or obsolete.
He suggests that rather than test each hypothesis individually, a whole theoretical
system of hypotheses can be erected, which gains its strength from the way the
relatively minor parts add together coherently. In this system, each separate part
seems almost arbitrary and with little strength of its own, but when the parts are
interlinked logically, the whole has acquired a convincing coherence which
substantiates the theory as it builds it. This thesis pursues this form of approach.
Surveys as Instruments
Surveys have two separate aspects of interest to our analysis. A given
survey can be both a research instrument and a political instrument. We will examine
these aspects separately.
In essence, surveys point up correlations. Properly handled, they display
the likelihood of events occurring simultaneously, but they offer no indications of any
causal interrelationship. A-2
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Consider the following hypothetical table, displaying the results of a
survey of housing conditions:
Fig. A.1.: Condition of Housing Stock by Tenure and by Race, in Percentages
Owners Renters All Dwellers
Housing Condition Negro White Negro White Negro White
Standard 50 80 30 40 40 65
Deteriorating 30 15 40 35 35 25
Dilapidated 20 5 30 15 25 10
This is just a simple permutation of the many possible forms in which survey
results are presented, overwhelming the reader. This particular set of data can be
used in support of any of the following:
- Whites own more houses, ergo , whites are more interested in ownership
- Negro tenant quarters are run down, ergo, they cause deterioration
- Standard houses house more whites, ergo, those houses attract whites
- Owned houses are in better condition, ergo, ownership is a panacea.
etc.
While this example may appear overly simplified, research often follows this
approach. Surveys as a research form are weak in identifying a causal chain. If
we were inventorying Woolworth's, or if we were in the role of central decision-
maker, charged with computing the cost of bringing the housing stock to a definable
standard, then this approach is an appropriate one. But if we are concerned with a
housing. stock that is deteriorating, we need a research instrument that encompasses
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causal factors in a manner that identifies them. Such causal factors might include
previous tenure patterns, cultural or economic differences, migratory patterns,
etc. -- common to these is a time dimension to illuminate changes over time.
To find such causal factors, we must begin with thought models which originate
in case studies and functional analyses.
Surveys identify correlations, but not causality. A survey serves as a net
that sifts data, but there is nothing intrinsic in the instrument to prevent mere
symptoms being correlated. Frequently, causal factors slip through the net in
survey research and consecutive surveys do not overcome this. Analyzing the
1950 and 1960 Housirg census for trends is a poor guide to the 1970 situation.
These shortcomings would be inconsequential if surveys did not have another
aspect: political appeal. The survey is the ideal political document. To make a
survey, a group works hard,. studies the problem, and its output is in the form of
objective scientific data. Yet it seldom challenges stereotypes (see the many
conclusions which can be drawn from the survey above),and can safely be
espoused without inducing the alienation that any specific course of action
generates. The inherent ambiguity in survey data escapes nearly everyone
as each interprets the data in his own way, or "reads the data through his own
colored glasses."
An illustration of the intrinsic ambiguity of much statistical and survey data
can be found be examining the repercussions to the Moynihan Report. Rainwater
in his analysis of the controversy describes how the Report "backfired" into the
author's face. Carefully, Moynihan had assembled evidence which he felt A-4
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"showed" that the Negro family pattern reflected its socio-economic predicament.
The evidence was in the form of di-rect correlations. But within weeks after the
President delivered these findings in a message, the Report was scuttled and
Moynihan found himself scorned as a racist by those who effectively applied
an alternative thought model to his survey data:
Instead of: socio-economic plight -+ family disorganization
they inferred: family disorganization -- + socio-economic plight
Thus an argument intended to support income transfer strategies was remade
into the racist case for "people change." Surveys can be thought to "prove"
many different things, because they do not provide their own thought model. This
is furnished, uncontested, by the beholder, generally without awareness on the
part of researcher or beholder that the applied thought models differ. Therein lies
both the political appeal and weakness of this form of research.
The Case Study as Instrument
Case studies have a different set of strengths and weaknesses. While
they can lead to a functional analysis and a coherent image of the interrelationship
of the factors, they are highly specific, and do not provide any guides on how to
generalize the findings. The reader has no way of knowing whether he is
examining a highly unique or very frequent phenomenon.
While not a case study, the following example conveys some of the spirit of
case findings: A-5
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In Boston, Rev. Virgil Wood; a resident of the city's Roxbury
area, told of the difficulty one Negro family had in getting
police to respond to a call for assistance:
One family had called the police because of an incident
in the area. They waited 10 minutes, 15 minutes, 20
minutes and there was no response. Then someone was
smart enough to think of calling the police, saying
"Get out here quick, there is a Negro beating up a
white man." The police were there in two minutes.
One good picture is worth a thousand words; similarly, one good case says
more than many, many responses. This illustration communicates a tremendous
amount of information, because it provides its own thought model, to be used
in conjunction with other things we know. This instance is statistically invalid:
we don't even know if the police were actually arriving in response to the first
call, but the inherent logic of the situation suggests a "reasonable" explanation
that is hard to refute. Note how much more effective this is than an expensive
study, conducted over months, plotting the median response time of the police
to calls from various areas in the city, analyzing the correlations of these times
with socio-economic characteristics of the respective areas. And how powerful
would these findings be, if stated in properly scientific language?
Some of the advantages and drawbacks of case studies are clearly suggested
by this instance. A good case is seldom ambiguous in what it suggests, but
detractors can always point to the insignificance of one instance, an "n=l.
The more bounded a case, the simpler it is to communicate to the reader the
inherent logic of the system. Erwin Goffman (3) has investigated isolated social
systems such as prep schools, prisons, and asylums. In these cases, he presents
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convincing evidence that such systems shape the behavior of each individual,
whose behavioral responses simply reflect the systemic constraints. Since all
the factors determining behavior appear to be included in the bounded system,
we are prone to accept Goffman's conclusions about his institutions. Whether we
infer from them to other, less bounded systems, is left up to us, but he has made
such a persuasive case that individual behavior reflects systemic constraints that
we are inclined to assume this may occur outside the bounded systems he
describes as well.
Oscar Lewis has developed a technique of describing a way of life through
case studies of individuals. Although the bounds of the cultural systems he
describes are much more difficult to identify, through masses of fascinating
intricate detail, he implies the existence of a system no less constraining to
individual behavior than Goffman's Asylums. The chance reader, skimming through
The Children of Sanchez, may judge on his own preconceptions, wondering why
Manuel doesn't pull himself together, stop toying with Garciela, knuckle down
to work, and bring up his children properly. But this is missing the whole point
of Lewis' method. The more careful reader is expected to put his own value
structure or colored glasses aside, to "hear it like it is" from the Children of
Sanchez. Assembled before the reader is a logical coherent picture, multi-dimensional
in its Rashomon-effect, which suggests how the system, as perceived by each, shapes
his behavior. Taken instance by instance, the actions could be viewed as
fortuitous; but altogether they form a whole, in the same way that Zetterberg has
suggested systems.of theory be fitted together. A-7
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Those who have only scanned Lewis' books or read the reviews argued
"whether there really is a culture of poverty," but the careful reader finds
himself frequently challenged by Lewis' evidence as the stereotypes in his
own mind about poverty are being rebuilt. But how can one generalize from
a particular case? A case is presented with a wealth:of detail, covering many
different dimensions. Surveys on the other hand are restricted to very few
dimensions or "assumed independent variables. " An in-between solution
consists of comparative. cases, which are arrayed along one or several significant
dimensions, to examine which of the possible inferences from the single case study
hold across a range of instances. As resources allow, cases can explore more than
one dimension, but the effort rapidly mushrooms if the level of specificity suitable
to case studies is maintained. The researcher makes trade-offs of specificity
against breadth.
The Systems Approach
To this point we have briefly discussed some conventional instruments
in social science research. But it is useful to see them in a broader context. Other
fields have concurrently developed other approaches -- among them input-output
models, servo-mechanism theory, as well as the concepts of positive and negative
feedback and benefit cost analysis. These can be amalgamated into a theory of
systems, fitting Zetterberg's outline. Such a theory of systems embraces a whole
approach of analysis, rather than merely the instruments to be used in the approach.
It strives to provide both overview and focus, by simultaneously building and testing
theory in ways that surveys and cases by themselves do not. A-8
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Thinking in systems terms is very much in vogue, yet in spite of frequent
avowals by "would be" practitioners, clear focus of it is seldom encountered.
Weber, Durkheim, Michel, and more recently Goffman, 0. Lewis and Ashby( 5
offer good illustrations-of its productiveness in generating new insights. As a
conceptual approach, it appears both simple and alien to most minds. Witness
how easy it is to fault decisionmakers -- Johnson, Nixon, college presidents,
mayors, students -- for not doing what we think they should, or what we, in their
place, think we could have done. Similarly, witness our anti-poverty strategies
that have set out to change those people tangled in a "culture of poverty." It
seems easier to think of "people change" than "process change" which can only
be grasped by viewing a given situation in systems terms. Seldom do we pause
to consider how the erratic behavior of these people may be determined by systems -
that their behavior is data to us, that this behavior reflects and is shaped in response
to perceived opportunities and constraints systematically determined.
(6)
Goffman, in his study of Asylums, developed this analytical approach in
describing a bounded, homeostatic system, bent on its own survival. Weber and
Michel support the view that homeostasis and survival quest may be much more
universal, to be found in less bounded systems as well. If we make the assumption
that organizations strive to survive, and beyond that to maximize their attainment of
ends meaningful to them, then their behavior is information to us. Monitoring their
actions will give us insight into how the system looks from their point of view.
One of the principal impediments to developing a systems understanding of
housing is that the system includes all of us. Goffman's task was relatively easy, A-9
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since he could examine his closed systems as an outsider, simply identifying the entry
point of other influences. But if we accept his tentative hypothesis and invert it,
we can let the behavior of each and every actor group in housing tell us the
constraints each actor perceived. This approach will lead us to insights and
inferences which can then be checked out, both against reality, and for internal
coherence. If we can develop it, we have a powerful tool for examining systems
that contain us within their bounds. This exploration follows the guidelines set by
Zetterberg.
The Nature of Systems
To examine any system, one must identify its bounds and set up frames
of reference. This is particularly difficult in systems that include us since our roles
are multiple and changing, with respective shifts in viewpoint. At times every man
thinks of himself as outside the system, dreaming of comprehensively orchestrating a
rational order; at other times he sees himself within, as "change agent" working for
"basic change," whatever that is. Particularly the professional planner (although
every man is to some extent a planner) is quite a chameleon regarding his present
role in "the system.
Heraclitus, ages ago, perceived the constancy of change. Although he talked
of stepping into a river, it is more appropriate to think of change as that river;
subsystems can move with it, ahead of it, or against it. Given the constantly
shifting relationships between the parts of the whole, the sub-systems are continually A-i
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called upon to respond adaptively in order to survive. They need monitors
of the interacting affects of different elements within the system, and with
its surroundings.
In the past, when change was less apparent, planners were called upon to
fix the over-all design, comprehensively taking all elements into account. It
was assumed that the entry points of change could be controlled, its effects
foreseen, and the flow of change channeled. But recently, the figure-ground
relationship seems to have reversed, and change is omnipresent, and we are
upon rafts of systems within it, attempting to monitor our progress against
various frames of reference. Social science research techniques are in this kit
of monitoring instruments -- our lodestone and astrolabe, so to speak.
Identifying Subsystems
To do this monitoring, a number of disciplines have attempted to impose
rationality on the system, to aid in identifying its components.. One of the most
powerful analytical tools is the dendritic model:
Fig. A.2. The Dendritic Model
A level
B
A-l1
C
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This abstraction is frequently viewed as mapping the sequential decision
process over time, or alternatively, diagramming the functional interrelationships
among hierarchically ordered decision-making entities. While useful in
describing phenomena from Darwinian evolution, to military organizations,
note that the tree does not account for the spillover effects of decisions at one
node upon others upstream, or outside the linkage.
The dendritic model is a convenient abstraction, leading to insights by
examining its "fit" when applied to inadequately understood phenomena. It is
most suitable to phenomena manifesting irreversibility or one-way influence
patterns, which is merely a broad subset of all phenomena.
A close look at the city reveals that in too many ways it is not a simple
hierarchical tree, it is not part of the subset of dendritic systems. C. Alexander's
article, "The City is not a Tree," suggests that a lattice is a more apt description.
There are cross-ties between subsystems, and ordering onto levels can onJy be
done inconclusively -- there may even be circular linkages: X controls Y controls
Z, which in turn controls XI
Hierarchical systems are presumed to have goals that can be defined -- all
points within the system are working toward a common goal. Strategies to attain
such goals could probably be objectively determined. But assuming that any system
has a common goal may be a dangerous over-simplification.
Consider Marris and Rein's Di lemmas of Social Reform, wherein the authors
make the assumption that the goal of reducing juvenile delinquency was commonly
A-12
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shared. As described in their chapter on research, the program implementers
anticipated unambiguous evidence of the efficacy of certain approaches, and
that the system's over-all commitment to the goal would not permit backsliding
once the route of attaining.this goal was clearly demonstrated. Instead, the
system swallowed the efforts almost without trace. In explanation, Marris and
Rein describe the goals actually pursued as more immediate, more homeostatic
and survival-oriented. They suggest that better information and communication
would facilitate attaining the more distant goal, but this may be a fallacy that
arises from assuming that the system is primarily dendritic.
- Accepting the concept of systems with lattic linkages (but not circular),
introduces enough complexity to let the ultimate goals sink to low priority or
out of sight completely. C , C 3 , C4 , 5' C6 may find themselves serving
B2 as a commonly acceptable end, instead of clarifying whether they pursue
AI or A2 .
Fig. A.3. Lattic System (Partial Glimpse)
A level
B
C c6 c, C rzc
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In this study AI might be upgrade neighborhoods, A2 might be assist low
income households, and B2 would be concentrate on standard housing.
Mutually independent branches find themselves at cross-purposes at the
juncture points. Possibilities of competitive games between branches of the
system arise: selective perception and selective communication between decision
points becomes dominant. Staffing the various positions with human actors, we
find each has a differing scope of awareness. Some accept the hierarchy implicit
in the dendritic model and do not look outside it; others are aware of impinging
elements from outside, or more ultimate consequences of decisions reached. To
retain his influence, the actor at B2 , a local FHA director, may project very
different images to each of the others interlinked with him.
Concurrent with the increased complexity, advocates and seekers of shortcuts
have arisen. In short, planners have developed new roles for themselves, beyond
their historic task of fixing the overall design in light of "the public interest.
They have become engaged in the system. The advocates lobby for the under-
represented; the shortcutters try to save time by shortcircuiting links in the
cumbersome system. (7)
The simple dichotomy of working within or outside the system (or the
Establishment), becomes more elaborate: it is a question of bounds of the system
within which one is working. In the hierarchical model (Fig. A.2.) B 's system
2
covers C3 , 4, C5 , and these are all part of A, 's system -- the bounds are easy
to identify. In the Lattice system (Fig. 2), the system impinging onA3 is more A-14
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difficult to isolate. It is perhaps useful to consider the levels as occurring on
layers of an onion. Operating as an outsider would be equivalent to B 's
2
influence over everything at the C Layer, and acting within the system would
be analogous to layers outside as well as inside B. But this model, too, is a
conceptual simplification, that still does not include circular situations, where
X controls Y, controls Z, which in turn controls X.
Perhaps this has sufficiently muddied the waters surrounding these systems.
Postulating their dendritic nature is only a crude first approximation, frequently
of debatable utility, and treacherous if accepted without question. But, what
alternatives are there?
Patterns of communication between parts of the system can be revealing.
The bounds and interfaces between parts of the system become increasingly
importantib know. In The Communication-Based Theory of Growth, Meier sketches
a fascinating study that offers promise in examining these urban processes. If the
necessary vocabulary could be developed, and sufficient time, access, and
resources were available, then monitoring the rates and states of communication
between the parts of the system would be illuminating.
A short-cut first approach to this proposed monumental undertaking of Meier's,
is to monitor behavior, to follow the maxim, "actions speak louder than words.
As already suggested at several points above, specific actions and behavior offer
clues as to the nature of the system as perceived by the participants in the action.
When a Nixon President, or a Mayor.White, or anybody acts, it is productive to A-15
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consider their actions as those of a rational, average being, responding to forces
that he feels upon himself -- and certainly it is more productive than merely to
fault each for behaving otherwise than we'd expect. For in that very difference
lie the clues that yield tentative insights into the nature of the system.
Actions do speak louder than words. Pronouncements and verbiage are
frequently just a screen that has been deliberately erected to shield us from the
action to which we should be listening. The screen is deliberate because in the
lattice-system, an actor of B needs protection in order to survive in the present
2
system which confronts him with conflicting goals. For us identifying what occurs
behind the screen is vital to understanding the systems interlinkages.
Two Types of Social Research Information
(8)Weiss and Peattie have indicated that social research deals in
two classes of information. On the one hand there is contextual, or. "hired hand"
in formation, which consists of the kind of data properly found in the public records;
on the other is a more closely guarded form of information. This latter type is "vital"
in the awareness of systems. It involves knowledge of intervention points, spillovers,
and implicit linkages, which are normally kept under cover. This "vital"
information is carefully transacted as a form of power. However, the alert observer
can discover it by probes and by observing the system responses. This probing and
monitoring can either be specifically arranged, or conceptually imposed upon the
real world. Bearing systems concepts in mind, a tremendous amount can even be
learned from daily newspapers. A-16
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If vital information is so useful, why can't we specify it and get it?
Precisely because it is a form of power in the systems that include us - and
this power brings with it the potential of altering and changing systems within
whose bounds we are located.
If we return to the dendritic system (Fig. A.2.), and consider evaluating
the nature of the system under B we can easily recognize that B2 is interested22
in evaluating C3, C4 and C5. However, B will strive to influence any35" 2
evaluation of itself, as it does not wish to have itself compared unfavorably
to B1 or B - such findings would be confidentially handled at the A level.
Findings about each level are not threatening to the level above it. However,
they may have life or death consequences to others at that level, who. will
therefore strive to influence the evaluation, only furnishing information selectively
if possible. The "vital" information is kept and transacted behind the screen of
verbiage, which actors within the system jointly find convenient to erect and
.. (9).maintain.
This outlines the problems inherent in examining a system from within, but
it also suggests useful strategies for exploring it. In the dendritic model, while
A holds life or death power over the existence of the B's, all the B's have a common
interest in understanding A as completely as possible, so each can strive to meet the
demands of A1 . The B's are in a form of competition, and are actively transacting
information on a quid pro quo basis among one another. In these transactions,
they are willing to include any peer who is non-threatening to them, and who can A-17
offer fresh insights about the nature of A. Each will bargain in information
as long as the returns to him in the form of more vital data, exceed the costs.
Any bargainer is welcome in this market-place if he is prepared to offer fair
information, and will stick to the implicit rules, which provide that anything
exchanged be used for purposes non-threatening to the seller. If he transgresses
these, he is summarily ostracized. Any interviewer can play this role, trading
quid pro quo.
The interviewer wishing to make his information general or public, faces
a special problem. The trading of information bits has been highly specific,
dealing in aspects of the subsystem surrounding only. the common interest of the
B's. Before making it public, he must transform his bits in ways non-threatening
to his informants, again shielding them. If he errs in this, his sources dry up
and he is ostracized.
Methodology Used in This Thesis
At this juncture it becomes useful to bring together the reasons for
examining comparative cases of housing rehabilitation. Our objective is to
increase our understanding of the inner city housing production system for low
income users. This is a system that includes us within its bounds. If the researchers
are within a system, a different repertoire of research strategies is called for, than
when systems are being probed from the outside. The contextual, or "hired hand"
information is essential as background but the clues that offer insight into the
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system and ways of changing it are "vital" information. Vacancy rates, dweller
attitudes, analyses of the housing stock and user populations and the like are blunt
instruments in probing for processes and causal factors.
Instead, the principal task here has been to seek out "vital" information, by
bargaining for it with the actors engaged in the process. The choice of small
cases in seeking vital information arises out of several reasons:
- Small cases can more easily be grasped in their entirety, and seen
from several points of view.
- Access to key individuals is easier for the researcher, since he
can rapidly master enough of the situation to offer relevant
information on a quid pro- quo basis.
- Since the cases are out of the limelight, more trial and error, and more
innovation are possible than in larger scale operations.
Scale is an extremely important factor, however. What may hold across a
range of instances in the small scale may not be possible at a larger scale;
similarly, larger efforts clearly have possibilities out of reach at the small scale.
This thesis is exploring and testing ways of gaining insights into process, not answers.
The reason for investigating small cases lies in their accessibility and the opportunity
to gain a sufficient overview over few enough actors to obtain "vital" information.
The approach of analysis assumes that monitoring an on-going process reveals a
series of actions which reflect the constraints perceived by each participant as he
attempts to better his lot. By inference, the linkages of the housing system
surrounding that point are illuminated. A-19
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Each interview was designed to explore why. the actor is doing what he does
-- asking, in effect, what's in it for him. To trade information, as a peer, there
was a conscious'effort to pay for information by other information, useful to him.
Inevitably, confidential information was involved -- the sort found in "read and
destroy memos." This presents the researcher with a dilemma. He must protect
his sources and cannot offer such information as evidence -- yet as he abstracts
it, the persuasiveness is lost, and statements and inferences remain as mere
assertions.
The choice is clear: stick to those assertions that can be documented, or
attempt to go further, hoping the reader will tolerate some assertions if they can
be joined in Zetterberg's manner into a model that attains self-sustaining
coherence. This thesis chooses the latter approach in hope that the reader will bear
with us through the effort.
A-20
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APPENDIX - FOOTNOTES
1. Rainwater and Yancey, The Moynihan Report and the Politics of
Controversy.
2. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, ~A Time to Listen . . . A Time to
Act, p. 24.
3. Ervin Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other inmates.
4. Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez. See also Elliot Liebow,
Tally's Corner for a similar study in our society.
5. Weber, Durkheim and Michel are part of classical sociology; Ervin Goffman
and Oscar Lewis have been footnoted above. See also, W. Ross Ashby, Design for a
Brain.
6. Goffman, op. cit.
7. Moynihan was attempting this role. In this thesis, the role and
report of Urban Planning Aid, Ind. in evaluating the Boston Rehabilitation
Program demonstrates how advocates attempt to manipulate the system.
8. Robert Weiss and Lisa R. Peattie develop this distinction in their MIT
sociology seminars.
9. James M. Beshers, in his sociology seminars at MIT enjoyed showing
students what was going on behind the "screen" of rhetoric. Urban Social Structure,
chapter VII, in the discussion of the one way visibility of status symbols, furnishes
a drier exposition of the nature of screens.
10. E. Banfield is master at this technique of research, but others, like
Martin Rein also practice it.
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